Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries Report of a workshop held in Perth, 24-25 March 2003 by Anonymous
i
 
Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries
Edited by Ray Trewin
ACIAR Technical Report No. 53
(printed version published in 2004)
 
Cooperatives: Issues and 
trends in developing countries
 









Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries
Edited by Ray Trewin
ACIAR Technical Report No. 53
(printed version published in 2004)
 
The Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) was established
in June 1982 by an Act of the Australian Parliament. Its mandate is to help identify
agricultural problems in developing countries and to commission collaborative research
between Australian and developing country researchers in ﬁelds where Australia has a
special research competence.
Where trade names are used this constitutes neither endorsement of nor
discrimination against any product by the Centre.
© Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, GPO Box 1571, 
Canberra, ACT 2601
R. Trewin (ed.) 2004. 
Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries: Report of a workshop, held in
Perth, 24–25 March 2003. 
ACIAR Technical Report No. 53.
ISBN 1 86320 401 6 (printed)
1 86320 402 4 (electronic)
Technical editing: Robin Taylor
Cover design: Design One Solutions, Hall, ACT
Typesetting and layout: Sun Photoset Pty Ltd, Brisbane, Australia
Printed by: Pirion Pty Ltd, Canberra
ACIAR TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES
This series of publications contains technical information resulting
from ACIAR-supported programs, projects and workshops (for which
proceedings are not published), reports on Centre-supported fact-
ﬁnding studies, or reports on other topics resulting from ACIAR activ-
ities. Publications in the series are distributed internationally to
selected individuals and scientiﬁc institutions and are also available
from ACIAR’s website www.aciar.gov.au. 
iii
 
Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries
Edited by Ray Trewin
ACIAR Technical Report No. 53


















John O’Connor, Industry Management Services
 




Zhang-Yue Zhou, Asian Agribusiness Research Centre, The University of Sydney
 




David Harris, freelance economist
 




K.V. Raju, Institute of Rural Management, Anand
 










Peter Batt, Curtin University
 




Phillip Simmons, University of New England
 




R. Oktaviani, Department of Socio-Economics, Faculty of Agriculture, Bogor Agricultural University
 




D.S. Damardjati, Indonesian Agency for Agricultural Research Development 
v
 
Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries
Edited by Ray Trewin
ACIAR Technical Report No. 53




This report is the outcome of a workshop held in Perth in early 2003.
A number of developing countries have shown interest in cooperatives as a way for
smallholders to obtain some market power, especially where old institutions have disap-
peared or are losing their relevance. Cooperatives have a long history in developed
countries and have evolved to changing market environments.
The purpose of the workshop was to cover the broad range of issues and trends asso-
ciated with cooperatives, drawing on relevant experiences of developing and developed
countries.
ACIAR is publishing this report so that a wider audience, both in developing coun-
tries and in Australia, is aware of the issues associated with cooperatives. The report is
also available to download from our website: www.aciar.gov.au.
It is hoped that some research partnerships may evolve from this work, as has been
the case with similar ‘issues’ workshops, such as one on water policy.
ACIAR has a supported a number of research projects covering cooperatives defined
broadly. The Agricultural Development Policy Program, which funded this workshop,
has projects on microfinance, contract farming and marketing institutions, some of
which were represented at the workshop. The issues are relevant to other programs and
researchers from ACIAR’s Agricultural Systems Economics and Management Program
were also involved in the workshop.
This publication is number 53 in ACIAR’s technical report series. More information
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 in one form or another began
centuries ago. In the Macquarie Dictionary, the
definition of a cooperative is a ‘business owned and
controlled by members, and formed to provide them
with work or goods at advantageous prices’. The
range of ‘businesses’ now considered as ‘coopera-
tives’ is broader than this definition as will be
evident from the papers in this proceedings. Exam-
ples of such ‘businesses’ include Indonesian contract
farmers who own and control their farming business
but negotiate their contracts as a ‘cooperative’ group.
Another example is state trading enterprises (STEs)
which, as suggested, are state-owned but can be
controlled by farmers as a group through legislative
requirements such as the election of farmers on
controlling boards, both at the Federal and State
level (BAE, 1983; 1985). Some of China’s past
approaches to organising the agricultural sector, such
as collective farms, are considered by some as a
cooperative approach.
What are some of the inherent common character-
istics of cooperatives broadly defined? Ownership
and control are obviously common characteristics
but the level of democracy has become a key issue in
the development of cooperatives. Providing work or
goods at advantageous prices is another potential
common characteristic. This aspect may relate to
labour and other input supplies such as finance,
product consolidation, processing and marketing.
Counteracting perceived market power being held
by employers, input suppliers like financiers,
middlemen, buyers, and marketers is one of the key
rationales for the existence of cooperatives. Another
common characteristic is that, at some stage in their
development, cooperatives may require legislative
support for such actions as retaining control or pro-
viding goods at advantageous prices. 
The development of the inherent characteristics of
cooperatives over time suggests that they have not
been a static concept but that trends have become
apparent. Cooperatives emerged as early as the
1820s, if not before, and flourished in the 1830s
along with the industrial revolution, with consumer
cooperatives starting in 1844. Generally, members
had one vote in the early cooperatives regardless
of the level of capital investment. As these early
cooperatives grew in size the level of membership
involvement declined. Recent trends are reflected in
the situation of ‘new cooperatives’ where members
have greater ability to accumulate and withdraw their
capital, as well as stronger governance. Another
trend in developed countries is that where there has
been an increase in reliance on competitive markets
through domestic reforms and globalisation,
surviving cooperatives are having to rely less on
legislation providing protection/assistance and are
becoming more commercial (eg Bonlac).
Legislative support for cooperatives may have
been appropriate in the past, given developing mar-
kets and market failures, but agricultural-related
markets have developed dramatically over time with
forces for change like globalisation, competition
policy, liberalisation and privatisation. Long-
established institutions in Australia, such as mar-
keting boards, that have the characteristics of
cooperatives, have been identified by processors as
possible constraints to the development of down-
stream industries where future growth and trade
reside (ABARE, 1987). There has also been a
domestic issue concerning these boards ‘crowding
out’ private enterprise activities. These institutions,
especially those with single desk powers, have also
been targeted by overseas traders as impediments to
open trade and liable to disputes involving the WTO.
Other countries with current high government subsi-
dies to farmers see such boards as a new opportunity
to assist farmers in a more WTO-legal way
(APSEM, 2001). Where cooperatives have not
become more market-oriented, financial pressures
imposed by the amount of assistance required for
them to survive in a non-market form is putting pres-
sure on their continued existence as such. This is
more the case in federal systems with decentralisa-
tion where states often have to pick up such costs
with insufficient funding. Financial pressures are
also evident where cooperatives have moved beyond
their initial purpose, such as the Nokyos in Japan
which undertake peripheral activities like retailing, 
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travel, banking and transport, much of which are not
commercial and only survive through government
support. These cooperatives have become political
organisations heavily aligned with the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party, implementing government poli-
cies, for example on rice acreage control. These
apparent agricultural institutions are under most
pressure for reform from factors outside agriculture,
such as financial liberalisation (RIRDC 2003).
Despite a high failure rate amongst cooperatives,
they have remained attractive to some groups. Why
is this so? Is it a continued belief that farmers face
unfair market power in their dealings? Are these
concerns still relevant given developments in compe-
tition policy in many countries and increasing glo-
balisation? Do new forms of cooperatives overcome
many of the problems of old forms of cooperatives in
the new economic environment? Are ‘cooperatives’
established for individual farmer benefits or broader
sectoral political interests? Has new technology been
a positive (leading to more concentrated market
power) or a negative for cooperatives? These are just
a few of the issues that need to be considered at this
workshop.
A regular question that was asked leading up to
this workshop was “How did its structure and deci-
sions about who would participate evolve?” The
initial stimulus for such a workshop was a request
from Indonesia for ACIAR to be involved in collab-
orative agricultural policy research on cooperatives.
A key issue in Indonesia at the time was the need to
fill vacuums in input and output markets created by
the demise of some conglomerates and other institu-
tions as a result of the Asian crisis, with cooperatives
being thought of as possible substitutes. Indonesia
has had cooperatives in the past, such as in the
dairying sector (Erwidodo and Trewin, 1996). At
the same time, other developing countries, such as
transitional economies like Vietnam that had not yet
established non-government institutions in some
markets, had shown interest in collaborative research
on cooperatives. Thus it was decided to run a
broader workshop covering key issues and trends
associated with cooperatives, drawing on relevant
experiences of developing and developed countries
like Australia. 
The broad range of papers included in this report
cover various aspects of the title of the workshop.
A range of specific countries are covered other than
Indonesia and Vietnam, for example, China and
India. These countries are representative of many
other countries with an interest in this area. There are
papers looking at recent trends in a long history of
evolving cooperatives in developed countries that
may show the future for developing countries, for
example the development of ‘new cooperatives’.
This discussion shows the danger of cooperatives not
moving with the times and becoming a constraint on,
rather than a possible catalyst for, development. The
evolution of cooperatives in one country is covered
in a paper on China’s experience with cooperatives.
Another paper describes the experience of Bonlac, a
dairy cooperative in Australia. Dairy cooperatives in
India are facing similar pressures to those faced by
Bonlac and the paper by K.V. Raju analyses this sit-
uation. As mentioned earlier, state trading enter-
prises display many of the characteristics of
cooperatives and a presentation (not published)
looked at these institutions in India in light of WTO
reform pressures. Vietnam is a transitional economy
just coming to terms with the role cooperatives may
play in its agricultural markets. Two papers look at
this issue, one from the perspective of government
interventions. The final papers look at Indonesia’s
situation, one in terms of filling voids in its agri-
business sector, another in terms of a contract
farming approach and a third, prepared by Rina
Oktaviani, on Indonesian cooperatives. As can be
appreciated from this outline, there are many varia-
tions of cooperatives in developing and developed
countries, covering various products and functions,
some successful and some otherwise. The workshop
and this report have attempted to cover as many of
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 have played a major role in the
agricultural industries of all developed countries
and  many developing countries for well over a
century. They have been important in both farm
supply (providing fertiliser and other inputs) and
product marketing (including transport, storage and
processing).
This obvious success has, however, been accom-
panied by frequent failure. Many cooperatives have
been forced into liquidation or merger as a result of
changing conditions in their business environments,
poor business models, bad management or the failure
of members to support them. In other cases, such as
Japanese cooperatives, they have become institution-
alised by government intervention, becoming part of
the system by which farm prices are regulated. In
these circumstances, they are inclined to become
inefficient and uncompetitive, and a burden on both
farmers and the broader economy.
The purpose of this paper is to consider some of
the characteristics that distinguish successful cooper-
atives from unsuccessful ones. It is hoped that, as a
result, workshop participants can, if they become
involved in establishing cooperatives, maximise the
chance that those businesses will succeed. After a
brief discussion about the cooperative as a business,
the paper considers the reasons why farmers (and
others) establish cooperatives. Subsequent sections
are concerned with the definition and nature of
cooperatives, the particular problems encountered by
cooperatives as businesses, and finally, some solu-
tions to those problems.
 
The cooperative as a business
 
Cooperatives in agriculture are first and foremost
businesses. As such they must succeed in the market-
place, competing against other cooperatives, and
businesses established as companies or other entities.
To compete successfully, they must do most of the
things that other businesses do at least as well as
those other businesses.
Take a grain marketing cooperative as an
example. Such an enterprise typically collects grain
from its members, transports, grades, stores, markets
and arranges payments. In order to undertake these
functions, a cooperative seeks to obtain capital at
competitive rates, acquire or lease assets, hire
employees or contractors, manage funds, acquire and
disseminate market information, establish corporate
governance processes, and so on. If it does not do
most of these things at least as well as its competi-
tors, the cooperative will fail.
In other words, while there are often advantages
in establishing a business as a cooperative, the fact
that it is a cooperative does not guarantee success,
even if members have a strong commitment to
making it work. Profits must be made if the coopera-
tive is to sustain its capital base. Members must be
paid a competitive price; they may accept a lower
price for their product for a short period, but cannot
do so for long. Customers must also be offered a
competitive price; they will not pay a higher
price because they are buying from a cooperative.
Successful cooperatives are successful businesses
first, and cooperatives second.
So in establishing a cooperative, farmers should
develop a business plan first. They should agree on
the nature and scope of the business, the sources of
capital, the business strategy and so on. As part of
this process they should consider the corporate struc-
ture, which could be a cooperative, company, associ-
ation or other structure which might be peculiar to
the particular country. The best corporate structure
will often, but not always, be a cooperative structure.
 
Why farmers form cooperatives
 
The design and purpose of every cooperative is
different, so the motives behind their establishment
cannot be simply stated. However, three motivations
are common. The first is to increase bargaining
power. A prominent example is grain farmers in
Australia and the USA in the early 20th century, who
needed to sell their grain to elevators. Elevator 
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companies would obtain grain from large numbers of
farmers so that they could transport and market the
grain in sufficiently large quantities to keep the cost
of providing these services down. Because of the dis-
tances involved, each farmer was able to sell his
grain to only one or few elevators and therefore felt
vulnerable to exploitation by those elevators.
American farmers responded by forming local
cooperatively owned elevators, while the Australians
established a mix of cooperative and statutory organ-
isations to store, transport and market their grain. In
the subsequent decades, however, improvements in
transport, communications and on-farm storage
largely overcame the weakness in grain farmers’
bargaining power, and a wide range of marketing
options became available. For example, it is now
possible for many farmers to send their grain by
truck to one of several elevators or to an end user
(mill or livestock enterprise). In these circumstances
grain farmers have less need to sustain their coopera-
tives and many have ceased trading.
While weaknesses in farmers’ bargaining power
because of storage, transport and communication
issues have declined over time, other sources of
weakness have increased. In particular, in a modern
economy there are more processors that have advan-
tages based on technology or brands that make them
monopoly buyers of certain farm products. An
extreme example of technology-based market power
is the chicken meat industry, where the major com-
panies control the small number of bloodlines that
are capable of producing meat at competitive prices.
Farmer-suppliers have virtually no bargaining power
except through joint action or government regula-
tion. An example of brand-based market power is the
tobacco industry, where virtually all product is sold
through a few dozen brands owned by a small
number of companies. In Australia, cooperatives
have been established by tobacco growers to nego-
tiate sales to the tobacco companies.
Another important factor causing farmers to have
weak bargaining power is the perishability of the
product they produce. The important example is
the dairy industry, where farmers must find a cus-
tomer for their milk every day. A farmer can
typically hold one day’s production on farm, but
must deliver the milk to a processor before the next
day’s milk arrives. In view of this extreme vulnera-
bility, it is not surprising that cooperatives are more
prominent in the dairy industry than any other. And
the prominence of cooperatives has not declined
greatly over time in the dairy industry as it has in
many other industries.
The second common motivation for establishing
cooperatives is the advantages offered by govern-
ments to this form of corporate structure. In many
countries, cooperatives benefit from certain exemp-
tions from competition law. These allow members to
act together in a way that is not permitted for other
businesses. Also in many countries, cooperatives
have privileges in taxation arrangements. Typically,
profits are not required to be taxed before they are
distributed to members. This allows members to
reduce their overall tax burden when the tax rate paid
by the farm enterprise is lower than the corporate tax
rate. Of course this privilege comes at a cost: the
same laws that allow this concession also require
that the cooperative conduct most of its business
with its members. This requirement limits the range
of business models for which a cooperative structure
is suitable.
The third common motivation for establishing
cooperatives has probably become more common in
recent decades. This is that the members consider
that they have the opportunity to pursue a particular
business opportunity through acting together. They
may see an opportunity to develop a business with
lower costs or one producing innovative, value-
added products. Cooperatives of this type are ‘entre-
preneurial’ in nature and generally carry higher risks.
They can succeed only with an innovative business
model. The New Generation Cooperatives, which
are discussed later in this paper, are generally of
this type.
 
The definition and nature of cooperatives
 
The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) is a
grouping of cooperatives from around the world
which is recognised as the collective international
voice of cooperatives. The ICA’s ‘Principles of
Cooperation’ are regarded as the best guide to distin-
guishing a cooperative from other forms of corporate
organisation, although some cooperatives diverge
from the principles in significant ways. These princi-
ples, as amended in 1995, are as follows:
 
1. Voluntary and open membership
 
Cooperatives are voluntary organisations, open to all
persons able to use their services and willing to
accept the responsibilities of membership, without
gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimi-
nation.
 
2. Democratic member control
 
Cooperatives are democratic organisations controlled
by their members, who actively participate in setting
policies and making decisions. Men and women
serving as elected representatives are accountable to
the membership. In primary cooperatives, members
have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and 
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cooperatives at other levels are organised in a demo-
cratic manner.
 
3. Member economic participation
 
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically
control, the capital of their cooperative. At least part
of that capital is usually the common property of the
cooperative. They usually receive limited compensa-
tion, if any, for capital subscribed as a condition of
membership. Members allocate surpluses for any or
all of the following purposes: developing the cooper-
ative, possibly by setting up reserves, part of which
at least would be indivisible; benefiting members in
proportion to their transactions with the cooperative
and supporting other activities approved by the
membership.
 
4. Autonomy and independence
 
Cooperatives are autonomous, self-help organisa-
tions controlled by their members. If they enter into
agreements with other organisations, including gov-
ernments, or raise capital from external sources, they
do so on terms that ensure democratic control by
their members and maintain their cooperative
autonomy.
 
5. Education, training and information
 
Cooperatives provide education and training for their
members, elected representatives, managers and
employees so they can contribute effectively to the
development of their cooperatives. They inform the
general public, particularly young people and
opinion leaders, about the nature and benefits of
cooperation.
 
6. Cooperation among cooperatives
 
Cooperatives service their members most effectively
and strengthen the cooperative movement by
working through local, national, regional and inter-
national structures.
 
7. Concern for community
 
Cooperatives work for the sustainable development






The important aspects of the principles have
remained consistent for a century. In particular, the
principles relating to cooperative structures have not
changed significantly. These are the first three prin-
ciples specifying openness, democratic control, and
the source and management of capital. Cooperatives
that adopt these principles differ significantly from
public limited liability companies. Greenwood





The characteristics that distinguish traditional














In proportion to patronage
Earnings, if distributed to members, are 
excluded from corporate taxable income
In proportion to stock holdings





Most earnings allocated to individual 
patrons
Earnings that are not allocated to indi-
vidual patrons are included in corporate 
taxable income
Earnings not allocated to individual 
owners
Dividends paid out to shareholders 





No mechanism for individual equity 
appreciation





Directors from similar backgrounds and 
relatively homogeneous
Directors from a diverse range of back-




Generally close to the board Generally remote, though large 
shareholders are showing increasing 




Measures of effectiveness and appointment 
of appropriate individuals seen as more 
difficult
Generally easier for the board to take 
action and improve its performance by 




Difficult to measure Easier to measure 
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but are also the source of some of
their weaknesses. These weaknesses are widely
recognised, and have been summarised under five
headings by Cook (1995).
 
The common property or free rider problem
 
Free riders are cooperative members who make use
of the capital of the cooperative by supplying pro-
duce, but without contributing their full share of that
capital. These are generally new or near-new mem-
bers, who benefit from the open membership and
capital management principles (ICA Principles 1
and 3). The free riders receive the same price for
their produce as long-standing members and, while
the latter may receive more in dividends paid on
shares held, this form of member benefit is small or
non-existent in a traditional cooperative. The ulti-
mate consequences are that production by free riders
is subsidised, leading to oversupply, and members
are reluctant to provide capital, leading to a shortage
of capital and the inability of the cooperative to




The horizon problem also arises from the manner in
which capital is managed, and also results in a
shortage of capital. Members who plan to be sup-
pliers far into the future will favour continuing
investment at a rate necessary to sustain their
farms and the cooperative. Retiring and dry (non-
supplying) members may resist such investment and
may even seek to withdraw the capital they have
already contributed. The result is inadequate invest-





Farmers become members of a traditional coopera-
tive in order to supply product to it, however they
differ in their preferences for investments with var-
ious levels of risk. The more risk-averse members
want to invest in the cooperative only to the extent
that is necessary to find a market for their produce.
Other members may wish to invest more in the
cooperative so that it can pursue discretionary busi-
ness opportunities. These two groups have different
views about the purpose of the cooperative. This
contrasts with the position of equity investors in
companies, all of whom choose those investments
because they fit their particular risk preferences. The
effect of the portfolio problem is often that the
cooperative adopts a strategy between the two




Corporate governance is more difficult in a coopera-
tive than in a public company for a number of rea-
sons. If the traditional one member-one vote
principle applies, farmers who supply a large volume
of produce and have a major stake in the cooperative
have no more say over its direction than minor sup-
pliers, and even dry shareholders. Second, there is an
absence of the external scrutiny that applies to public
companies from skilled investors, in particular finan-
cial institutions and analysts employed by stock-
brokers, rating agencies and the press. Third,
directors typically have less expertise than directors
of public companies, and may have less incentive to
provide effective governance given that ownership is
very widely spread. The common consequence of the
control problem is less effective oversight by the
owners than applies in public companies, and exces-




There is typically more ‘politics’ in a cooperative
than in a public company and this has a cost in
monetary terms and in terms of poor decision-
making. The problems arise partly from the fact that
members have divergent interests: members differ
according to the size of their farms, the location of
their farms relative to collection/processing sites, and
so on. The most expensive influence cost in agricul-
tural marketing cooperatives often arises when mem-
bers in a certain area want their local facility to
remain in operation when the overall performance of
the cooperative would benefit by its closure. In this
case the influence cost is incurred either as excessive
operating costs if an uneconomic facility remains in
operation, or in time wasted by board and manage-
ment in managing the politics of closure. Influence
costs are generally low in small, narrowly focused




The most successful cooperatives are generally those
that find ways to minimise or avoid these five
problems. Means of overcoming each problem are
discussed below, however there is a common charac-
teristic running through these means. This is what is
sometimes referred to in Australia as the ‘KIS prin-
ciple’, where KIS stands for Keep It Simple.
Cooperatives are best kept simple because of their
membership-based nature. Members must agree on
how the cooperative is structured and operated, and
the more complex the business, the more scope there
is for disagreement between members. Disagree-
ments between members can be disastrous because it 
7
 
Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries
Edited by Ray Trewin
ACIAR Technical Report No. 53
(printed version published in 2004)
 
is not sufficient for issues to be resolved just by
majority vote. Although a majority vote is a demo-
cratic and legitimate process, those who find them-
selves in the minority may leave the cooperative,
possibly threatening its viability. So important deci-
sions must be accepted by virtually all members, not
just the majority.
Some solutions to the specific problems listed in
the previous section are as follows.
 
The common property or free rider problem
 
The common property problem is best managed by
minimising the extent to which the capital of the
cooperative is held as common property. The ulti-
mate expression of this type of capital structure is the
so-called New Generation Cooperatives (NGCs).
NGCs became prominent in the USA in the 1990s
but their structure has been widely adopted else-
where. NGCs strictly tie capital provision to delivery
rights, so that members contribute capital in propor-
tion to the amount of product they must deliver to
the cooperative. New members must buy delivery
rights (shares) from existing members and members
wishing to cease supplying product must sell their
delivery rights. The result is that members benefit
directly and proportionately from their investment,
so are likely to be willing to provide capital when a
business opportunity appears.
There are no obstacles to new cooperatives being
established with a capital structure of this type, how-
ever it is more difficult for existing cooperatives to
do so. Typically, existing cooperatives already have
a substantial amount of unallocated capital, and
members delivering amounts of product which are
unrelated to their shareholdings. In such circum-
stances, many cooperatives seek to move towards an
NGC-type structure by gradually buying out ‘dry’
shareholders, by requiring capital contributions from
new members, and by increasing the dividends paid
to shareholders. This is often a difficult and slow




The horizon problem can also be alleviated by
adopting a NGC-type capital structure. Because
under this structure shares are freely tradeable at
market prices, even those members who do not
intend to remain members far into the future can
benefit from new investments if these investments





Like the common property and horizon problems,
the portfolio problem relates to the capital structure
of the cooperative and its ability to raise capital from
members. However, compared to the first two prob-
lems, which can be largely overcome by establishing
an appropriate capital structure, the portfolio
problem is less easily solved. It reflects very dif-
ferent views among members about what the cooper-
ative is all about.
At one end of the spectrum, there may be mem-
bers who see the cooperative simply as a way to
increase their bargaining power. Such members will
favour confining the cooperative’s activities to the
minimum necessary to achieve that objective. This
minimum level of activity might involve the cooper-
ative in negotiating prices with a buyer or buyers,
without itself taking delivery of the product.
At the other end of the spectrum, there may be
members who see the cooperative as an opportunity
for members to capture downstream margins which
are currently captured by distributors, manufacturers,
wholesalers or retailers. However, these margins can
generally be captured only with a higher level of
(and more risky) investment by members.
Many cooperatives seek to bridge this difference
between members by separating the funding of the
cooperative into two parts. The close-to-farm activi-
ties that all members consider to be necessary are
funded by all members on an equitable basis, and the
later-stage ‘value adding’ is funded by other sources
of capital. These other sources may be those mem-
bers who choose to participate, or external investors.
Sometimes joint ventures with private companies are
used as a means of accessing outside capital. Such
arrangements are common enough, and often
succeed at least for a period, but in solving the port-





As indicated earlier, a number of characteristics of
cooperatives make corporate governance difficult,
relative to other corporate structures. Having two
sets of members/shareholders to overcome the port-
folio problem greatly complicates this task. The two
businesses are likely to be competing for capital and
management time, and in conflict over the terms
under which one sells product to the other. The
problem is best overcome by maintaining an arms-
length separation between the businesses.
Other aspects of the control problem are more
easily alleviated. The problems arising from the one
member-one vote basis of governance can be over-
come by modifying the traditional principles of the
cooperative movement and establishing a voting
regime based on shareholding (where capital is 
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allocated to members) or delivery rights. This
practice is widely adopted.
The absence of external scrutiny can be partly
overcome by bringing in outside expertise, and
reporting the information obtained to members. An
example of this is the shareholder council established
by the Fonterra Cooperative Group, a major dairy
processor in New Zealand. This council has the
power to appoint expert advisers and to report to
members on the views of those advisers.
The final aspect of the control problem, the rela-
tive lack of expertise on cooperative boards, is often
at least partly overcome by the introduction of non-
member directors with relevant expertise. This
option is attractive to larger cooperatives which can
afford to pay a sufficient salary to attract people with
the desired skills. Another option, which is very
widely adopted by cooperatives of all sizes, is to pro-




Influence costs are generally highest for older
cooperatives, in particular when they have been
formed by amalgamation of a number of smaller
cooperatives. Such amalgamations often occur
because the scale of operations of the smaller
cooperatives is too small, and consolidation into
fewer, larger plants is necessary if the businesses are
to remain viable. There will be winners and losers
among members in such change, and the losers are
sure to resist. There are no easy solutions in these
circumstances and strong leadership is required to
manage the necessary change.
In new cooperatives, differences between mem-
bers have typically been resolved prior to establish-
ment, so influence costs are relatively low for a
period. Also, new cooperatives typically start on
a small scale with fewer members to disagree and





These means of avoiding the common problems of
cooperatives all lend support to the KIS principal.
Keeping the capital structure simple and equitable
minimises the risk of conflict between members.
Keeping the business simple reduces conflict
between those members wanting basic services and
those wanting to add value. The value-adders may be
frustrated, but they may have other ways of investing
in downstream businesses. Keeping the business
simple also reduces control problems. The NGCs
have been notably successful on control issues, and
this is generally regarded to be at least partly because
they are generally highly focused and narrowly
defined businesses.
Keeping it simple is, in any case, a good starting
point for any new business. Growth and complexity
can always be added later. So it is important for
those establishing cooperatives to have a clear idea
of their purpose and to focus on that. If, as is
frequently the case for farm cooperatives, the pri-
mary purpose is to increase the farmers’ bargaining
power, then the cooperative needs only undertake
those activities that are essential to that purpose.
Thus, it may need to take delivery of the product and
store it in one or a few places but having done that, it
has the opportunity to negotiate sales to processors
or other customers.
In this way, a cooperative can minimise the
requirement for its members to contribute capital,
and minimise the risk of the investment. At the same
time, the benefits in terms of improved bargaining
power, may be just as great as if the cooperative had
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of Agricultural Economics 77, 1153–1159.
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Corporation: Melbourne.9
 
Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries
Edited by Ray Trewin
ACIAR Technical Report No. 53
(printed version published in 2004)
 














 cooperatives have been an important
way for farmers to organise themselves. The agricul-
tural community has usually been characterised as
geographically scattered, which, in turn, results in
the community being disorganised, lacking negotia-
tion power in the market, and lacking a voice in
society. Various types of agricultural cooperatives,
when properly used and organised, can help the agri-
cultural community to avoid or reduce the above
weaknesses. 
In China, as in many other countries, agricultural
cooperatives have been used as a way of organising
farmers. They were strongly favoured in the mid
1950s and this led to the establishment of tens of
thousands of agricultural cooperatives across the
country by 1957. Areas of cooperation were chiefly
in agricultural production but also in rural supply
and marketing, and agricultural credit. This massive
movement of agricultural cooperatives soon evolved
into the people’s commune movement. As a result,
agricultural production cooperatives were soon
replaced by agricultural collective farming in the
form of ‘production teams’ at the grass roots level,
‘production brigades’ in the middle, and ‘people’s
communes’as the highest level of rural administra-
tive organisation. 
The people’s commune system was gradually
dissolved as a consequence of China’s economic
reforms that started in late 1978. Individual rural
households regained their autonomy to carry out
production activities. While the marketing of some
of their produce was still subject to government
quotas in the earlier years of the reforms (especially
in the case of grains and cotton), over the past two
decades government control over farmers’ disposal
of their products has been significantly reduced.
How have small individual Chinese rural households
coped with the extremely small scale of production
and the markets that have become increasingly com-
petitive and also open to the rest of the world? Have
they cooperated among themselves to increase their
production ability or their negotiation power in the
market and, if so, how? To answer these questions, it
is interesting and useful to look into China’s experi-
ence with agricultural cooperatives since the eco-
nomic reforms. China’s experience may also bring
useful revelations to other developing or transitional
economies.
In the next section, we briefly look back at what
happened with China’s agricultural cooperatives
before 1978. The following section focuses on what
has happened with agricultural cooperatives in China
since its economic reforms in the late 1970s. It high-
lights the reasons for the development of agricultural
cooperatives; areas, depth, and scope of cooperation;
and reasons for development or lack of development
in different regions. We then evaluate the develop-
ment of China’s agricultural cooperatives in the era
of economic reforms, highlighting experiences and
lessons from these cooperatives. This is followed by
a discussion of the likely development of China's
agricultural cooperatives in the future and some con-
cluding comments.
 
China’s agricultural cooperatives movement 
in retrospect
 
Cooperatives started to emerge in rural China as
early as the 1920s under the Kuoming Tang govern-
ment (Pan, 2002). The concept became widely
known in China in the 1950s.
After the Communist Party of China came to
power, the new government soon carried out a
nationwide land reform, which began in late 1950
and was largely accomplished by the end of 1952.
This reform entitled millions of farmers to their own
land and also to some basic production inputs. Many
farmers were full of zeal to work their own land.
However, many rural households lacked capital,
draught animals or some essential large farming
tools and their production activities were limited. 
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Some farmers desired to cooperate among them-
selves and formed mutual aid groups. There were
2.72 and 4.68 million agricultural production
mutual-aid groups in 1950 and 1951, respectively
(Table 1), embracing 11% and 19% of rural house-
holds in the corresponding years.
The government encouraged this and a ‘Resolu-
tion about Mutual Aid and Cooperation in Agricul-
tural Production (Draft)’ was issued in December
1951 (Huang et al., 1992). This led to an immediate
jump in the proportion of households participating in
agricultural production mutual-aid groups, from less
than 20% to almost 40% (Table 2). In February
1953, the above draft resolution was formally
passed.
In December 1953, the government promulgated
another ‘Resolution on Developing Agricultural
Cooperatives’ (Huang et al., 1992). As a result, agri-
cultural production cooperation gathered renewed
momentum in 1954, during which time the propor-
tion of households participating in cooperation
jumped by another 20% (Table 2). Later, two other
government documents regarding cooperatives were
issued: one in October 1955, which is a ‘Resolution
on Further Promoting Agricultural Cooperatives’ and
the other in June 1956, which is a set of ‘Demonstra-
tive Guidelines for Advanced Agricultural Coopera-
tives’ (Huang et al., 1992). With such a strong push
by the government, the level of cooperation in agri-
cultural production increased rapidly. The strength of
cooperation also increased rapidly. It took about six
years for mutual-aid groups to evolve into prelimi-
nary cooperatives (1950–55) but it took only about
two years for preliminary cooperatives to evolve into
advanced cooperatives (1956–57) (Table 3). By the
end of 1957, almost all the rural households
belonged to agricultural production cooperatives,
with the majority belonging to the advanced
cooperatives (Tables 2 and 3).
At the lower level of cooperation in the form of
mutual-aid groups, households were still the basic
economic entity and they owned all the means of
 
Note: Data are obtained from the two sources as indicated below. Data in both sources contain errors. Cross-checking is
carried out to correct errors where possible. The number of participating households for 1956 in both sources is 1,042,000












Development of agricultural production mutual-aid groups in China in the 1950s
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Mutual-aid group (1000) 2724 4675 8026 7450 9931 7147 850
Year-round 1756 1816 3801 3172
Seasonal 6270 5634 6130 3975
Participating households (1000) 11,313 21,000 45,364 45,637 68,478 60,389 10,420
Year-round 11,448 13,329 30,713 32,843
Seasonal 33,916 32,308 37,765 27,546
Average size per group 4.2 4.5 5.7 6.1 6.9 8.4 12.2
Year-round 6.5 7.3 8.1 10.4 















1952 40.0 39.9 0.1
1953 39.5 39.3 0.2
1954 60.3 58.3 2.0
1955 64.9 50.7 14.2
1956 97.2 0.9 96.3
1957 97.5 97.5
1958 (mid year) 98.4  98.4 
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production. They cooperated by using each other’s
production means for a fee and they also carried out
simple planning and division of labour. The scale of
a mutual-aid group was also relatively small
(Table  4). When the level of cooperation was
increased, the households gradually lost ownership
of their means of production and they got paid
according to the labour they provided to the coopera-
tives. In the meantime, the scale of a cooperative
also increased when the level of cooperation was
escalated, ie from preliminary to advanced coopera-
tives (Table 4). 
In the 1950s, mutual-aid groups suited the very
small and vulnerable farmers better. This can also be
seen by the fact that an increasing number of house-
holds opted for joining mutual-aid groups as shown
in Table 1. The scale of such groups remained small,
with an average of six to eight households per group
(Table 1). Unfortunately, the ideology that ‘big is
better’ prevailed and the government added incen-
tives to indulge this ideology. As early as 1953, the
tendency for some to hastily push the mutual-aid
groups to expand and to evolve into cooperatives
was detected and reported to the central government
(Huang et al., 1992). But the tendency could not be
reversed. 
The situation worsened, with some proposing
even bigger cooperatives at the end of 1957 after all
farmers had been persuaded to become members of
the advanced cooperatives. In April 1958, the
government issued its ‘Opinion on Merging Smaller
Cooperatives into Bigger Cooperatives’ (Huang et
al., 1992). Subsequently, some advanced coopera-
tives were merged to become ‘collectives villages’ or
‘communist communes’. In August of the same year,
the government passed its ‘Resolution about Issues
related to the Establishment of People’s Communes
in Rural Areas’ (Huang et al., 1992). By the end of
September, over 740,000 advanced cooperatives
were all converted to about 24,000 people’s
communes.
Within a people’s commune, there were produc-
tion brigades at the next level and production teams
at the lowest level. There were about 30 households
in each production team. This collective system
lasted till the end of 1982. During most of the
lifespan of this system, production and marketing
faced little uncertainty as the ‘unified purchasing and
sale systems’ dictated to the production teams how
much to produce and how much to deliver to the
government. Hence, as soon as the people’s com-
munes emerged, production cooperatives disap-
peared in China because the need for cooperatives
disappeared. (The Editorial Office (2002) provides




Increase in the scale of mutual-aid groups and
cooperatives






















Note: Data are obtained from the two sources as indicated below. Data in both sources contain errors. Cross-checking is








Development of agricultural cooperatives in China in the 1950s
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
No. of cooperatives 
(1000)
0.019 0.130 3.644 15.068 114.4 633.7 756 789 741
Advanced 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.015 0.2 0.5 540 753
Preliminary 0.018 0.129 3.634 15.053 114.2 633.2 216 36
Participating house-
holds (1000)
0.219 1.618 59.028 274.852 2297.0 16,921.0 117,829 121,052 122,354
Advanced 0.032 0.030 1.840 2.059 11.8 40.1 107,422 119,450
Preliminary 0.187 1.588 57.188 272.793 2285.2 16,880.9 10,407 1602
Average size 
per cooperative
11.5 12.4 16.2 18.2 20.1 26.7 155.9 153.4 165.1
Advanced 32.0 30.0 184.0 137.3 58.6 75.8 198.9 158.6
Preliminary 10.4 12.3 15.7 18.1 20.0 26.7 48.2 44.5 
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contemporary China. It contains a number of cases
of agricultural cooperatives.)
While the preliminary agricultural production
cooperatives expanded quickly during the mid
1950s, China’s rural supply and marketing coopera-
tives and rural credit cooperatives also developed
quickly. However, they did not fare much better than
their production cooperative counterparts. From
1958 when the Great Leap Forward movement took
place, they largely evolved into the agents of govern-
ment departments and could no longer be classified
as cooperatives according to the principles of the
International Cooperatives Association (Lu 1986;
Zhu and Zhang, 1998). Since the economic reforms,
many have called for reforming these ‘cooperatives’
but they have been little transformed (Wan et al.,
1988; Liu and Feng, 2000; Sun, 2002). These
‘cooperatives’ are not included elsewhere in this
discussion.
 
Current status of the development of 
agricultural cooperatives in China
 
By the late 1970s, problems of collective farming
became more acute. Farmers in some areas
attempted to make changes to collective farming
arrangements. From late 1978, China’s profound
economic reforms began, first in rural areas. The
government accepted and supported all kinds of
reforms to the people’s commune system. Funda-
mental changes to rural economic institutional
arrangements began throughout the nation. In early
1983, the government issued a document, ‘Various
Issues Related to the Current Rural Economic Poli-
cies’, which endorsed the reforms to the people’s
commune system. Soon people’s communes disap-
peared across the country and were replaced by the
old ‘Xiang’ system which had been in place
previously. Production brigades were renamed back
to Cun (villages) but in many places, the term ‘pro-
duction team’ remained in use. Under this arrange-
ment, each household was allocated land with some
other production means and again became an
independent economic entity. While villages and
production teams no longer intervened in the busi-
ness decisions of households, they provided (or they
were expected to provide) some services to the
individual households.
In 1985, the ‘unified purchasing system’ was
abolished for all agricultural commodities except
grains and cotton. Without government’s guaranteed
procurement, individual rural households had to
increasingly face the market. Then, in 1992, the gov-
ernment made it clear that China would practise a
socialist market economy. This placed further
pressure on farmers to face the market. Added to
this, in the early 1990s, there was a relative surplus
of many agricultural products in China. Thus, some
kind of farmers’ cooperation would be useful for
those individual households to gain better negoti-
ating power in the market. In the late 1990s and early
2000s, life for Chinese farmers became even more
difficult because, not only had they to compete in the
domestic market, they also had to face overseas
competition. The Chinese government, in order to
prepare the country to join the WTO, continuously
reduced import tariffs for many lines of commodi-
ties, including some agricultural products. For
example, China’s average tariff rate was reduced
from over 40% in the early 1990s to 15.3% by
January 2001 (Tian and Zhou, 2001). With the
increased competition in the market, farmers’
cooperation became even more important for those
individual households to survive. 
 
Development and scale of agricultural 
cooperatives since the economic reforms
 
From 1979 till 1985, farmers’ desire for cooperation
was minimal as they had just become ‘liberalised’
from the collective farming system. They were also
largely capable of coping with the market for the
following three reasons:. (1) A high portion of their
major products was still procured by the government
under the ‘unified purchasing system’; (2) For the
majority of farmers, production was still semi-
subsistence and the proportion of the marketed
surplus of their products was relatively low;
(3) Villages and production teams, plus some other
service providers from the old system such as agri-
cultural extension stations and the semi-official rural
supply and marketing cooperatives, still provided
services to those individual rural households.
Following several years’ rapid increase in agricul-
tural products, the government abolished the ‘unified
purchasing system’ for most agricultural products
except for grains and cotton. In the meantime, the
services by those providers from the old system had
become weakened. Some noticed the need for farmer
cooperation but at that time, asking, or even sug-
gesting, that farmers cooperate was barely possible
because farmers feared talking about cooperatives
due to their bitter memories of the earlier efforts.
Nonetheless, due to the difficulties in disposing of
agricultural products, farmers started to try out part-
nerships in marketing their products beyond their
own local areas.
Unfortunately, no statistics about any cooperation
were collected during this time. This reflects the fact
that people were either fearful or reluctant to talk
about cooperatives and the government also gave
little attention to farmer cooperation, perhaps trying 
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to avoid alarming farmers due to its previous record
in the 1950s. In 1989, the new Department of
Rural Cooperative Economy, based on the previous
General Office of Rural Business Management, was
formed at the Ministry of Agriculture. This Depart-
ment was renamed the Department of Rural Cooper-
ative Economy and Business Management in 1998.
The establishment of such a department, to some
extent, indicated the government’s increased atten-
tion to the matters of farmer cooperation. From 1990
on, statistics on cooperatives were collected, but not
on a regular basis (Table 5). Although these statistics
may not be of a very high quality, there are no alter-
natives. In addition, the ‘cooperatives’ collected in
these statistics do not seem to match the ICA criteria
very well. Using strict ICA criteria, the number of
cooperatives would have been much smaller.
Table 5 shows that the number of cooperatives
was on the increase till 1994, after which it has been
steadily decreasing. This, however, does not indicate
that cooperation was no longer needed. The decline
in the number of cooperatives is most likely linked to
the fact that forming cooperatives is only one way
for cooperation but there are other possible ways for
farmers to cooperate. Hence, farmers may choose
between different ways of cooperation depending on
their popularity and benefits. Indeed, there have been
other forms of cooperation (see below) to which
farmers may be attracted. For example, in the mid
1990s, a new model called ‘Company + Rural
Households’ gained popularity and expanded rapidly
(Du, 2002b). 
 




 DRCEM, various issues. 
 
Areas, depth and scope of cooperation
 
Now we turn our attention to see where and how
cooperatives take place in Chinese agriculture.
Table  6 shows that a relatively large portion of
cooperatives is in farming (40%). Animal husbandry,
processing and transportation services account for a
similar portion, being about 21% each. The rest is in
various other industries (about 18%).
In terms of the services provided from the cooper-
atives, technology services and information services
are the primary activities of the majority of coopera-
tives (51%). This is followed by supply and mar-
keting services (27%). About 14% of the cooperatives
also have their own profit-oriented businesses. The
proportion of cooperatives in the area of credit
services is relatively small (9%) (Table 7).
The majority of China’s cooperatives are confined
within their local areas. Table 8 clearly shows that
almost 90% of the cooperatives are within their
Xiang areas. Nine per cent are inter-Xiang. Those




If we use the number of cooperative members per
1000 rural labour force to denote the level of cooper-
atives development in a region, then there is a
distinct difference between regions (Table 9).
It should be interesting to explore why coopera-
tives in some regions are more developed than in
others. One simple approach to discover the reasons
is perhaps to examine the local conditions in relation
to the needs for cooperatives. In general, the
following factors affect the need for cooperatives. 
 
The level of marketed surplus and market activities
 
.
If the level of marketed surplus is high, market activ-
ities increase. Then, the need for cooperation to
protect the interests of individual households and to
provide marketing services increases.
 
The level of labour division
 
. When division of labour
becomes more developed, farmers’ demand for all
kinds of supporting services increases, especially in
production.
 
Better utilisation of resources
 
. When the demand for
exchanging the use of resources (for a fee) increases,
the need for cooperation increases (eg, a farmer
using the capital or production means from another
farmer who is not currently in need).
 
Voice in the community
 
. Farmers may get organised
when they want their interest better represented in
the community.  
 
The level of agribusiness service provisions
 
. If the
services provided by agribusiness firms are of good
quality and at a high level, this mitigates the need for
cooperatives. 
 
Availability of other types of cooperation
 
. When
other types of farmer cooperation are readily avail-
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Industrial distribution of cooperatives (2001)
Region Total Farming Animal husbandry Processing and 
transportation
Other
No. % of total No. % of total No. % of total No. % of total
National 114,106 45,020 39.5 24,439 21.4 23,453 20.6 21,195 18.6
Beijing 1132 364 32.2 530 46.8 122 10.8 116 10.2
Tianjin 418 223 53.3 82 19.6 34 8.1 79 18.9
Hebei 14,465 6404 44.3 3169 21.9 2744 19.0 2148 14.8
Shanxi 4181 1864 44.6 1079 25.8 636 15.2 602 14.4
Inner Mongolia 409 234 57.2 96 23.5 46 11.2 33 8.1
Liaoning 619 371 59.9 185 29.9 16 2.6 47 7.6
Jilin 584 164 28.1 102 17.5 47 8.0 271 46.4
Heilongjiang 4955 2105 42.5 1279 25.8 968 19.5 603 12.2
Shanghai 87 44 50.6 17 19.5 5 5.7 21 24.1
Jiangsu 3830 1416 37.0 1201 31.4 541 14.1 672 17.5
Zhejiang 3060 1070 35.0 514 16.8 456 14.9 1020 33.3
Anhui 4396 1983 45.1 1028 23.4 632 14.4 753 17.1
Fujian 1314 377 28.7 240 18.3 233 17.7 464 35.3
Jiangxi 2695 1267 47.0 397 14.7 774 28.7 257 9.5
Shandong 15,737 5992 38.1 3073 19.5 2576 16.4 4096 26.0
Henan 2415 999 41.4 677 28.0 421 17.4 318 13.2
Hubei 9381 1407 15.0 1202 12.8 3640 38.8 3132 33.4
Hunan 14,856 6840 46.0 2831 19.1 3336 22.5 1849 12.4
Guangdong 2147 975 45.4 506 23.6 271 12.6 396 18.4
Guangxi 10,044 2870 28.6 2283 22.7 3158 31.4 1733 17.3
Hainan 523 95 18.2 153 29.3 226 43.2 49 9.4
Chongqing 367 130 35.4 125 34.1 65 17.7 47 12.8
Sichuan 3759 1673 44.5 1046 27.8 358 9.5 682 18.1
Guizhou 2619 1130 43.1 575 22.0 500 19.1 414 15.8
Yunnan 987 567 57.4 178 18.0 54 5.5 188 19.0
Shaanxi 5020 2556 50.9 850 16.9 1075 21.4 539 10.7
Gansu 3264 1598 49.0 714 21.9 466 14.3 486 14.9
Qinghai 83 38 45.8 18 21.7 1 1.2 26 31.3
Ningxia 484 131 27.1 213 44.0 44 9.1 96 19.8
Xinjiang 275 133 48.4 76 27.6 8 2.9 58 21.1
 
Among the above factors, the level of marketed
surplus is believed to be the most fundamental and
determinist. If a farm household carries out produc-
tion for subsistence or semi-subsistence purposes, the
need for cooperation is minimal. However, the level
of marketed surplus is likely to be important, mainly
during the earlier stages of market development of a
society. When the market becomes further devel-
oped, agribusiness firms will emerge and provide all
sorts of services to the agricultural community.
To measure the level of marketed surplus, an
index can be constructed by using total sales revenue
to the total value produced from agricultural prod-
ucts. However, such data for China are not readily
available. In this paper, we used per capita GDP as a
surrogate measure. It is reasonable to assume that the
higher the per capita GDP, the higher the level of
market development in a region. 
Relating the number of cooperative members per
1000 rural labour force in a region to its per capita
GDP, it is interesting to note that there is no clear
correlation between the two. Although the general
trend is that regions with a more developed market
have a higher level of cooperatives development and
vice versa, there are a number of exceptions. That is,
some regions with a more developed market have a
very low level of cooperatives development, eg,
Shanghai and Hainan, while some regions with a less
developed market have a relatively high level of
cooperatives development, eg, Guangxi and Shaanxi.
This seems to suggest that the level of market
development or the level of marketed surplus is
no longer the greatest determinant of cooperatives
development in China and that other factors must play
a role. These factors are most likely to be the devel-
opment level of agribusiness service industries and
the availability of other types of farmer cooperation.
However, due to lack of data, such assertions cannot
be confirmed. Further studies in this area should be
rewarding and are called for. 
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% of total Credit 
services
% of total Supply and 
marketing 
services




National 57,486 51 9683 9 30,841 27 15,300 14
Beijing 433 45 13 1 334 34 190 20
Tianjin 212 59 28 8 37 10 85 23
Hebei 7042 51 1461 11 3508 26 1739 13
Shanxi 5850 72 398 5 981 12 858 11
Inner Mongolia 297 32 53 6 514 55 73 8
Liaoning 347 76 12 3 62 14 34 7
Jilin 222 58 40 10 120 31 2 1
Heilongjiang 2558 70 280 8 558 15 284 8
Shanghai 142 99 0 0 1 1 0 0
Jiangsu 1414 37 92 2 1991 52 325 9
Zhejiang 2061 78 77 3 276 10 216 8
Anhui 1776 42 312 7 1351 32 827 19
Fujian 519 48 99 9 194 18 279 26
Jiangxi 1015 46 232 11 570 26 390 18
Shandong 7359 49 989 7 4378 29 2162 15
Henan 1105 57 167 9 420 22 256 13
Hubei 3987 32 3327 27 4210 34 1021 8
Hunan 2955 35 550 7 3092 37 1822 22
Guangdong 2865 70 71 2 706 17 438 11
Guangxi 3506 37 520 5 3911 41 1645 17
Hainan 183 49 19 5 106 29 62 17
Chongqing 114 34 1 0 142 42 80 24
Sichuan 3944 71 296 5 664 12 664 12
Guizhou 1717 62 229 8 346 12 490 18
Yunnan 1616 91 10 1 94 5 51 3
Shaanxi 2018 46 221 5 1607 36 560 13
Gansu 1748 56 177 6 481 16 696 22
Qinghai 57 90 0 0 2 3 4 6
Ningxia 345 64 9 2 145 27 44 8
Xinjiang 79 65 0 0 40 33 3 2
 
Other types of cooperation and agribusiness 
services
 
Since the availability of other types of cooperation
and agribusiness services affects the demand for
cooperatives, it is useful to briefly describe other
forms of cooperation or similar services that are
available to Chinese farmers.
 
The ‘Company + Rural Household’ model
 
. This
model is currently popular and dominating. Com-
panies sign contracts with individual farmers to buy
their products. They sometimes also provide farmers
with technical assistance and information services.
However, in this model, individual households do not
actually get organised and each of them is dealing
with the company. The farmers are dominated and
when the demand for the company’s products is
reduced, the company may reduce the price paid to
the farmers or may not honour the contracts to
procure their products. Such examples are numerous,
including one case where farmers had to pour their




. Farmers may invest their capital in
shares of some entities which may be run by farmers
themselves or by some Xiang- or village-run enter-




 A small number of farmers may form a
partnership to carry out some profit-oriented activi-





tors owning their specialised equipment have started
to emerge. They provide services such as ploughing
or harvesting to individual households. Because of
China’s different climate zones from the south to the
north, such contractors often enjoy an extended
season for their work, such as harvesting by moving
from the south to the north.   
16
 
Cooperatives: Issues and trends in developing countries
Edited by Ray Trewin
ACIAR Technical Report No. 53




. These can be assembly/
wholesale, retail or combined. The market may deal
with only one product or various products. Simple
services are available to the participants, particularly
to those who travel long distances.
 
Evaluation of the development of China’s 
agricultural cooperatives in the era of 
economic reforms 
 
Cooperation among farmers in China has evolved
from almost non-existent in the early years of the
rural economic reforms to having developed reason-
ably rapidly in recent years. However, farmers’
cooperation in the form of cooperatives is not
substantial. This is clearly reflected by the fact that,
per 1000 rural labour force, only 7.3 people were
members of a cooperative (Table 9). This low level





. Due to farmers’ still fresh,
bitter memories of their experiences with coopera-
tives in the mid 1950s and the subsequent people’s
commune system, farmers feared hearing the term
‘cooperation’ (he zhuo). In the earlier years of
economic reforms, it was not wise to raise such issues
with farmers. [In the mid 1980s when the author was






), there were contributions that attempted
to draw people’s attention to the need for farmers’
cooperation. However, the editorial office was
extremely cautious in deciding whether such contri-
butions would be used at all. As the only national
journal at that time that dealt with agricultural
economics and policy issues, the journal was closely
read by agricultural leaders nation wide. The use of
articles calling for cooperation could have been inter-
preted as a sign that the government might reverse
back to ‘agricultural cooperation’, a topic that was
 









Intra- and inter-regional cooperation
Region  Intra-Xiang % of total Inter-Xiang % of total Inter-county % of total
National 90,700 89 9187 9 1877 2
Beijing 957 87 102 9 47 4
Tianjin 326 98 5 2 1 0
Hebei 11,574 92 796 6 145 1
Shanxi 3064 83 607 16 39 1
Inner Mongolia 324 94 6 2 13 4
Liaoning 536 93 21 4 22 4
Jilin 571 98 12 2 1 0
Heilongjiang 4786 97 144 3 25 1
Shanghai 66 76 15 17 6 7
Jiangsu 3529 94 176 5 65 2
Zhejiang 2553 92 190 7 37 1
Anhui 4015 94 237 6 38 1
Fujian 1150 93 76 6 13 1
Jiangxi 1619 65 343 14 536 21
Shandong 14,542 92 1057 7 138 1
Henan 2080 86 317 13 18 1
Hubei 3423 76 870 19 227 5
Hunan 13,542 91 1145 8 169 1
Guangdong 1824 89 186 9 35 2
Guangxi 5816 84 1025 15 93 1
Hainan 270 82 47 14 13 4
Chongqing 283 80 70 20 2 1
Sichuan 3472 92 233 6 54 1
Guizhou 1841 83 319 14 48 2
Yunnan 930 94 56 6 1 0
Shaanxi 3992 81 901 18 45 1
Gansu 2844 92 218 7 37 1
Qinghai 82 99 0 0 1 1
Ningxia 470 97 8 2 6 1
Xinjiang 219 97 5 2 2 1 
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better not touched on at the time.] As time moved on,
the need for agricultural cooperation became gradu-
ally greater and farmers did start to cooperate in var-
ious ways. However, they tended to label their
cooperation using terms such as ‘united’ (lian he),
‘association’ (xie hui), or ‘cooperation’ (he zhuo), but
in many cases they did whatever they could to avoid
calling themselves ‘cooperatives’ (he zhu she). Even
today, not many cooperatives included in the statistics
of Table 5 use that term to describe themselves.
 
2. Government’s lack of measures
 
. While there were
significant psychological barriers to cooperatives in
farmers’ minds, the government was not able to
develop innovative measures to dismantle such
barriers. In fact, the government also feared men-
tioning the term ‘cooperatives’, as reflected by the
fact that it rarely used the term in its official docu-
ments for the purpose of encouraging farmers to
form cooperatives (except on occasions when the
term was used with reference to self-criticising its
radical doings in the 1950s). In recent years, the
government has been a bit more open in encouraging
different kinds of farmer cooperation and sometimes
in using the term ‘cooperative’. 
 
3. Availability of other types of cooperation
 
. Reluc-
tance to use cooperatives, coupled with the need for
cooperation seem to have forced the emergence of
other types of farmer cooperation or services that can
render farmers with similar assistance. When these
types of arrangements emerge and develop, farmers
have a choice between them and cooperatives.
Hence, the use of cooperatives becomes subject to
 
Notes: No data for Tibet. The number of cooperative members for Sichuan (as presented in the original) is clearly an error.








Level of cooperatives development denoted by the number of cooperative members per 1000 rural labour force
(2001)









Number of farmers 
joining cooperatives per 
1000 rural labour force
Number of 
cooperatives 
per 1000 rural 
labour force
National 7543 482,291 114,106 3,535,098 7.3 0.24
Beijing 25,523 1653 1132 114,183 69.1 0.68
Tianjin 20,154 1692 418 40,610 24.0 0.25
Hebei 8362 27,179 14,465 613,524 22.6 0.53
Guangxi 4668 21,596 10,044 471,122 21.8 0.47
Shandong 10,465 36,537 15,737 572,495 15.7 0.43
Shaanxi 5024 13,331 5020 171,556 12.9 0.38
Shanxi 5460 9886 4181 111,425 11.3 0.42
Ningxia 5340 2004 484 21,201 10.6 0.24
Gansu 4163 9422 3264 84,245 8.9 0.35
Jiangsu 12,922 26,844 3830 229,312 8.5 0.14
Zhejiang 14,655 21,701 3060 169,585 7.8 0.14
Fujian 12,362 12,552 1314 91,677 7.3 0.10
Heilongjiang 9349 9188 4955 62,080 6.8 0.54
Hubei 7813 17,817 9381 113,563 6.4 0.53
Hunan 6054 28,776 14,856 171,786 6.0 0.52
Xinjiang 7913 3654 275 16,823 4.6 0.08
Anhui 5221 28,215 4396 126,300 4.5 0.16
Guizhou 2895 18,215 2619 68,437 3.8 0.14
Guangdong 13,730 28,587 2147 90,807 3.2 0.08
Jilin 7640 6400 584 19,826 3.1 0.09
Yunnan 4866 19,710 987 43,077 2.2 0.05
Jiangxi 5221 15,522 2695 32,890 2.1 0.17
Liaoning 12,041 9775 619 19,695 2.0 0.06
Qinghai 5735 1740 83 3413 2.0 0.05
Henan 5924 46,878 2415 57,301 1.2 0.05
Hainan 7135 2295 523 2730 1.2 0.23
Chongqing 5654 13,452 367 10,907 0.8 0.03
Inner Mongolia 6463 6325 409 3781 0.6 0.06
Shanghai 37,382 2550 87 721 0.3 0.03
Sichuan 5250 37,788 3759 26 0.0 0.10 
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the provision of other agribusiness services. The
findings from a survey on agribusiness service pro-
viders may, to some extent, support this point.
Table 10 shows that the proportion of Type II organ-
isations varies as the number of other service pro-
viders changes. It is noted that the concept of
agribusiness (chan ye hua) used in China may be not







While Chinese farmers were reluctant to use
cooperatives, they seem to be very creative in
inventing various other ways of cooperation to look
after their interests. The emergence of various types
of farmer cooperation has led many, including both
academics and government officials, to propose the
development of China’s broad agribusiness services.
This is, perhaps, an important breakthrough in
government policy thinking; it is a huge step forward
in China’s agribusiness development that has
resulted from the economic reforms, although to
some extent it is a by-product of the government’s
lack of measures to encourage farmer cooperatives. 
The rapid development of various other types of
farmer cooperation in China clearly suggests that
agricultural cooperatives are only one form of farmer
cooperation and farmers should not have to keep to
cooperatives but should be free to devise other forms
of cooperation. Reviewing China’s experience with
agricultural cooperatives in the era of economic
reforms in general, and the regional difference in the
level of cooperative development in particular, we
are led to think that the decline in the importance of
agricultural cooperatives in farmer cooperation is
likely a general trend when a country’s overall
economy and market become well developed. To
elaborate on this, we refer to the development
process of cooperatives in developed countries.
At earlier times in the economic development of
today’s developed countries, farmer cooperation was
important and farmers might have formed various
cooperatives to look after their interests. When the
economy and the market get further developed, how-
ever, firms specialising in serving the agricultural
industry emerged and expanded and hence agri-
business industry started to develop. As a result,
many functions performed by cooperatives might
have gradually been replaced by the services pro-
vided by agribusiness. This clearly reduces the need
for cooperatives. For example, in Australia today,
there are a small number of large cooperatives but
farmers’ cooperatives at the grass-roots level are not
extensive — though there is a need for them in some
cases (Ding et al., 1998). The development of
cooperatives in relation to the development of agri-
business industry is simplistically depicted in
Figure 1 (Part A) where total supply of agribusiness
services is the sum of services provided by coopera-
tives plus those provided by other providers. The
latter includes services provided by both the public
and private sectors. At a later stage, total supply is
increased and is able to largely match the demand. In
some cases it may have been possible that the supply
was slightly greater than the total demand, indicating
that farmers have a choice between the service
providers. 
To construct a similar diagram for China is a bit
complicated. Part B of Figure 1 may be used as a
close representation. After the economic reform
started, the services provided by previous collective
arrangements were running down until the mid
1980s and the need for cooperation to provide
services to the agricultural sector started to increase.
From the early 1990s, various agribusiness services
began to develop. Related to the differences in
regional cooperatives development as shown earlier
(Table 9), it may be speculated that (1) in relatively
developed regions, agribusiness services are more
developed and hence the need for cooperatives
has declined, eg, Shanghai and Hainan and (2) in
less developed regions, agribusiness services are less
developed, and thus the need for cooperatives is still
strong, eg, Hebei and Guangxi. The findings from a
survey reported in Niu (2002) confirm that the
proportion of agribusiness services provided by
the less developed China western region out of the
national total is much lower, though it tends to catch
up in the latest round of the survey (Table 11).
If the above speculation is true, it would imply
that the stages of agribusiness development in devel-
oped regions in China are somewhere in the middle
of a diagram similar to Part A where the need for
cooperatives has started to decline. However, less
developed regions are still possibly at the stage
before the need for cooperatives starts to decline. In





Types of agribusiness service providers (%)
Type 1996 1998 2000
I. Companies (Company + 
Rural Households model)
45.5 49.9 41.0
II. Cooperative organizations 
including cooperatives
28.6 26.4 33.0
III. Large agricultural markets 12.3 15.9 12.0
IV. Others 13.4 7.9 14.0 
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Prospects for agricultural development 
in China
 
Based on discussions in the earlier parts of the paper,
the following future development of agricultural
cooperatives and related structures is possible. 
Given that China’s agricultural market is increas-
ingly being integrated into the international market
and that China’s agribusiness service industry is at
an early stage of development, there is a strong need




Regional distribution of agribusiness service
providers (%)
Type 1996 1998 2000
I. Companies (Company + 
Rural Households model)
45.5 49.9 41.0
II. Cooperative organizations 
including cooperatives
28.6 26.4 33.0
III. Large agricultural markets 12.3 15.9 12.0
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Agricultural cooperatives as an important form of
farmer cooperation are still needed in China and
there is room for their development. However, they
will not be used substantially by Chinese farmers
unless an effective way of overcoming farmers’
psychological barriers to cooperatives can be found.
In the near future, the development of cooperatives
in China will be closely affected by the development
of other types of cooperation and the overall devel-
opment of China’s agribusiness industries. In the
longer term, the need for cooperatives is likely to
decline.
Although the ‘Company + Rural Households’
model is popular and predominant at present, interest
conflicts between the companies and farmers
intrinsic to this model are most likely to cause
problems more to farmers and, to a lesser extent, to
the companies. If this intrinsic problem cannot be
properly solved, some farmers may turn to other
forms of cooperation. 
Should more farmers turn away from the ‘Com-
pany + Rural Households’ model and become organ-
ised in other forms of cooperation, including
cooperatives, it is possible to see increased use of a
‘Company + Agricultural Cooperatives’ model or
‘Company + Other Types of Cooperation’ model.
Such models are likely to increase the cooperation
between farmers themselves and between farmers
and the companies. 
More firms will be separated from their current
business operations or newly formed to provide
specialised agribusiness services to the rural indus-
tries and China’s agribusiness industries will
develop.
The Chinese government’s support for agricul-
tural cooperation and agribusiness development is
likely to increase. To a great extent, this support is
legitimate and desirable. Developed countries took
about 200 years to develop their agriculture and
agricultural market and then allowed their market to
be opened to the world. Even so, some developed
countries nowadays still provide heavy subsidies and
support to their agriculture. For some developing
countries, like China, agriculture has developed from
a subsistence level after only about 50 years. Many
farmers’ production is still largely semi-subsistence
or even subsistence in nature. The governments, for
various reasons, such as in exchange for WTO mem-
bership, have prematurely pushed them onto the
international market. In this regard, there is every
reason for the Chinese government to provide assist-
ance to farmers to foster their ability to compete
internationally. Favourable policies encouraging the
provision of agribusiness services to the extent that
the supply is able to match the demand (like the situ-
ation in Australia, Part A in Figure 1) will be a most
effective way to support Chinese farmers and
China’s agriculture.  
 
Summary and concluding comments
 
After briefly reviewing the development process of
China’s agricultural cooperatives in the 1950s, this
paper highlights their current development status in
the era of economic reforms. It addresses the area,
depth and scope of agricultural cooperatives and also
examines regional differences in the development of
cooperatives. Overall, the development of coopera-
tives in China since its economic reforms has not
been substantial.
The lack of development of cooperatives is
largely attributable to farmers’ resistance to the
concept of organising themselves using cooperatives
due to their bitter experience in the 1950s. The other
contributing factor is the government’s lack of meas-
ures to dismantle farmers’ psychological barriers to
accept cooperatives. On the other hand, increased
agribusiness services and the availability of other
types of cooperation may also have reduced farmers’
need for cooperatives. 
In view of the very small scale of agricultural
operations by millions of households who have to
face an increasingly internationalised agricultural
market, farmer cooperation is needed even more in
China. Cooperatives are an important means for
farmers to cooperate among themselves and there is
scope for further development of agricultural cooper-
atives. However, the way in which China’s future
agricultural cooperatives will develop is uncertain
and likely to be affected by a number of factors, of
which the lowering of farmers’ psychological
barriers to cooperatives is possibly the most impor-
tant. In this regard, the government may need to play
an active role. While it should avoid intervening in
the internal affairs of cooperatives, the government
needs to devise innovative approaches to explain to
farmers the nature of cooperatives and to encourage
them to accept, voluntarily, that cooperatives are a
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 Foods is an Australian dairy company
engaged in the conversion of raw milk into manufac-
tured dairy products. The company has a strong
cooperative heritage and is controlled by supplier
shareholders. Bonlac  was established in 1985 in
response to the commercial forces that shaped the
development of the Australian dairy industry. 
The company has a major presence in the dairy
industries of Victoria and Tasmania. It was created
through the merger of several smaller Victorian-
based cooperatives. The merging cooperatives were
small-scale operations with a regional marketing
focus. Individually, their future capacity to achieve
sustainable, competitive returns in the emerging
trading environment was limited. Suppliers recog-
nised that a  combined entity had the potential to
generate higher returns.
In the period since 1985 Bonlac has developed
into one of Australia’s leading dairy companies. The
growth in the business has reflected the market
forces that have shaped the development of the
Australian dairy industry. Some of the major factors
that influenced the development of Bonlac Foods
include:
• changes in government policies
• structural adjustment in the farm sector
• rapid growth in the export focus of the industry
By the late 1990s Bonlac had become a major
player on the world dairy  market accounting for
about 5% of world trade (Leatherhead Food, 1997).
In 1999–2000, total sales were around $1.2 billion
and the annual milk intake reached 2.4 billion litres
(BFL, 2001a). Bonlac was a major supplier of dairy
products on the Australian market with a leading
position in branded sales of cheese and butter.
More recently, the company’s commercial per-
formance has deteriorated. The weaker performance
affected the company’s competitive position in the
Australian dairy industry. Bonlac was unable to pay
a competitive milk price and experienced a loss of
milk supply as suppliers left the cooperative for
other companies.
A major restructuring was initiated to correct the
decline in performance. Non-core assets were sold in
order to retire debt. The manufacturing and distribu-
tion supply chain was rationalised to reduce produc-
tion costs. At the same time Bonlac entered into a
trans-Tasman strategic alliance with a New Zealand
company, the Fonterra Cooperative Group.
 
The Australian dairy manufacturing sector
 
The historical development of Bonlac Foods has
been shaped by the market forces driving structural
change in the Australian dairy industry. Cooperatives
have always been a major part of the industry.
Today, the continued strong presence of cooperatives
primarily reflects the bargaining position of dairy
farmers in the dairy product marketing chain. 
Milk is a perishable product. In the short term
dairy farmers are unable to make supply adjustments
in response to changes in market returns. Once a cow
becomes an active milk producer, the milk flow con-
tinues for the duration of the season. Producers have
no choice but to accept the pricing conditions offered
by those seeking to purchase milk.
In the early stages of industry development dairy
farmers believed they were in a vulnerable position
in the marketing chain. Milk was costly to transport
and competition among potential milk buyers was
limited. Processing capacity constraints limited the
demand for milk at times of peak milk flow. 
Dairy farmers had few options for selling their
milk. The weak bargaining position of producers
created the conditions for regional milk processing
monopolies to emerge. Producers were compelled to
accept relatively low prices for their milk, particu-




Many changes have taken place in the structure of the Australian dairy industry in recent years. This paper provides a
snapshot of the situation in March 2003. 
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To offset the monopoly purchasing power, pro-
ducers responded by joining together in cooperatives
to develop their own milk processing facilities. This
led to the creation of a large number of regional
dairy cooperatives throughout Australia. The objec-
tives were to retain ownership of the milk until it
was converted into storable dairy products, process
all milk supplied by the members and maximise the
price they received for their milk.
Over the past two decades the commercial struc-
ture of the dairy manufacturing sector has changed
substantially. The industry has developed from a
domestic-oriented commercial structure to one with
a strong global focus. The number of small, region-
ally based milk processing companies has declined
rapidly. A small number of large-scale manufac-
turing cooperatives have emerged. 
Industry output has  expanded and exports cur-
rently account for more than 60% of Australia’s milk
flow. In 1999–2000 exports exceeded $2 billion and
Australia was the third largest export supplier on the
world market (ADC, 2000). The increase in exports
has been driven by the strong growth in milk produc-
tion in Victoria and Tasmania. In 1999–2000 dairy
exports from Victoria exceeded $1.5 billion. 
 
Government policy changes and the 
formation of Bonlac
 
Changes in government policies were the primary
driving force behind the accelerated mergers of
regional cooperatives. Initially, smaller regional
cooperatives merged into larger regional or state-
based cooperatives. Over time, these larger coopera-
tives have themselves merged into even larger
organisations. 
In 1986 the Federal Government altered the regu-
lations that determined manufacturing milk prices
with the implementation of the Kerin Plan. The
change in regulatory arrangements was a key factor
behind the creation of Bonlac Foods on 1 January
1986. Supplier concern about the longer-term
viability of smaller regional cooperatives was
another reason behind the decision to form Bonlac.
Prior to 1986 domestic prices for manufactured
dairy products were regulated by a system of pooling
export returns. The regulations equalised returns
across all companies and created a commodity focus
for the export sector of the industry. There was very
little incentive for individual companies to develop
and market new products.
Government regulations had created an industry
with two distinct sectors — market milk and manu-
facturing milk. Both sectors gained benefits through
transfers from domestic consumers to milk pro-
ducers. These transfers increased producer returns
and raised the retail prices of dairy products
(ie cheese, butter, etc) above export parity. 
The Government used the Kerin Plan to restruc-
ture the domestic price support arrangements for
manufacturing milk and to reduce the size of these
consumer transfers. The changes predominantly
affected the dairy industries of Victoria and
Tasmania. Both states had large dairy industries and
were major producers of tradable dairy products.
The effect of the Kerin Plan was to make
company returns reflect the individual export per-
formance of each firm. The regulatory changes were
the catalyst for the Victorian industry to focus on
export markets as the primary source of industry
growth.
 
The formation of Bonlac Foods
 
Bonlac Foods was created through the merger of
several smaller dairy cooperatives and the acquisi-
tion of a complementary dairy marketing business.
The primary strategic focus of the company was to
convert milk into bulk dairy commodities for sale on
the domestic and international markets.
Supplier shareholders of the merging companies
were seasonal producers of milk used to manufacture
bulk dairy commodities such as cheese, butter and
milk powders. Bonlac was established to ensure they
received the full market value for their milk in a
highly competitive global market. 
The company was formed through the merger of
three independent dairy cooperatives based in
Victoria — the Camperdown-Glenormiston, Colac
and ACMAL Cooperatives. A dairy marketing com-
pany (IBIS Milk Products) was also included in the
merger proposition put to shareholders. Subse-
quently Bonlac expanded through a number of
strategic acquisitions. In 1986 the company acquired
Unigate Australia and Murrumbidgee Dairy Prod-
ucts. In 1987 the Drouin Cooperative Butter factory
merged with Bonlac. 
At the time Bonlac was formed, product sales
were primarily focused on the Australian domestic
market. Surplus bulk commodities were exported but
efforts to develop markets and long-term customer
relationships were limited. Over time the growth in
Victorian milk production required a stronger focus
on export market development.
As exports increased, farmgate returns became
closely linked to world market developments. World
prices received for bulk commodities determined the
underlying base level of returns for Bonlac suppliers.
Domestic prices for cheese and butter followed
changes in export prices for the same products. 
The initial positioning of the company provided
limited opportunities to improve supplier returns. 
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Trading strategies, negotiation skills and the timing
of sales have only a marginal impact on producer
returns. Longer-term factors, such as the scale and
efficiency of manufacturing plants, the product mix
and the efficiency of distribution systems have a
larger impact though the improvement in average
returns is small.
As the company developed during the 1990s, a
new strategic direction was adopted. The strategy
was to move up the value chain by placing more of
the raw milk inputs into higher valued products
earning higher returns. This would be achieved by
building a portfolio of Australian retail brands and
positioning them as market leaders. The strategy was
aimed at reducing the dependence on bulk com-
modity exports where opportunities to enhance
supplier returns were limited. 
After a period of consolidation, Bonlac purchased
the retail brands and food service business of
National Foods in 1994. This acquisition expanded
the portfolio of retail brands which was to become a
key focus of the future strategic direction of the
cooperative. The company was investing in the
building blocks behind the strategy. It acquired
brands and invested capital to promote their position
on the Australian market. 
 
Bonlac’s position in the Australian 
dairy industry
 
The Australian dairy industry revolves around three
large cooperatives — Murray Goulburn, Bonlac
Foods and Dairy Farmers. Collectively they account
for about 65% of Australia’s milk flow. The trading
performance of these cooperatives has a big impact
on farmgate milk prices in the Australian dairy
industry. There are a number of other smaller
cooperatives with a regional focus as well as several
‘proprietary’ companies such as National Foods Ltd,
Parmalat (Pauls) and Nestle.
Murray Goulburn and Bonlac Foods are producers
of manufactured dairy products. Their milk supply
base is primarily located in south-eastern Australia.
Both companies have a strong export focus and
producer returns are determined by world market
developments. Suppliers are seasonal producers and
milk is typically converted into tradable products
such as milk powders, butter and cheese.
The Dairy Farmers cooperative is focused on the
drinking milk sector. Its supply base is spread across
several states. Historically producer returns have
been largely determined by state government regula-
tions on the price of drinking milk. Suppliers are
year-round producers. Milk is typically used for
retail sales of drinking milk and short-self-life
products such as yoghurts and dairy desserts.
Australian dairy cooperatives are primarily
supply-driven dairy companies that aim to maximise
the price paid to their suppliers for raw milk. They
accept all the milk produced by their shareholders.
As production has grown the cooperatives have had
to expand processing capacity. For the manufac-
turing cooperatives the supply growth has required a
concurrent investment in the development of export
markets.
By joining one of the major manufacturing
cooperatives, producers gained the security of guar-
anteed milk purchases. This allowed them to make
the on-farm investments required for productivity
improvements that were necessary to maintain
competitiveness.
Fluctuations in world prices around a downward
trend have required producers to expand the scale of
their dairy farms. Producers have responded by
expanding herds and improving the livestock feeding
capacity of their farms. Milk yields have increased
and productivity gains have helped to sustain
industry profitability.
Proprietary companies such as National Foods and
Parmalat have a different commercial focus. These
companies are driven by market demand and only
acquire sufficient milk to meet their retail product
requirements. Their aim is to minimise the price paid
for raw milk and maximise returns on shareholder
capital. The presence of cooperatives puts a floor
under farmgate milk returns. Proprietary companies
have to match the returns paid by the cooperatives in
order to purchase the milk they require.
Bonlac’s position in the Australian dairy industry
reflects the growth of the manufacturing milk sector
in Victoria. The company’s milk supply increased
from around 1.5 billion litres in 1990–91 to
1.9 billion litres by 1999–2000. Over the same
period Victorian milk production increased from
3.9 billion litres to 6.9 billion litres (ADC, 2001). In
1999–2000 Bonlac accounted for 28% of Victoria’s
milk production and 23.5% of Australian milk
production.
During this period the pressure of adjusting to
fluctuations in world market prices has required con-
tinual improvements in on-farm productivity.
Smaller-scale farms have been leaving the industry
and the number of suppliers has been steadily
declining. In 1990–91 there were around 15,400
dairy farms in Australia (ADC, 2001). By
1999–2000 the number had fallen to around 7930 —
the annual reduction in farmer numbers has averaged
280 per year.
Supplier numbers in Victoria have followed a pat-
tern similar to the national trend in the number of
dairy farms. Bonlac supplier numbers also reflected
the industry level changes. In 1990–91 Bonlac had 
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approximately 3500 suppliers. By 1999–2000
supplier numbers had fallen to around 2400.
Over time, Bonlac Foods developed a strong
export focus and in recent times accounted for about
one-third of Australia’s dairy exports. The two major
manufacturing cooperatives — Bonlac and Murray
Goulburn — become the dominant suppliers of
Australian dairy exports. Bonlac sales revenue
increased from $630M in 1990–91 to $1237M in
1999–2000 (Table 1). In the late 1990s Bonlac’s
export sales contributed about 50–55% of total sales
revenues. 
 
The commercial structure of Bonlac Foods
 
In commercial terms Bonlac Foods was a coopera-
tive with a board and management committed to
supplier control. It was owned and operated by the
supplier shareholders. Shares issued to Bonlac
suppliers were the only shares which had voting
rights at shareholder meetings. 
The corporate objective of the company was to
maximise shareholder returns in terms of cash flow
(milk price and share dividends) and growth in the
value of the company. Shareholders gained the full
value of any increase in wealth that came from com-
mercial strategies. This was achieved through the
payment of commercial dividends on shares and the
issuing of bonus shares to reflect the value creation
in the company.
The commitment to supplier ownership did not
require all equity capital to be obtained from
suppliers. Bonlac has raised non-voting equity cap-
ital to help fund new investments. For example, in
June 1999 Bonlac raised $100M through the issue of
unsecured perpetual notes. While the notes are listed
on the Australian Stock Exchange, Bonlac’s share
capital is held by suppliers and is not listed on the
stock exchange.
Although the company was operated as a coopera-
tive, it was legally defined as a public company gov-
erned by Australian corporation law. Until recently
Bonlac was treated as a cooperative for tax purposes
under the Australian Tax Act. This status changed in
1999 with a rise in the level of non-supplier capital
invested in the company. The change in status was
required under existing tax laws and it allowed the
company to pay franked dividends to supplier share-
holders. 
Historically Bonlac Foods has primarily operated
three core business divisions: 
• consumer products
• bulk commodity ingredients 
• beverages.
 
The consumer products business 
 
The consumer products division was a key focus of
the Bonlac business strategy of moving up the value
chain. The strategy aimed to increase the proportion
of the business in more secure domestic market
segments that delivered higher returns. The focus of
the strategy was the development of leading retail
brands in the Australian market.
Retail products inherited from the initial merger
and acquisition activity were regionally focused with
limited distribution. Over time the company invested
in brand development and a national distribution
system. Additional brands were purchased to
increase the product portfolio. The company did not
manufacture short-shelf-life products. The product
range primarily focused on cheese, dairy spreads and
milk powders. 
The investments were largely self-funded through
retained earnings. Most of the investments in con-
sumer products occurred during the first 10 years of
Bonlac’s existence. During this time the company
continued to pay a competitive milk price. 
A strong portfolio of Australian retail brands was
developed. Cheese was a central focus of the brand
development activity. The Australian dairy spreads
market was a mature market with sales of butter on a
slow downward trend. Cheese was a higher-valued
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The consumer products business incorporated two
streams of activities — branded retail sales and food
service sales. In both market segments brands were
promoted and the market shares held by the Bonlac
products increased. For example, between 1990–91
and 1996–97 Bonlac retail brands achieved the fol-
lowing gains in national supermarket sales:
• natural cheddar market share increased from 6%
to 15% (No. 1 ranking)
• processed cheese market share increased from 9%
to 14% (No. 2 ranking)
• butter market share increased from 18% to 38%
(No. 1 ranking)
• skim milk powder market share increased from
31% to 33% (No. 1 ranking).
By the late 1990s the company had established
several brands as the leading product in key sales
categories. The business was predominantly focused
on company owned retail brands. There was very
little exposure to the house brand and the generic
product trade.
There was strong competition from the generic
house brands being developed by the major super-
market chains throughout the 1990s. Margins on
supplying generic products to the supermarkets were
tight but there was a steady growth in sales. Bonlac
was able to earn higher per unit returns on retail
brands but maintaining its leading market required
continued investment in promotional activities.
In the year 2000 cheese brands marketed by
Bonlac held an aggregate market share of 14% in
branded Australian cheese sales (Table 2). In the
same year the portfolio of dairy spreads held an
aggregate market share of 33% in sales of branded
dairy spreads. Bonlac had a major presence in










The bulk commodity ingredients business 
 
The ingredients division supplied a range of products
to customers in Australia and numerous markets.
Asian markets were the major overseas customers
for commodity ingredients (Table 3). Substantial
sales were also made to customers in the Middle
East, the Indian Rim, Europe and North and South
America.
Japan was the focus of company efforts to move
up the value chain in exporting bulk cheese. A
Japanese sales office was established to strengthen
marketing efforts. Investments were made in produc-
tion quality control systems to satisfy customer
requirements. This demand-driven marketing effort
was in direct contrast to the supply-driven com-
modity approach of the Australian Dairy Corporation
in managing ‘single desk’ cheese sales. 
The composition of ingredient sales varied
according to changes in the manufacturing product
mix. The annual budgeting process was based on
judgments about the relative profitability of alterna-
tive outputs. After allowing for the requirements of
established customers this process determined  the
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Milk powders and bulk cheese were the major
export ingredient sales. In recent times milk powders
have accounted for about 80% of export sales
(Table 4). Asia and the Middle East have tradition-
ally been the major markets for powder exports.
A  broad range of food manufacturers use the bulk
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cream, bakery products, cheese products, dairy












The beverage business was a late addition to the
commercial activities of Bonlac Foods. The aim
for  the business was to make it the leading non-
carbonated beverages business in Australia. Com-
mercial activities were based around the Spring
Valley Beverages business which was purchased in
September 1997. The beverage business did not
include retail sales of fresh milk products.
At the time it was acquired Spring Valley held the
number one brand position in the Australian single
serve juice market. The company was purchased to
provide a route trade distribution network. The com-
mercial strategy was to increase the range of
products carried by the Spring Valley distribution
network. The overall business strategy of Bonlac
Foods was to increase producer returns by using
more milk in value-added dairy products. Spring
Valley provided an established network for distrib-
uting long-life (UHT) flavoured milk products.
Bonlac manufactured Big M flavoured UHT milk
products under licence from the Victorian Dairy
Industry Authority. These products were marketed
through the Spring Valley distribution network. In
August 1998 Gatorade sports drinks were added to
the suite of products. Licensing agreements were
negotiated with the owners of the Gatorade trade-
mark for Spring Valley to manufacture and distribute
these products.
In the following year Bonlac commissioned a new
plant to manufacture a new range of UHT flavoured
dairy beverages. These products were marketed
under the Wave brand and rapidly established a
competitive position in the route trade. Product
distribution was on a national basis to milk bars,
service stations, delicatessens and other convenience
stores.
Subsequently, Bonlac negotiated agreements to
distribute the high energy, single serve drinks manu-
factured by Frucor Beverages. These products were
also distributed through the Spring Valley customer
base. It further expanded the range of products
offered to the route trade and complemented the
focus of the beverage business on non-carbonated
drinks.
 
Bonlac investments in manufacturing plant
 
Operational efficiencies from larger-scale manufac-
turing plants are a key factor in maximising net
returns for cooperative shareholders. Cooperative
members provide most of the capital for investments
in manufacturing facilities. The extent of the
producer investment in downstream dairy processing
varies. The minimum level of investment is to create
a manufacturing base for converting milk into trad-
able dairy commodities. 
The competitive position of Bonlac Foods was
essentially determined by the net returns from
processing milk into tradable dairy products. The
average net return across all product sales is
reflected in the final milk price paid to suppliers. As
product prices are largely determined by world
market conditions it is the cost of manufacturing,
transport and storage that effects cooperative net
returns.
A key factor in delivering a competitive milk
price is the relative efficiency of the manufacturing
and distribution assets used by the cooperative. The
scale and operational efficiency of individual plants
is important. The configuration of the overall supply
chain is also important.
In the mid 1990s Bonlac operated 13 manufac-
turing plants. The sites were milk receival points,
predominantly located in the three major dairying
regions of Victoria. Bonlac had a strong supplier
presence in eastern and western Victoria and a
smaller supplier base in northern Victoria.
The geographical location of the plants reflected
the assets inherited from the initial mergers. Manu-
facturing sites were generally small-scale operations
and several were geographically located in close
proximity to one another. The supply chain configu-
ration was complex with relatively high fixed costs
associated with plant maintenance.
Product distribution is the other major element in
the Bonlac supply chain. On-site storage at regional
plants was limited, especially during the period of
peak milk flow. Several warehouses were used to
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The company recognised there would be efficiency
gains from introducing a centralised distribution
system for servicing export and domestic sales.
In 1996 Bonlac leased a purpose-built distribution
facility located adjacent to the port of Melbourne.
This facility was used to consolidate and dispatch
export orders for non-refrigerated bulk commodities.
The capacity of the site allowed Bonlac to close
some warehousing facilities that had been previously
used for product distribution.
Bonlac established a separate distribution centre
for refrigerated product. A distribution company
with a stand alone facility was contracted to provide
these services. This site was used to dispatch sales of
consumer products to the major supermarkets, the
route trade and overseas markets. The facility also
handled distribution for food service sales. 
Over time, the growth in milk supply required
new investments to expand processing capacity. The
company recognised the opportunities for efficiency
improvements in the supply chain. Larger-scale
plants would spread the cost of overheads over a
larger volume of milk. This would reduce per unit
manufacturing costs and increase net returns.
A strategy was implemented to concentrate invest-
ment in plant capacity at one site in each of the three
regions of Victoria. Older, smaller-scale plants
would be progressively closed as the new capacity
came on stream. In 1996 Bonlac decided to invest
$150M in a new milk powder plant in eastern
Victoria to service the expected growth in regional
milk supplies.
In November 1998 the shareholders of a
Tasmanian manufacturing cooperative (UMT) voted
to join Bonlac Foods. This gave Bonlac a dominant
presence in the Tasmanian dairy industry with about
60% of the state milk supply (UMT, 1998). It also
added another three manufacturing sites to the
Bonlac supply chain.
 
The restructuring of Bonlac foods
 
The financial performance of Bonlac Foods began to
deteriorate in 1999–2000, primarily due to a sus-
tained decline in the value of the Australian dollar
and the impact of hedging arrangements on net
returns. Losses on the currency hedging portfolio
created a substantial differential between the milk
price paid by Bonlac Foods and the price paid by
competitors. Murray Goulburn did not maintain a
rolling currency hedging system and was Bonlac’s
major competitor for milk supplies in Victoria.
The impact on company competitiveness was sub-
stantial. For example, in 2000–01 the Bonlac hedge
portfolio would have reduced total revenues by
$75m if an exchange rate of A$1 = US$0.55 had
been sustained throughout the year. The loss of milk
price competitiveness caused some suppliers to leave
Bonlac and join other companies. The loss of milk
supply increased supply chain costs and affected the
company’s ability to service debt. 
Bonlac’s financial position was unsustainable.
The business was highly geared and needed to raise
equity in order to reduce the level of debt. Balance
sheet gearing (the ratio of net debt to capital
employed) was approximately 62% at June 2000.
The deteriorating performance triggered a major
restructuring of the business. The supply chain was
rationalised with the closure of four manufacturing
sites and seven warehouses. The changes improved
the operational efficiency of the supply chain and
helped to correct the decline in performance.
The restructuring of the business included a deci-
sion to sell non-core assets and use the funds to retire
debt. The beverage business was a substantial non-
core business. In January 2001 the Spring Valley and
Wave brands were sold to Cadbury Schweppes for
$30M. Bonlac entered into a supply agreement with
Cadbury Schweppes for the supply of long-life dairy
beverages including Wave. The beverage manufac-
turing and distribution assets were also sold and a
further $30M was raised.
This action and the concurrent restructuring of the
dairy manufacturing supply chain helped to reduce
costs and improve profitability. The company was
able to pay a competitive milk price in 2000–01. The
restructuring also created the conditions for suppliers
to consider the merits of an alliance with a New
Zealand dairy company.
 
The strategic alliance with Fonterra
 
In May 2001 Bonlac formed a strategic alliance with
the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB). The alliance
substantially changed the business profile of Bonlac.
The consumer products business was separated from
the ingredient business. Bonlac Foods focused on
manufacturing and marketing bulk dairy products. 
The terms of the alliance were negotiated with the
NZDB. Subsequently the NZDB became part of
the Fonterra Cooperative in a major restructuring of
commercial activities in the New Zealand dairy
industry. When the alliance was formed it valued
Bonlac Foods at $825M on the basis of forecast
future cash flows. The implied value of Bonlac sup-
plier shares was approximately $3.86/share and the
issue price of supplier shares (including bonus share
issues) was $1.00.
The NZDB invested $260M in the alliance, com-
posed of a cash injection of $80M and the Australian
business activities of the NZDB which were valued
at $180M (BFL, 2001c). These  business activities 
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were incorporated into a new dairy marketing com-
pany, Bonland Dairies, in conjunction with the
consumer products business of Bonlac Foods. The
NZDB businesses included a consumer products
business based around the Mainland retail brand and
a food service business. 
 
A joint-venture dairy marketing company
 
A key aspect of the strategic alliance was the estab-
lishment of the new dairy marketing company,
Bonland Dairies. The company was a stand-alone
business as a 50:50 joint venture with Fonterra. It
purchased bulk commodities, converted the product
into retail packs and distributed the products to
customers throughout Australia.
Bonland Dairies had sales revenue of around
$560M when it commenced trading (BFL, 2001c). It
operated  at arms length from its respective parent
companies with equal board representation. The
business objective was to market and distribute con-
sumer products under the retail brands that were
licensed from the parent companies. The parent
companies licensed their retail brands to Bonland for
20 years. Bonlac contributed brands such as Western
Star, Bodalla, Bega, etc and Fonterra contributed the
Mainland brand.
Bonland payed royalties to the parent companies
for the use of their respective brands. Net profits
from the joint venture are distributed 50:50 to the
parent companies. As the business developed, the
plan was to create new brands and possibly license
other existing brands to strengthen the product
profile.
The establishment of Bonland Dairies generated
significant cost savings in marketing and distribu-
tion. Per unit distribution costs were reduced through
combining the respective product handling and trans-
port activities. Marketing expenses were reduced as
the business had greater buying power to purchase
advertising space.
The Bonland business structure reflected the con-
sumer product focus of its commercial activities.
There were three business units. The domestic retail
business was responsible for marketing the licensed
consumer product brands. The food service business
incorporated the Australian food service activities of
the parent companies. The international retail busi-
ness handled the retail export activities of Bonlac
Foods. Domestic retail accounted for 60% of total
sales. Domestic food service accounted for 25% of
total sales and international retail accounted for the
remaining 15% of sales.
The domestic retail business was primarily selling
consumer products to the five major supermarket
chains. The supermarkets have a strong bargaining
position in negotiations with food suppliers. They
use their market power to extract favourable pricing
conditions which has a flow-on effect for the net
returns of milk producers.
A key benefit of the alliance was to strengthen the
bargaining power for the branded dairy products
supported by Bonland Dairies. The company had a
substantial market presence in sales of cheese and
dairy spreads. Bonland had a greater influence in
product placement and trade promotion conditions
when negotiating with the supermarket chains. When
Bonland commenced trading it held market shares of
about 30% in branded cheese sales and 40% in
branded sales of dairy spreads. 
The food service business incorporated the
existing distribution networks of the parent compa-
nies. Cost savings from rationalising distribution
activities improved net returns from the food service
business. Bonland inherited a strong customer base
from Bonlac and was able to offer a wider range of
brands and products.
The international retail business continued to
service markets in Southeast Asia, the Middle East
and the Indian Rim. The business was based on retail
brand positions developed by Bonlac Foods. It
included several product brands with a strong market
presence and a generic dairy product brand,
Australian Dairies, with an established position in
Singapore and Malaysia. The business focus was
retail packs of milk powders, fat-based products and
cheese. 
Bonland was contracted to purchase bulk com-
modity requirements from Bonlac and Fonterra.
Purchasing conditions were based on world com-
modity prices. There was an additional margin to
cover the cost of transforming bulk product into con-
sumer product specifications.
Transfer pricing arrangements between Bonlac
and Bonland ensured the input costs for consumer
product sales reflected changes in world market
prices. There was greater transparency in the costing
decisions that determined milk allocations between
commodity exports and consumer products. The
discipline of market-based pricing overcame the
intra-firm transfer pricing issues which had led to
sub-optimal decisions on milk allocations.
 
Current commercial activities of 
Bonlac Foods
 
With the formation of the alliance Bonlac Foods
became a milk manufacturing company. It supplied
commodity ingredients to international customers
and bulk commodities to Bonland Dairies. Debt
levels were substantially reduced — debt servicing 
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commitments for Bonlac declined by about $300M
(BFL, 2001c).
Through the original NZDB investment, Fonterra
held a 25% stake in Bonlac Foods. The remaining
75% was owned by the Australian supplier share-
holders who owned and operated Bonlac Foods
before the alliance was formed. 
Australian shareholders retained control of the
dairy manufacturing business in Bonlac Foods. A
new milk supply cooperative was created to repre-
sent the interests of the combined 75% shareholding.
The commercial structure ensured the 75% share-
holding voted as a single block in board decisions.
Bonlac suppliers had 100% control of the new milk
supply cooperative.
Royalty payments and dividends from Bonland
Dairies became part of the sales revenue stream for
Bonlac Foods. The revenue was to be distributed to
Bonlac shareholders through the milk price or as
share dividends. Export ingredients were marketed
and distributed to overseas customers through
Fonterra’s global distribution network. Bonlac payed
a commission to Fonterra for utilising these mar-
keting services.
Under the terms of the alliance Bonlac was
obliged to pay a milk price to suppliers equal to
92.5% of the weighted average milk price paid by
competitor companies in the Victorian dairy industry
(BFL, 2001c). Fonterra was obliged to receive a
special dividend when the milk price exceeded this
92.5% threshold. The price formula was an average
price paid by competitors weighted by milk intake. 
The special dividend paid to Fonterra reflected
the company’s shareholding in Bonlac Foods. Once
the Bonlac milk price exceeded the trigger point the
extra revenue would be shared 75:25 between
Bonlac suppliers and Fonterra. Ordinary dividends
on shareholdings would still be paid if the commer-





The strategic initiatives of Bonlac Foods over the
past decade have been driven by the consolidation
and globalisation of the food industry. The major
customers for Australian dairy products are primarily
the global food manufacturers and retailers. Com-
mercial consolidation in the food marketing chain is
having a flow-on effect on the commercial structure
of the Australian dairy industry.
Retailers are consolidating into fewer global oper-
ations. This has increased their market power and put
pressure on the margins of food manufacturers.
Increasingly the major retailers will only deal with
brands that have a strong market position and are
promoted by food manufacturers. They want to deal
with fewer suppliers who offer a single integrated
distribution service. It creates strong competition for
shelf space and reduces supply chain costs. For
example, Woolworths and Coles demand a national
pricing structure and deliveries to distribution
centres strategically placed around Australia.
Retail consolidation is forcing consolidation in the
food manufacturing sector. The global food manu-
facturers operating in Asia, Europe and America
want to reduce costs and offset the market power of
retailers. They want to deal with fewer ingredient
suppliers who offer a distribution system that can
service their requirements in several markets.
Globalisation pressures in the food marketing
chain are forcing a similar consolidation process
among dairy companies. Larger-scale dairy product
suppliers have a greater capacity to deal with the
concentrated commercial structure further up the
marketing chain. The Australian dairy industry is
caught up in this globalisation process. 
To maintain a sustainable business relationship
with global retailers and food companies, dairy man-
ufacturers such as Bonlac Foods need operational
scale with national/international distribution capabil-
ities, cost competitiveness in manufacturing and
distribution and strong brands and marketing skills.
There will be further consolidation in the
Australian dairy industry. Murray Goulburn has
investigated the feasibility of a merger with Bonlac
but has not proceeded with a merger proposal at this
stage. In time there will be further consolidation of
the smaller manufacturing cooperatives. The pres-
sure of competing on the world market for dairy
ingredients will drive the change unless a coopera-
tive has a niche market position for a high-value
product.
To sustain a globally competitive business,
Australian cooperatives must become larger-scale
operations. Ongoing improvements in cost competi-
tiveness are a key factor in growing shareholder
returns through milk price and dividends. Develop-
ment of specialised ingredients, product innovations
and strong consumer brands are the key to moving
beyond a commodity dependency. These factors will
mean increased requirements for milk and capital.
The world dairy market is characterised by a long-
term decline in commodity prices primarily driven
by global productivity improvements. Lower costs of
production mean lower product prices for consumers
and farmers. It is a relentless process driven by
competition in domestic and international trade. 
Australian producers need capital for on-farm
investments to maintain their position as low cost
suppliers of milk. Cooperative shareholders are
focused on improving the price they receive for milk. 
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This limits the capital available for investment in
manufacturing facilities, R&D and marketing. As a
result, the use of non-farmer equity to fund business
growth will rise. In addition, farmer shareholders
will increasingly demand that commercial structures
include a mechanism that allows them to realise
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 policies of the 1990s — liberalisation, privatisa-
tion and globalisation — have accentuated the
vulnerability of small-farm agriculture and tradi-
tional craft-based, non-farm enterprises, threatening
the livelihood and security of large sections of
India’s population. The limited capacity of other
sectors of the economy to absorb these changes is
clear from the fact that employment generation is
much below the steady increase of the workforce
over all these years. Employment opportunities are
becoming increasingly scarce and the capital and
knowledge intensity of the jobs is steadily on the
rise. Under such circumstances as these, dairying has
continued to grow and offer opportunities to many
marginalised people, especially in rural areas. How-
ever, the growth in supplies has created adverse
terms of exchange and made dairying unattractive
for those who can shift to other occupations. The
steep downturn in prices has been checked to some
extent by the presence of cooperatives.
Dairying is an important sub-sector of the agricul-
tural sector of India’s economy. Among crop and
livestock products, milk is the number one farm com-
modity in terms of its contribution to the gross value
of output from agriculture in the national economy.
India has more cooperatives and more cooperative
members than any other country in the world.
Barring a few cooperatives in the supply sectors;
namely, credit, inputs, consumers and housing and in
commodity sectors like sugar, dairy and fertiliser,
cooperatives have not met with wide success. Dairy
cooperatives following the Anand pattern are among
those that have met with relative success.
 
Dairy farming in India
 
The predominant model of dairy production in India
is essentially a sub-system of the traditional farming
system. Dairy animals are fed largely on agricultural
by-products and crop residues. Less than 3% of live-
stock feed comes from grains and concentrates
 
* Provisional












Share of agriculture and livestock sector in GDP (at current prices, Rs. billion).
Year GDP (Total) GDP (Agriculture) GDP (livestock sector)
Rs. % share Rs. % share of 
total GDP
% share of 
GDP (Ag)
1980–81 1224 425 34.72 59 4.82 13.88
1985–86 2338 700 29.94 139 5.95 19.86
1986–87 2600 744 28.62 156 6.00 20.97
1987–88 2949 835 28.31 183 6.21 21.92
1988–89 3527 1041 29.52 217 6.15 20.85
1989–90 4087 1154 28.24 275 6.73 23.83
1990–91 4778 1352 28.30 308 6.45 22.78
1991–92 5528 1593 28.82 375 6.78 23.54
1992–93 6307 1779 28.21 432 6.85 24.28
1993–94 7991 2231 27.92 501 6.27 22.46
1994–95 9434 2612 27.69 571 6.08 21.86
1995–96 11,032 2877 26.08 646 5.86 22.45
1996–97 12,853* 3475 27.04 757 5.89 21.78
1997–98 14,267** 3596 25.21 841 5.89 23.39 
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(Tikku, 2002). By-products and residues include
materials such as straw, hay, bran and husks, which
in many parts of India have little economic value. By
using them as feed, farmers are able to convert low-
value materials into a tradable economic commodity
of significant value. Most farm operations are carried
out with the help of domestic surplus labour avail-
able within the household and, even more impor-
tantly, with substantial involvement of women. 
Two major uses of dung are as manure and
domestic fuel. It is estimated that 46 million tonnes
of India’s dung output (on a dry matter basis) is used
as manure, equivalent to 1.7 million tonnes of chem-
ical fertliser in a year. About 31 million tonnes of
dry dung is used as fuel, equivalent to the amount
of energy requiring an additional one million hec-
tares of forest per annum. The imputed economic
and ecological value of these outputs is far more than
the value of principal outputs from the livestock
sector in India (Chabra and Dinh, 2002).
AMUL (Anand Milk Union Limited) is the brand
name of the Keheda district milk producers’ cooper-
atives union in Gujarat. This is where the dairy
cooperative movement under the guidance of Sardar
Patel (later home minister of Independent India) and
Morarji Desai (later Prime Minister of India) started
in 1946, when the country was still under British
rule. The cooperative movement was developed by
Tribhuvandas Patel, farmer leader and Dr Verghese
Kurien, architect of the world’s largest development
program, Operation Flood, which made India the
world’s largest milk producer. Of the 10 talukas of
Kheda district, Kapadwanj taluka contributes the
maximum amount of milk to Amul, followed by
others. Kapadwanj taluka has insufficient water
sources for intensive agriculture. Dairying is the
mainstay of most families. It has the highest number
of dairy cooperative societies. Contrary to normal
expectations, the amount of milk received by Amul
from the well-developed Charotar area (Anand,
Nadiad, Borsad and Petlad talukas of Kheda district)
may gradually be outstripped by milk contributed by
others. There are several dairy cooperative unions
(DCU) which have a similar experience of increased
procurement from rain-fed areas and dwindling pro-
curement from irrigated areas, for example, procure-
ment of milk from upland areas of Krishna and the
west and east Godavari districts of Andhra Pradesh
compared to canal irrigated areas of the same
districts (Babu and Reddy, 1995). 
Irrigated areas usually offer more lucrative oppor-
tunities than producing milk for self and local
consumption. This might explain the very low level
of procurement of milk from such areas. But dair-
ying in a rain-fed area, even though a technically
feasible and attractive option compared to others,
would not be profitable without access to a market.
Lucrative alternate employment opportunities are
often not available in villages, making dairying an
attractive option. The low capital intensity, short
operating cycle and steady returns make dairying a
preferred activity among the marginal and small
farmers (those operating less than two hectares of
land) and even the landless who depend for fodder
on common grazing and forest lands. About 57% of
rural households are marginal and small farmers in
about 170 milk sheds serve consumers in about 500
urban centres. A majority of producers have one or
two milking cows, which account for some 70% of
milk production. Nearly 70 million households hold
a total of 98 million cows and buffaloes. On average,
milk contributes about 22.5% of the income of rural
households.
For India, dairy development is largely a way to
improve the rural economy when land is limited and
the rural population is large. Capital intensive, large-
scale dairy farming with high cost inputs of feed and
concentrates is not attractive as milk prices are rela-
tively depressed by the dominant production of milk
by conversion of low value crop residues by small and
marginal farmers. Over a period of time, this has
resulted in adverse terms of trade for large-scale dair-
ying activity and the trend continues. Small producers
continue to have a comparative advantage in terms of
farm gate price (Tikku, 2002).
Over the past three decades, India has achieved
tremendous progress in the field of dairy develop-
ment. In terms of milk production as well as annual
growth in production, India’s performance has been
phenomenal. The contribution of dairying to rural
employment and empowerment of women has also
been phenomenal. Within agriculture, dairying as an
enterprise has been more successful in distributing
the fruits of progress than crop production. In spite
of such phenomenal growth, India is far below the
world average in terms of productivity. While India
has 2% of the world’s geographic area, it supports
about 18% of the world’s cattle and buffalo popula-
tion, but contributes only about 14% of the world’s
milk output, largely as dairying continues to remain
a sub-system integrated with the farming system. 
 
The dairy processing industry in India
 
During the period 1980–81 to 2000–01, food grain
production increased from 129.6 million tonnes to
195.9 million tonnes; while milk production more
than doubled from 31.6 million tonnes to 81 million
tonnes, making India self-sufficient in major food
commodities such as cereals and milk. India is the
first world producer of milk but only about 14% of
its production is processed in organised cooperatives, 
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private and public sectors. Producer households
retain 50% of milk in the village itself for home con-
sumption. In addition, a large proportion of milk is
processed into ethnic milk products, including
sweets and culinary products such as cottage cheese
(paneer). Milk that is used in these products is not
included in the figures of milk processed by dairy
plants. 
 







plants are normally located near the source of milk
because about 85% of milk is water. It may not make
much of a difference to have plants nearer to
markets, if one is marketing liquid milk. Even then,
perishability of raw milk imposes limits. Assuming
that liquid milk markets have already reached satura-
tion at current price levels or would be doing so in
the near future, manufacture of products would then
become imperative. Location of plants, in such an
event, is going to confer either an advantage or a
serious handicap. Decentralised processing plants or
multi-stage processing plants would confer advan-
tages. Traditional product manufacturing industry
has these advantages and offers stiff competition.
The larger plants scored over much smaller adver-
saries earlier. Many existing cooperative dairy plants
are large-scale ones. These are facing the disadvan-
tage of transporting raw milk over long distances,
incurring substantial costs. When traditional compet-
itors establish themselves closer to the sources of
supply and manufactured products, this will cut into
the existing strongholds of cooperative dairy plants. 
 
Shorter operating cycles — heart of efficient opera-
tions. 
 
If we locate a plant at one point and draw con-
centric circles with different radii and plot the
percentage of milk procured from each of the con-
centric zones, we would understand the economics of
procurement operations better. The larger the share
the dairy plant collects from farther away, the greater
are its costs of collection. 
A similar exercise regarding disposal of milk and/
or products highlights the economics of marketing
operations. Again, the larger the volume of milk/
products the dairy is selling farther away, the larger
will be its selling costs. 
Another such exercise needs to be carried out with
respect to realisation of value over time. Once again,
the larger the volume or value of realisation that is
taking place farther from the point of incurring pro-
curement and processing costs, the greater would be
the costs of inventory, interest, etc. Large-scale
working capital and chain of cold storage for distri-
bution will also be required. 
The relative advantages enjoyed by small opera-
tors largely stem from their shorter operating cycles
and relatively high-margin, value-added products.
They will always be able to undercut others, if nec-
essary. Many of the cooperative, private and govern-
ment dairy plants also suffer from huge idle
capacities and the costs associated with them. In
simple terms, a dairy plant which is able to procure
most of its milk from the nearest point, sell most of
its output in the nearest market and realise its value
in the shortest possible time would be the most effi-









Although it is not well recog-
nised, operating in a compact area brings definite
advantages. It may be advantageous for a dairy plant
to encourage scale intensity of milk production at the
individual producer level rather than going farther
and farther away to collect milk. The milk shed con-
cept is based on these premises. Unfortunately, the
operating areas of most cooperatives simplistically
coincide with administrative divisions, without any
economic logic. It is not uncommon to find pro-
ducers who are not members of the plant nearest to
them but rather of a plant much farther away. 
We have to recognise the benefits of a compact
area of operation in relation to continuously incur-
ring higher operating costs. Poor milk producers may
have to be helped to supplement their capital either
directly or indirectly by working out arrangements
with credit institutions to increase their scale of
activity. This would make dairying more central to
their livelihood by increasing the relative share of
income from that activity. 
 
Operation Flood and the white revolution
 
A recent World Bank audit shows that of the Rs 200
crores (1 crore = 10 million) it invested in Operation
Flood II, the net return to the rural economy has been
a massive Rs 24,000 crores per year over a period of
10 years, or a total of Rs 240,000 crores (Chandler
and Kumar, 1998). No other major development pro-
gram has matched this input:output ratio. Operation
Flood, launched in 1970, has been instrumental in
helping farmers mould their own development, thus
helping them reach consumers in 700 towns and
cities through a National Milk Grid. It also helped
eradicate the need for middlemen and reduced
seasonal price variations. As a result of the coopera-
tive structure the whole exercise of production and
distribution of milk and milk products has become
economically viable for farmers to undertake on their
own. In this manner the farmer himself can enjoy the
full fruits of his own labor, instead of surrendering a
majority of the potential profit to middlemen. 
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Three phases of development
 
The scheme sought to establish milk producer coop-
eratives in the villages and make modern technology
available to them. The broad objectives are to
increase milk production (a ‘flood of milk’), aug-
ment rural incomes and transfer to milk producers





 of Operation Flood was financed by the sale
within India of skimmed milk powder and butter oil
provided free by the EC countries via the World
Food Program. During its first phase, the project
aimed to link India’s 18 best milk sheds with the
milk markets of the four metropolitan cities of Delhi,




 of the project, implemented during 1981–
85, raised this to some 136 milk sheds linked to more
than 290 urban markets. The seed capital raised from
the sale of WFP/EEC free products and World Bank
loan had created, by the end of 1985, a self-
sustaining system of 43,000 village cooperatives
covering 4.25 million milk producers. Milk powder
production increased from 22,000 tonnes in the pre-
project year to 140,000 tonnes in 1989, thanks to
dairies established under Operation Flood. The EEC
aid thus helped to promote self-reliance. Direct mar-
keting of milk by producer cooperatives resulted in
the transfer of profits from milk contracts, which




 of Operation Flood (1985–1996) enabled
dairy cooperatives to rapidly establish the basic
infrastructure required to procure and market more
and more milk daily. Facilities were created by the
cooperatives to provide better veterinary first-aid and




. The year 1995–96
marked the termination of Operation Flood III,
funded by a World Bank loan, EEC food aid and
internal resources of NDDB. At the conclusion of
Operation Flood III, 72,744 dairy cooperative socie-
ties in 170 milk sheds of the country, having a total
membership of 9,314,000 had been organised. The
targets set have either been effectively achieved or
exceeded apart from procurement targets which
could not be reached as private agencies started pro-
curing milk from the cooperative villages, following
the new de-licensing policy under the government’s
program of economic liberalisation. The conditions
for long-term growth in procurement have been
created. An assured market and remunerative pro-
ducer prices for raw milk, technical input services
including AI, balanced cattle feed and emergency
veterinary health services have all contributed to sus-
tained increases in milk production. Three state-of-
the-art dairies designed to produce quality products
for both the domestic and export markets have been
commissioned. While the demand for milk was
rising under Operation Flood the total cattle popula-
tion remained more or less static. 
The main thrust of Operation Flood was to organise
dairy cooperatives in the milk-shed areas of the
village, and to link them to the four metro cities, which
are the main markets for milk. The efforts undertaken
by NDDB have not only led to enhanced production,
improvement in methods of processing and develop-
ment of a strong marketing network, but have also led
to the emergence of dairying as an important source
of employment and income generation in rural areas.
It has also led to an improvement in yields, longer lac-
tation periods and shorter calving intervals through
the use of modern breeding techniques. Establishment
of milk collection centres, and chilling centres pro-
vided marketing avenues for producers in hinterlands,
extended the life of raw milk and enabled minimisa-
tion of wastage due to spoilage of milk. 
 
Anand pattern dairy cooperatives
 
Operation Flood, which started in 1970, concluded
its third phase in 1996. What it achieved covers more
than the application of science and technology,
though both have played a role; and more than the
creation of farmer-owned structures, though such
structures have been necessary to success. It covers
all of this, as well as the orchestration of all policies
and programs that affect production.
The story of Operation Flood can be viewed from
three angles. The first is to consider what it did to the
dairy industry; the second is from the eyes of the
small farmer — it has revolutionised their way of
life; and the third is the pattern of success it created
for other countries to follow. By promoting the
Anand pattern of dairy cooperatives, Operation
Flood envisaged a sustained increase in resource
productivity, culminating in improved quality of life
for milk producers and an assured supply of quality
milk and other dairy products to consumers at a
reasonable price in a free market environment.
Following the cooperative path, market oriented milk
production and modernisation of dairying in milk
production, processing and marketing progressed
significantly. The Anand pattern involved:
• decentralised milk production by small milk
producers 
• milk procurement by primary dairy cooperatives
of milk producers
• centralised milk processing by a union of dairy
cooperatives and 
• marketing of milk and milk products by a federa-
tion of unions 
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The primary milk producers democratically
govern this entire federal cooperative structure to
ensure that the higher tier organisations are geared to
serve the purpose of the lower levels and the gains at
all levels flow ultimately back to the milk producers
in a significant measure. The Anand pattern model
was the basis of this monumental achievement. The
core feature of the Anand pattern model is farmer





 Value adding at the procurement and
processing stages has been realised by the coopera-
tives through control over marketing, thus making
marketing an essential and critical feature for suc-
cess. Many cooperatives worldwide end up as sup-
pliers of raw material to private companies as the
private companies own brands and marketing.
 




 Catalysing Cooperation: Design of Self Governing Organisations 
by Tushaar Shah 1996
 
A. Market as the pre-condition for post-subsistence production
 
In a subsistence production system, in order to raise production and productivity, we must first stimulate and
expand the remunerative market opportunities to which subsistence producers have easy, low-cost access.
“In order to create an Anand, it is important to first find a Bombay”.
 
B. Marketing as the first step to cooperative organisation
 
It is best to begin by studying the demand system rather than the production system and to first mount a
successful marketing strategy rather than to organise the producers. Where marketing is under-emphasised
or mishandled, dairy and other cooperatives failed.
“Production enhancement programs must follow and not precede the commissioning of the procurement,
processing and marketing system”.
 
C. Anand pattern: a superior design concept
 
A superior design concept is required to avoid mis-match between demand and supply and also to free the
cooperative from competition with small-time players.
“An Anand can capture and retain a Bombay’s market and yet provide its farmer members a stable remu-
nerative market for milk only if it has processing facilities.” Decentralised small-scale production of milk in
the villages is more cost-effective than large-scale milk production in urban areas but without transport and
processing facilities distant markets cannot be accessed. 
 
D. The principle of pump priming
 
The best way to organise a producers’ cooperative is to start with marketing. However, unless producers’
cooperatives are organised, they have nothing to market; and unless cooperatives know how to dispose of
the produce, they cannot start the procurement process. 
“External resource support is required for priming the pump”.
 
E. The SNF surplus — distinctive competitive advantage
 
The SNF surplus made it possible for cooperatives to offer much higher prices than traditional operators
and made it entirely uneconomical for members to make ghee at home. In addition it has helped to ensure a
steady supply in spite of lean to flush seasonal variations in milk production. 
“The SNF surplus was created by the powder plant and was a source of powerful competitive advantage
vis-à-vis the traditional competitors.”
 
F. Member involvement and professional management
 
In the absence of professional expertise, it would be difficult to quickly gain a market foothold on the scale
needed and exploit the full advantage offered by technology and the market. Whose interests a successful
business enterprise serves will depend upon whom professionals are accountable to, in principle and practice. 
“If development of producers is the goal behind building the business, then this goal could be best
achieved by ensuring that the business is managed by professionals and technocrats who are and “feel”
accountable to producers through their elected board”. 
Quotes are attributed to Dr V. Kurien, architect of Operation Flood, a large-scale dairy development
project involving millions of milk producers in India. 
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Dairy cooperatives account for the major share of
processed liquid milk marketed in the country. Milk
is processed and marketed by 170 Milk Producers’
Cooperative Unions, which belong to 15 State Coop-
erative Milk Marketing Federations. The Dairy
Board’s programs and activities seek to strengthen
the functioning of dairy cooperatives as producer-
owned and controlled organisations. NDDB supports
the development of dairy cooperatives by providing
them with financial assistance and technical exper-
tise, ensuring a better future for India’s farmers.
Over the years, brands created by cooperatives have
become synonymous with quality and value. Brands
like Amul (GCMMF), Vijaya (AP), Verka (Punjab),
Saras (Rajasthan), Nandini (Karnataka), Milma
(Kerala) and Gokul (Kolhapur) are among those that
have earned customer confidence.
Unfortunately, for several reasons including
a) politically dictated leadership in cooperatives
b) undue bureaucratic and pervasive control by state
governments c) regulation by restrictive and repres-
sive cooperative laws and d) lack of accountable
professional expertise that could harness the advan-
tages of technology and market opportunities, the
federal cooperative structures that emerged did not
function with the autonomy and the independence to
truly serve the interests of milk producer members.
The federal cooperative structures in several cases
(with a few exceptions) and especially the higher tier
organisations (unions and their federations) became
self-serving, operationally inefficient and loss
making ventures and thus became oppressive bodies.
Decisions related to procurement and marketing
were often not dictated by sound business practice or
the long-term interest of the business. This adversely
affected the capital accumulation within the federal
cooperative structure and slowly crippled their
capacity to service debt, perform efficiently and
effectively meet with the challenges from domestic
and international competition leading to erosion of
faith in the cooperative path. 
Over the years, remedial efforts were initiated by
several organisations and individuals to restore
autonomy and independence to dairy cooperatives, to
reform central and state cooperative laws and, in
some instances, to recommend dismantling of
inefficient and oppressive higher-tier organisations.
These efforts resulted in: 
• progressive parallel Cooperative Societies Acts in
several states, starting with Andhra Pradesh
• the enactment of the Multi-state Cooperative Soci-
eties Act, 2002 by the central government 
• the Companies (Second Amendment) Bill, 2001
which allows incorporation of producer compa-
nies that can work in consonance with principles
of cooperation under the Companies Act, and




Opportunities are now available for cooperatives to
enter into new strategic partnerships, float joint
ventures and negotiate supply or marketing arrange-
ments with other cooperatives and/or other organ-
isations, including companies. What do these
opportunities really mean and how can one prepare in
order to benefit from them? What kind of pitfalls
could one avoid by learning from the experience of
Dairy cooperatives in India at a glance.
Reach
The Dairy Cooperative Network 
• includes 170 milk unions 
• operates in over 285 districts 
• covers nearly 1,01,000 village level societies 
• is owned by nearly 11 million farmer members 
Milk Production 
• India’s milk production increased from 21.2 million 
tonnes in 1968 to 84.6 million tonnes in 2001–02
• Per capita availability of milk presently is 226 grams 
per day, up from 112 grams per day in 1968–69
• India’s 4% annual growth of milk production 
surpasses the 2% growth in population; the net 
increase in availability is around 2% per year
Marketing
• In 2001–02, average daily cooperative milk 
marketing stood at 13.4 billion litres; annual growth 
has averaged about 5% compounded over the last 
five years
• Dairy cooperatives now market milk in about 200 
large cities including metropolitan cities like Delhi, 
Kolkata, Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad and 
Bangalore, and some 550 smaller towns
• During the last decade, the daily milk supply to each 
1000 urban consumers has increased from 17.5 to 
47.3 litres
Innovation 
• Bulk-vending, saving money and the environment
• Milk travels as far as 2200 kilometres to deficit areas, 
carried by innovative rail and road milk tankers
• Ninety-five percent of dairy equipment is produced in 
India, saving valuable foreign exchange
Macro Impact 
• The annual value of India’s milk production amounts 
to about Rs. 850 million
• Dairy cooperatives generate employment 
opportunities for some 11 million families 
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others? The changing liberal context calls for a serious
debate to examine such issues as the following:
 
Opportunities for collaborative arrangements
 
The emerging liberal context offers collaborative
opportunities to cooperatives to experiment with
entering into relationships such as strategic partner-
ships, joint ventures, contractual supply or marketing
arrangements etc. with other cooperatives and/or
organisations, including companies. There is some
apprehension about the implications of such collabo-
ration on the autonomy and independence of policy-
making governance systems, strategic, management
and operational control systems in various coopera-
tives in the federal structures. Several other issues
include resource sharing, transfer pricing, respon-
sible risk (surplus/deficit) sharing, protection from
divesting, transfer of shares to other parties, and
transparent and accountable functioning of partners,
resolution of disputes and responsibilities in case of
winding up or divestment.
• What impacts do such strategic partnerships, con-
tractual supply or marketing arrangements and
joint ventures etc. generate for the ultimate mem-
bers in terms of improved benefits and enhanced
democratic control over their own cooperatives? 
• What are the risks involved in such strategic part-
nerships and joint ventures etc., and what meas-
ures can be thought of to protect and safeguard
member interests? 
• What should be the broad terms of such strategic
partnerships and joint ventures to ensure the long-
term viability of cooperatives in terms of capital
accumulation, operational efficiency and capacity
to withstand and thrive in the face of domestic and
international competition?
• What specific advantages or disadvantages do
such collaborations offer in the changed circum-
stances over other options? What precautions are
required to overcome the disadvantages and capi-
talise on advantages?
• Are still more changes required in the state and
central legislation to fully benefit from such
opportunities?
 
Future of cooperative federalism 
 
Experiences with cooperative federalism that prima-
rily emerged to provide access to markets far and
wide for inputs and outputs, harness technology and
attract capital seem to have created a mix of a few
successes and many failures. The future of coopera-
tive federalism needs to be examined in the light of
the experience of different sectors in India and also in
the light of the experience of cooperative federalism
in other countries. Several weaknesses, such as the
following, have come to light.
 






Many of our primary
cooperatives are ‘large scale’ from the economic
theory point of view. The primary co-operative itself
can be treated as a federal enterprise of member level
economic enterprises. Unless members, their primary
co-operative, the union and the federation think of
themselves as parts of one large composite business
unit, they cannot effectively derive the benefits of
unified action. Developments in technology and
emerging big markets indicate a bias towards large
scale and matching organisations can only use the
opportunities offered. Unfortunately, the way the
cooperative institutions are organised does not pro-
mote such unity. Each cooperative has distinct legal
identity and autonomy. Myopic assertions of
freedom prevent greater integration. With ever-
increasing politicisation, federal structures are
becoming contentious.
 
Rigid boundaries — barriers for exchange of factors.
 
There are other barriers for smooth transfer of dif-
ferent factors of production. These factors are strictly
identified with autonomously organised units. Even
if some units had an excess or a shortage of some of
these factors, and judicious transfer across the insti-
tutions was mutually beneficial, it could not be done.
Federations need to be reconstituted as single com-
modity organisations with the unions or primaries as
constituent parts and not as autonomous units with
their own identity. This can be done with sufficient
space for member participation as well. Today, the
cooperative federations need to respond to competi-
tion from much bigger rivals, and can ill afford
chinks. The degree of integration and coordination
they need is akin to that required in a human body!
While private trade is moving towards increasing
scale of operations, cooperative institutions should
not lag behind with pseudo considerations of a sense
of freedom and autonomy. The history of coopera-
tives in Europe is replete with examples of
successes, where the required degree of integration
was achieved, and with failures where the pseudo
sense of freedom and identity prevailed in the way of
such meaningful mergers (Watkins, 1986).
 
Rigid boundaries build myopic vision.
 
 In numerous
cases federations force deals, which are advanta-
geous to them, on constituent unions. The surplus/
deficit below their level is not of concern to them.
Similar thinking abounds at the union and primary
levels too, losing sight of the very objectives of the
entire structure. In retrospect, cooperative federa-
tions of India, barring a very few, have invariably
acted against the interests of their constituents. Many 
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of these are in fact oppressive ‘parasites’, though
they were created to nurture their constituents. The
major reason is the way they are structured.
 
Decentralisation and unitary structures.
 
 Economic
theory suggests a federal entity with a unified, single
identity but with several constituent sub-units or
small sub-groups. Reorganising cooperative federa-
tions in the light of economic rationalism is an
urgent and paramount task. Federalism and decen-
tralisation are associated in much of our thinking but
federalism and centralisation seem to be the direction
in which our cooperative federations have moved.
Large structures with a unifying identity need not
necessarily go with centralisation, as seen in the
reorganisation of several large transnational com-
panies. Networking promotes an essential sense of
being part of a large organisation without eroding
their sense of autonomy. Unfortunately, the indi-
vidual identity and sense of autonomy of existing
federations and constituents stand in the way of such
a grand alliance marked with unified identity. 
• Is cooperative federalism still relevant in the
changed circumstances?
• What are the specific advantages or disadvantages
federal cooperative structures offer in the changed
circumstances over other options?
• What changes are required in federal cooperative
structures to overcome the disadvantages and
capitalise on advantages in the changed circum-
stances?
 
Role of promotional agencies
 
Promotion of cooperatives and their federal struc-
tures through external project funding seems to have
resulted in low capital stakes of members and
weakening demand from members for transparent
and accountable conduct from elected leaders as well
as professional managers. With little of their capital
at stake members did not insist on the efficiency or
profitability of their operations. The following ques-
tions about the future of agricultural cooperatives
need to be considered:
• What is the role of promotional agencies to make
cooperatives and their structures truly successful
in terms of member control and self-reliant and
sustainable instruments to serve the interests of
members?
• What are the appropriate instruments or package
of instruments – project funding, equity participa-
tion, technical and managerial assistance, policy
advocacy, involvement including takeover of
management and operations, providing backward
and forward linkages, capacity building, subsi-
dising capital costs and operational costs etc? 
• Most of these instruments have been tried with
different degrees of success and failure both in
India and in other countries. What are the lessons
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 marketing of agricultural products is undergoing
a revolution. Where spot market transactions were
once the ‘norm’ for farmers, increased attention is
now being placed on vertical integration between
farmers and other agents in the supply chain. This
trend in the global food industry reflects growing
consumer demand for attributes such as health, nutri-
tion, convenience and variety; and the technological
innovation that has enabled these attributes to be
produced. Technological advances in farming
include, for example, production of leaner pork and
biological control of pests, to satisfy western health
concerns. Innovations at the preharvest and post-
harvest level in the production and handling of fruit
and vegetables have satisfied consumer demand for a
nutritious variety of fresh produce. Technical inno-
vations in the handling and processing of food have
also enabled production of more convenient foods
demanded by the urban consumer. However, these
processes often require a greater degree of homoge-
neity in the quality of raw inputs. The overriding
feature of these trends has been the high value placed
on certain food attributes and the interdependence of
decision making along the supply chain to produce
such attributes. This interdependence implies that
coordination of decision making allows a greater
economic gain in the agrifood industry (Hennessy,
1996; Royer, 1995; Kerallah and Kirsten, 2001).
Increasing liberalisation of agricultural markets
around the world has meant that developing country
farmers are not immune to these changes in the
global food industry. The impact of agricultural trade
liberalisation on smallholders in developing coun-
tries is a hotly debated issue. However, at least in
theory, developing country farmers, who have a
comparative advantage in the production of some
products at the farm level can potentially benefit
from participating in the global food industry. One of
the significant constraints in the realisation of gains
from agricultural production in developing countries
is the marketing of these products. These constraints
relate to inferior technology in the supply chain,
insufficient information, weak institutional arrange-
ments and high transport and handling costs that are
the result of weak public infrastructure. Moreover,
consumer preferences in the global market for
agrifood products are such that economies of scale
are significant. 
 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) and 
agricultural marketing
 
The industrialisation of agriculture in response to
consumer demands has led to an increased inter-
dependence between decision makers and is associ-
ated with a high degree of asset specificity in the
supply chain. The ‘invisible hand’ theory of neo-
classical economics loses its appeal in complex
supply chains where the costs of undertaking trans-
actions are substantial. The New Institutional Eco-
nomics provides an alternative approach for
understanding the vertical organisation of produc-
tion, and has been applied to the problem of agricul-
tural production and marketing by numerous authors
(eg Hobbs, 1996; Gabre-Madhin, 2001; and those
reviewed here).
Based on seminal works of Coase and Williamson,
the NIE applications to agricultural marketing have
focused on vertical relationships in the supply chain
and the issues surrounding the transactions between
farmers and downstream agents. Two main concepts
in NIE are relevant to this analysis; these are theory
of incomplete contracts and principal-agent theory.
A substantial amount of literature has examined the




investor owned firms (IOF) in the downstream
marketing/processing of agrifood products. It is not
surprising that there has been such renewed interest
in this field. The significant economies of scale in the
downstream sector of the agrifood industry have led
to an increased degree of concentration in marketing
and processing and the traditional justification for
agricultural cooperatives was to provide counter-
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The other main area of discussion of cooperatives
is their effectiveness as an organisational form.
Numerous issues arise in the governance of coopera-
tives and historical experience indicates that they can
run into financial difficulty due to design problems
(Cook, 1995). NIE has also been applied to exam-
ining property rights and control issues in the
management of cooperative firms. The newer
cooperatives that have emerged in the 1990s in
North America are vastly different in nature and
appear to overcome many of the inherent difficulties
previously encountered. 
The aim of this review is to examine the theory of
cooperatives with particular attention to the question
of their involvement in downstream activities in the
agrifood chain, and to assess its relevance to devel-
oping countries (particularly in the context of their
participation in world markets). The first section
examines NIE theory in terms of its insights into the
organisation (vertical integration) of modern agricul-
tural markets, and addresses the question of the rela-
tive advantage of cooperatives over investor owned
firms. The second part examines the literature on the
internal management of cooperatives. The final
section summarises the key points and examines the
question of relevance of the literature to developing
country markets.
 
The theory of incomplete contracts
 
The theory of incomplete contracts focuses on the
problem of asset specificity that is characteristic of
many decisions in the agrifood chain. Assets are said
to be ‘specific’ if there is a divergence between
acquisition cost and resale value, and there is imper-
fect competition in the market that can allow one of
the parties in the transaction to act opportunistically
(Staatz, 1987b).
An example that is often cited is the case of a pri-
mary producer who needs to make a specific invest-
ment (such as in capital or knowledge) in order to
produce a raw input that is required by a processor.
The investment is specific to the type of product
required by the processor, and involves a fixed
investment that has no value elsewhere. A numerical
example presented by Hendriske and Veerman
(2001) is repeated here for illustration:
The potential for opportunism can discourage
investment that is otherwise socially efficient, as
illustrated in Figure 1. This renegade behavior is
usually deemed to arise from the incompleteness of





, the renegade uses the excuse







Asset specificity: cooperatives vs investor-owned 
firms
 
The ‘hold-up problem’ illustrated in Figure 1 con-
curs with the notion of countervailing power that has
been used to justify the establishment of coopera-
tives. Numerous authors have considered whether
cooperatively owned firms can offer more security
and certainty for farmers’ investment choices and
thus solve the ‘hold-up problem’ (eg Royer, 1995;
Skyuta and Cook, 2001). Staatz (1987b) acknowl-
edges that there may be alternative collective
response solutions to the problem, such as lobbying
the government, or suing contract breaches, but
argues that a marketing/processing cooperative may
be more cost effective.
However, as Hendriske and Veerman (2001) point
out, asset specificity exists on both sides of a trans-
action between farmers and processors. Indeed, the
large economies of scale associated with modern
agrifood chains may mean that the asset specificity
problem is more important on the processing side.
The processor investing in sunk capital may fear that
farmers will try to negotiate a share of the quasi sur-
plus, with the threat of withholding supply of its raw
input. They consider the distributional consequences
of investor-owned (where the surplus is shared
between farmers and processors), and cooperative
processing firms (where all the surplus is owned by
farmers). Their general result is that efficient govern-
ance structures (ie sharing of surplus rules) depends
on the degree of asset specificity and the size of the
surplus relative to it. Investor owned firms are more
efficient as asset specificity becomes more pro-
nounced on the processing side, but a larger surplus
will still mean that a cooperative is efficient for
higher levels of relative asset specificity. However,
their analysis focuses on a bilateral bargaining game
that relies on farmers’ bargaining power being suffi-
ciently strong — there may be scope for processors
to weaken a coalition of farmers who also have sunk
assets in the supply chain.
The extent to which exploitative behavior can
occur will also depend on the nature of the produc-
tion and the degree of imperfect competition in the
market. For a highly perishable product, the appro-
priate ‘quasi surplus’ in the hold-up problem is really
the value of the raw input to the processor, less the
opportunity cost of the farmer’s product. A highly
perishable good that has already been harvested has
little value unless it is transferred immediately into
the supply chain; thus the potential size of the quasi
surplus is large. The highly perishable nature of agri-
cultural production has often been cited as justifica-
tion for the claim that farmers have a weak
bargaining position. However, as Staatz (1987b) 
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notes, the extent to which exploitative behavior
would continue in a repeated transaction will be tem-
pered by the need to maintain a raw input supply
(farmers need to at least recover seasonable variable
costs) and the threat of entry of alternative marketing
channels. Similarly, the degree to which exploitative
behavior over farmers sunk long-term costs would
continue will depend on the degree of competition
and, in particular, the strength of the processor’s
spatial monopoly. 
The presence of sunk costs in both the processing





 of the new generation cooperatives in
North America. For example, Staatz (1987a) argues
that one of the potential advantages of decision
making in cooperatives, is that decision making
takes account of the fixed or sunk costs of patrons.
They are more interested in guaranteeing a market
for the patrons and may accept a lower return on
investment in order to achieve this goal (ie in return
for the non-monetary rewards of farming). Stefanson
et al. (1995) cite numerous case studies where the
impetus for cooperative development has been in
response to ‘structural adjustment issues’, and has
been supported by government, at least in terms of
information and training, as a ‘pro family farm and
pro rural development’ institution. In this context,
some of the proposed benefits of cooperative












The hold-up problem (from Hendriske and Veerman, 2001)
Suppose a farmer considers producing a crop that has a total investment cost of $40, of which $20 is a fixed
(sunk) cost. A processor is willing to pay $50 for the crop as a raw input into his production, so a surplus
of $10 is possible, which can be shared between the two agents in the transaction, the farmer and the
processor. 
A deal may be struck in an ex ante situation where the processor agrees to share the surplus equally with
the farmer. Thus, the farmer stands to receive a price of $45, and a surplus of $5, hence will make the
investment. However, in the ex post situation, when the farmer has made the investment and produced the
product, the processor may renege on the ex ante deal and try to extract a greater surplus. The amount of
rent that is available ex post is the sum of the original surplus ($10) plus the value of the fixed investment
(as this has no market value outside the transaction), thus the surplus is $30. If the processor offers the same
share (50%) of the ex post surplus, the farmer loses $5 from the transaction. If the farmer anticipates that
such behaviour will occur then he is unlikely to make the investment. The sequence of the game is shown
in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Payoffs from investment and contract execution decisions 
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involvement also relate to regional income distribu-
tion (Staatz, 1987b)
There are some cases in the US where farmer
cooperatives have bought out existing IOFs that were
closing down operations. Staatz (1987b) considers
the question “if farmers are willing to accept a lower
return for a guaranteed market, why didn’t they
simply renegotiate prices with the IOF?” He suggests
that a lack of trust may be the explanation. For
example, perhaps the farmer group refuses to believe
that the IOF is in financial trouble, hence can’t
distinguish between the threat of closure and oppor-
tunism. Porter and Scully (1987) claim that coopera-
tives are given financial incentives over and above
their investor-owned counterparts, including tax
breaks, interest subsidies and free advice, which may
explain their ability to accept lower returns on
investment.
 
Risk and the asset specificity problem
 
The theory of incomplete contracts focuses on
‘unforeseen events’ as the mechanism by which par-
ties can renege on contracts. Uncertainty in a trans-
action will increase the likelihood that contracts will





by contracting parties to renegotiate are hampered by
fear of opportunism, and this implies that greater
effort needs to be put into writing more complete
contracts and into monitoring the behavior of con-
tracting parties. The extent to which farmers are
collectively organised, and therefore have bargaining
strength in renegotiation of contracts, and the extent
to which alternative market channels for the raw
input are available, will influence the IOFs’ invest-
ment in more complete contract specification, thus
raising transactions costs and reducing the economic
surplus.
The uncertain nature of agricultural production, in
terms of both quantity and quality, means that there
is a large degree of risk in vertical contracting. The
organisation of the supply chain affects how this risk
is borne between parties, and consequently in the
need for renegotiation of contracts due to unforeseen
events. In many cases investor owned processing
firms will write contracts with growers specifying
deliver price, which places a degree of risk on the
firm, as they cannot necessarily pass on this price
risk to consumers because prices are more rigid in
upstream markets. The contingency pricing nature of
cooperatives (where prices are paid on results of
sales) reduces risks at the processing end and
reduces the need for renegotiation of contracts
(Staatz, 1987b). The appeal of contingency pricing
arrangements, from the point of view of the proc-
essor, is such that even IOFs are moving to this type
of pricing. However, according to Staatz, such
arrangements may not work as well because in a
cooperative the members can monitor accounts and
have representatives overseeing management so





The interdependence between decisions along the
supply chain means that principal-agent theory is
highly relevant to the problem of supply chain man-
agement. Agency problems arise because one party
(the agent) has decision making rights that affect the
other person’s (the principal’s) wealth, and has an
informational advantage over the principal, and the




Sykuta and Cook, 2001). Information asymmetry,
which raises the cost of transactions because of the
need to design monitoring and enforcement mecha-
nisms to overcome incentive incompatibility, can
prevent development of viable agrifood sectors. 
The two different types of information asymmetry
are hidden information and hidden action, which











Hidden information (adverse selection)
 
Hidden information problems, otherwise known as
adverse selection, refer to the case where one party
has an informational advantage over the other before
entering into a transaction. 
One of the important adverse selection problems
in agrifood supply chains stems from the fact that
food consumers have strong preferences for
embodied attributes that are difficult to measure
from visual inspection of the consumer good. For
example, consumers have preferences for food
safety, production technique (eg free range eggs) and
are willing to pay premiums for these attributes.
They are unable to assess whether these attributes
are in the product they are consuming and rely on
information provided to them by suppliers. There is
an incentive for suppliers to lie about these attributes
and claim the premium. The adverse selection
problem, if not dealt with, results in a sub-optimal
supply of quality because, in the absence of
screening information, consumers base their willing-
ness to pay on a probability weighted expected value
— which only low-quality suppliers have the incen-
tive to supply (Ackerlof, 1970).
At the consumer end, adverse selection can be
attenuated by advertising and branding; or by govern-
ment intervention in the form of quality standards
and licensing (Sexton, 1994). However, the provision 
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of product guarantees at the consumer end also
requires that hidden information problems are dealt
with along the length of the supply chain and this can
be achieved by contracts that specify measurable
quality; by advertising and branding by input
suppliers; or by government intervention in licensing
or quality standards in upstream processes. An
important question in agricultural supply chains is the
extent to which the public vs the private sector should
be involved in overcoming the adverse selection
problem.
From the point of view of the processor, who
seeks a high quality raw product, the problem of
selecting farmers with whom to contract represents
another adverse selection problem. While the IOF
can specify technological processes that must be
followed, thus controlling for many input factors
affecting product quality; they cannot control for
managerial quality. It is in the interests of the IOF to
seek contracts with the better farmers who are likely
to be able to deliver to the quantity and quality
specifications in the contract. 
One of the claimed advantages of cooperatively
owned processing firms is that they can overcome
adverse selection problems at the farm/processor
level because of a closer relationship with the farmer
(eg Staatz, 1987b). 
From the point of view of the farmer, hidden
information may also be a problem. In particular, the
farmer may have little information about market
alternatives and may be unable to distinguish
between different buyers in terms of their reliability
in honoring the contract. Empirical work on first-
handler relationships with farmers indicates that trust
is very important in the selection of buyers (eg Poole
et al., 1998). 
Another important hidden information problem
that is not mentioned in the literature on incomplete
contracts, but is very relevant to agricultural supply




investment stage, about the size of the surplus. This
information asymmetry is likely to go against the
farmer — it is much easier to collect information
about opportunity costs of farmer involvement than
it is to collect information about the cost structure of
a large complex firm. Thus, there is potential for
opportunism at the investment/contracting stage, as
the IOF has the incentive to hide the size of the
surplus and only offer the farmer a raw input price
just above the opportunity cost. This potential
opportunism could be overcome by cooperative
investment downstream in the supply chain. 
 
Hidden action (moral hazard)
 
Hidden action problems arise in a post-contracting
situation, where there is an incentive for the agent to
cheat on the deal that has been struck. Such cheating
could be undertaken by the farmer, eg by using
inferior (cheaper) inputs to production or not fol-
lowing specified production protocols aimed at pro-
viding the processor with the desired quality of raw
materials. 
IOFs that take on the role of input supply to pro-
ducers increase their exposure to the risk of moral
hazard (Royer, 1995). Babb (1992) says that contract
cancellation is a bigger risk for processors/lenders
than for producers, who can continue as independent.
However, their ability to do this will depend on
opportunities in other markets, which define the
degree of spatial monopoly of the IOF. Firms with a
larger spatial monopoly essentially have a captive
market and the risk of contract cancellation is
diminished.
 
IOFs vs cooperatives in information asymmetry 
problems
 
Skyuta and Cook (2001) discuss how the organisa-
tional structure (IOF vs cooperatives) can affect
information asymmetry and hence coordination and
contracting. For example, in the IOF structure there
is no inherent interest in the welfare of producers,
and thus there is an incentive to withhold informa-
tion on both sides. This is said to create an element
of distrust that is greater than in a cooperative struc-
ture. They argue that the producer orientation of
cooperatives leads to a greater sense of trust, because
producers are involved in the governance of the
organisation with which the farmers are trading. The
implication of these different degrees of trust is that
IOF contracts must be more transparent and easily
verified; more likely to involve third parties; and
more complete. Thus, the transactions costs of a
cooperative processing firm are likely to be much
lower than those of an IOF. However, the extent to
which this trust benefit of cooperatives is realized
will depend on the governance of the cooperative.
Larger, more heterogeneous cooperatives with
conflicting interest groups may not be able to invoke
trust.
Staatz (1987a) argues that cooperatives may be
more effective than IOFs in vertical contracting
because members who do not comply with a cooper-
ative not only get the same incentives as IOFs for
non compliance, but also face local monitoring and
social sanctions if they let the team down. The
ability to use peer pressure and local monitoring to
reduce transactions costs is well established in the
literature on common property. However, this
benefit does not necessarily justify the involvement
of cooperative groups in the processing sector. An
alternative institutional arrangement is to use a 
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cooperative to represent farmers contracting with
IOFs. Indeed, multinational companies dealing with
small farmers often negotiate through social hierar-
chies (such as village governance) to overcome
adverse selection, moral hazard and to reduce the
costs of negotiation.
The principal agent problems arise because there
is an incomplete separation of property and decision
rights, and this can create a need to monitor the
agent’s performance. An alternative solution is to
align decision makers’ incentives, giving them
access to residual claims where their inputs have a
greater influence on economic value of the produc-
tion process (Fulton, 1995). For example, in farming,
if labour is the most variable input, labour should
rent land and have the residual claim, thus giving an
incentive to work hard. If land quality is the main
factor affecting production then land owners should
hire labour at a fixed rate and have the incentive to
invest in and manage the land to maximise its quality
attributes. Using this argument Fulton claims that
marketing cooperatives are the most likely to form in
supply chains where there is a greater degree of
uncertainty in production at the farm level, because
in this case it makes sense for raw input suppliers to
have the residual claim at the processing stage, as it
will give them an incentive to produce better quality.
He also argues that as agriculture becomes more
industrialised, the uncertainty issue at the farm end is
reduced, so it is possible to contract farmers at a
fixed price for their raw input supply. 
Compared to IOFs, cooperative management will
generally have better information about the produc-
tion characteristics at the farm level. To achieve
more control over product quality, contracts between
farmers and processors usually specify technological
processes that must be followed. Royer (1995) sug-
gests that these technical directives will be better
designed in the case of cooperative processing firms,
because of the informational advantage of having
farmers on the board of management. 
 
NIE and justification for cooperatives
 
The literature reviewed above has focused on the
potential for marketing cooperatives to provide an
alternative to IOFs through downstream investment
in marketing or processing services. These argu-
ments are summarised in Table 1. As stated by
Royer (1995), much of the literature advocating the
benefits of cooperative ownership are actually bene-
fits of vertical coordination, which can also be
achieved directly by IOFs taking out contracts with
farmers. Other solutions to the problems raised in the
literature can also be found by considering alterna-
tive relationships between investor-owned firms and
collective groups. Public sector participation can also
assist in reducing transactions costs and providing
better supply chain arrangements. Some of the alter-
native solutions are noted in the table.
 
Issues in the management and efficiency 
of cooperatives 
 
The four basic characteristics of cooperative firms
that affect their management and efficiency com-
pared to investor-owned firms are:
1. Fixed return on capital
2. Residual claims awarded to farmer members
through patronage (sales to the cooperative in the
case of agricultural marketing)
3. Democratic governance (one member-one vote
and restrictions on non-member voting).
4. Management overseen by a board of elected
members
These characteristics lead to a number of issues,
including difficulties in raising capital and in gov-
erning the cooperative. In addition to these problems,




Justifications for cooperative ownership of downstream facilities
Problem Benefits of cooperative ownership of facilities Alternatives
Asset specificity Common objective, hence less fear of 
opportunism







Information asymmetry Common objective, hence more trust and 
reduced transaction costs





Can be achieved by cooperative 
bargaining groups contracting with IOFs
Better decisions due to better communication 




Must be weighed against control 
problems (below)
Information about the 
size of the surplus




Public information to assist farmers/
collective bargaining groups in negotiation 
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heterogeneous members also affect decision making
and performance. Cook (1995) argues that these
weaknesses cause the demise of most cooperatives,
unless action is taken to solve them by redesigning
property rights. The ‘new generation cooperatives’ in
North America overcome some of the inherent
weaknesses of cooperatives. These weaknesses are
discussed below:
 
Capital and investment issues
 
Cooperatives have traditionally been financed by
capital contributions from members, where these
capital contributions effectively amount to a loan to
the cooperative. That is, members earn a return on
capital invested according to a fixed (regulated)
interest rate, and usually redeem this equity on a
revolving repayments principle (Porter and Scully,
1987). Company profits are returned to members in
proportion to patronage and usually there are no
rules that link capital contributions to patronage.
Thus, there is an incentive for cooperative members
to minimise their capital contribution and increase
the patronage relative to that investment (Staatz,
1987a). These factors imply that it is difficult to raise
capital from membership contributions (Levay,
1983; Vitaliano, 1983; Porter and Scully, 1987).
Because profits are returned on the basis of
patronage, cooperative membership is only benefi-
cial for active members. This gives rise to what it
called the ‘horizon problem’ in cooperative decision
making (Vitaliano, 1983; Cook, 1995). Those share-
holders who are nearing retirement will discount the
benefits of investment by the cooperatives, and will
pressure for a larger repayment of current profits as
dividends, compared to retained earnings for invest-
ment. The pressure from these members will further
exacerbate difficulties in financing long-term invest-
ment projects. This problem is most severe in
cooperatives where large, long-term capital invest-
ments are needed, such as processing technologies
where there are significant economies of scale, or
where investment in R&D for technical innovation is
important.
Open cooperatives also suffer from ‘free rider’
problems that further reduce investment incentives.
New members are only required to invest equity
according to a prescribed formula, rather than paying
in proportion to the value of benefits they receive,
which are the benefits of patronage (Cook and
Iliopoulis, 2000). There are also free rider problems
in the maintenance of throughput for the cooperative.
Cooperatives may rely on farmer loyalty to maintain
throughput and achieve economies of scale, whereas
open membership policies can result in farmers
defecting to other buyers if prices are temporarily
better. While short-term decisions about patronage
affect the long-term viability of the cooperative, and
hence expected future prices if the cooperative has
been providing competitive pressure, the member
does not take the marginal effect of his patronage
decision into consideration (Staatz, 1987a). 
The problem of raising capital can imply that the
cooperative has to rely more on debt financing as a
means of making capital investments. However,
Vitaliano (1983) notes that cooperatives may have
special problems in obtaining such loans, because it
is more difficult for lending agencies to monitor the
performance of these agencies. For example, they
may be restricted from sitting on boards of directors.
Moreover, because residual claims are not marketed,
lenders may require higher risk premiums. These
problems have been circumvented in the US by
government involvement in creating specialist banks
that lend to cooperatives.
Some of the problems associated with capital
investment of cooperatives can be overcome in
special cases. For example, in communities with a
strong tradition of family farming the horizon
problem may be overcome because the older mem-
bers may take into account the effect of investment
on the patronage benefits accruing to their heirs
(Staatz, 1987a). However, in most cases it is neces-
sary to formally strengthen the property rights issues
inherent in traditional cooperatives, in order to
improve equity and investment choices. The so-called
new generation cooperatives do this by aligning
membership and capital contribution to patronage. 
One example is the sale of ‘delivery rights’ to
cooperative processing firms, which specify a quan-
tity that can be delivered. This strategy achieves a
closed membership and a secondary market of
delivery rights (Stefanson et al., 1995). Toegerson
(2001) notes that some authors have criticised such
practices (as contravening cooperative principles) for
this restrictive membership policy (ie not helping
all). In the longer term, such ‘privatisation’ of
cooperatives may lead to reduced public assistance
for cooperatives.
Cook and Illiopoulis (2000) provide evidence on
the importance of stronger property rights on the
equity of cooperatives. They conducted an empirical
analysis of 127 marketing cooperatives in the US
(representing 75% of cooperative sales in 1996),
analysing the level of equity as a function of
property rights parameters. They showed that mar-
keting cooperatives with closed memberships, mar-
keting agreements, and transferable delivery rights
had significantly higher levels of member invest-
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Cooperatives are managed by a specialised manage-
ment team who are employees of the organisation,
overseen by the board who are elected from the
group of member-patrons. Management decisions
about the organisation are meant to take into account
the effect of those decisions on its patrons. The
extent to which this is achieved depends on the
strength of the board of management. A more active
board will ensure that members’ interests are
accounted for, but an overactive board may interfere
with the manager’s job and make it difficult for the
manager to run the business efficiently (Levay
1983). Vitaliano (1983) argues that the manager’s
alignment to members’ interest will also be con-
trolled by the extent of competition in the market —
the manager may have to compete for patronage, in
which case members will be better served.
A number of authors compare the mechanisms
available for control management in cooperatives and
investor-owned firms, which relate to equity arrange-
ments (eg Vitaliano, 1983; Porter and Scully, 1987;
Staatz, 1987a). In an IOF stockholders can immedi-
ately sell stock and move elsewhere if they do not
like management. The marketability of equity shares
means that managers receive clear price signals on
the implications of their decisions on expected future
profits. In contrast, members of a cooperative cannot
provide the same market signals — this is one of the
reasons why boards representing members need to
play a greater role in monitoring management. 
The high degree of involvement by the board has
a number of implications. First, the cooperative man-
agement style has higher decision-making costs
(Staatz, 1987a). Second, the skills of the board of
management usually relate to the farming activity,
not the downstream activity, in which the coopera-
tive is involved. Vitaliano (1983) suggests that this is
a fundamental flaw in the organisational structure —
cooperative board members are expected to make
decisions about matters that exceed their qualifica-
tions and experience. King (1995) suggests that the
residual claims argument proposed by Fulton (1995)
missed one of the most important issues — good
management, which is the most variable and difficult
to monitor component of production. He suggests
that the cooperative structure is more limited in
granting equity to the manager, which would other-
wise provide an incentive for better management.
An additional feature of the influence of the board
on decision making in the cooperative is that man-
agers are constrained in their investment decisions
according to the interests of members. This means
that these firms are less likely to integrate into unre-
lated activities or into products that compete with
members’ products; and more likely to try to expand
markets of members’ products (Schafer, 1987;
Rhodes, 1983). 
Most of the discussion about the effect of manage-
ment problems on the performance of cooperatives
has been conjecture but Porter and Scully (1987)
provide empirical evidence to support the claim that
cooperatives are less efficient than their investor-
owned counterparts. Based on a cross-sectional study
of milk processing firms in the US, they used fron-
tier analysis to examine the efficiency of coopera-
tives, and found that they were only 75% as efficient
as propriety counterparts. Average production costs
are higher due to technical inefficiency and loss of
scale. They argue that it is tax breaks, interest sub-
sides and free services from departments of agricul-
ture that help to compensate them for their less
efficient operations. However, they also noted that
cooperatives may provide services to farmers that
were not included in the analysis (although costs




Formal models of incentives for collusion/entry into
a cooperative have been developed by Staatz (1983).
He demonstrated the generalities that are typical of
cooperative game results — that the greater the
member heterogeneity, the harder it is for coopera-
tives to keep and maintain memberships, and that
gains need to be large enough and distributed in such
a way that will ensure benefits of cohesion rather
than defection. 
One of the roles of the board of management is to
ensure that members’ interests are represented to
management, and the democratic nature of coopera-
tives means that the concerns of all investors should
be considered. In reality, coalitions will form that
lobby board members, and this may serve to main-
tain some cohesion, in the sense that those with a
greater threat will have a greater influence. However,
the cost of coalition building raises the transactions
costs of management (Staatz, 1987a).
In order to maintain cohesion in the cooperative,
the cooperative’s board of management needs to
become involved in pricing and dividend payment
policies, more than boards of IOFs would (Royer,
1995). However, while differential pricing may be
necessary to ensure stability, it may be difficult to
achieve such policies because of the one member-
one vote rule. Staatz (1987a) claims that the prob-
lems of cohesion are partly attenuated by uncertainty
about what is in ones best interest.
Member heterogeneity, as expressed through the
board of management, also affects investment deci-
sions. Some of these problems were dealt with in the 
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discussion on the ‘horizon’ problem associated with
raising equity for investment. Large multi-product
cooperatives will also be constrained in making
investment decisions that favour some products but
not others.
Another claimed advantage of cooperatives is that
price pooling can reduce risk to farmers. However, if
members are heterogeneous, pooling can end up
being a cross subsidy between producers of differen-
tiated product, which results in inefficient price
signals to growers. Also, the income transfers associ-
ated with pooling across differentiated products are
likely to cause conflict. In recent years, the redefini-
tion of more narrow pooling arrangements has been
the trend to overcome these problems (Staatz,
1987a). He also observes that in the US, pooling is
more prevalent among fruit and vegetables where
highly perishable (hence naturally volatile) markets
prevail, compared to grain and livestock producers
where markets are more stable. However, the fact
that this latter group also have market mechanisms
for dealing with risk might also be a factor influ-
encing this difference. 
 
Developing country context: can marketing 
cooperatives serve a role?
 
The literature reviewed in the previous section
focused on agricultural marketing cooperatives in
developed countries. The main generalities emerging
from the review are that cooperatives have numerous
problems associated with management, but these can
be minimised by keeping them small and homoge-
nous; or by defining appropriate property rights to
membership; or generally by designing them to be
more like an IOF. Some of the potential benefits of a
cooperative marketing structure relate to the greater
degree of trust involved in the transaction, which
may improve communication and reduce transac-
tions costs relative to an IOF. However, most of the
discussion in the literature has been conjecture; there






reduces transactions cost (with the exception of
Porter and Scullys’ empirical condemnation of the
efficiency of cooperatives). Moreover, much of the
proposed benefits of reduced transactions costs could
also be achieved by bargaining cooperatives that
represent the farmer in supply chain negotiations.
Downstream asset ownership is not the only way
forward.
Developing country farmers seeking to gain a
greater return from agricultural produce by investing
in downstream operations will face similar problems





The prospect of farmer investment in downstream
areas of the supply chain in developing countries is
dim, given the severe capital constraints under which
farmers operate. It is unlikely that sufficient capital
could be raised internally to finance investment in a
processing sector that exhibits economies of scale
(Zhu and Apedaile, 1998). Whether such invest-
ments could be financed by government or donors
would need to be viewed in the context of the oppor-
tunity cost of public funds which could arguably be
better spent supplying public goods. 
Even for smaller-scale investments, capital issues
are likely to be a major problem. For example, even
extending ownership of the commodity further down
the marketing chain by investing in first handler
services, will require that the farmer delays payment
for his product, which may be impossible given the
tight cash-flow position of most smallholder farming
operations. These issues will arise even if all the
equity issues of traditional cooperatives are dealt
with by creating appropriate property rights
structures, at least for capital constrained small-
holders.
The problems of investing in high technology
agrifood chains in developing countries are further
exacerbated by underlying inadequacies, that require





A major issue associated with cooperative businesses
is the adequacy of management, and its oversight by
boards of management. Where farmers have little
knowledge about downstream processes, and limited
marketing experience beyond traditional first-
handler channels, management will suffer from
inexpert leadership. While this might be mitigated by
providing public education services, by donors or
government, such expenditure would need to be
weighed against its high opportunity cost. If funding
is to be spent on training it may go further by
focusing on training farmer cooperatives in negoti-
ating with IOFs, rather than training them to replace
IOFs.
 
Transactions costs of contracting and negotiation
 
A major issue in vertical coordination of agrifood
chains in developing countries is the small size of
holdings, which makes the cost of negotiating with
individual farmers and monitoring and enforcing
contracts prohibitively costly. Collective action,
which provides an efficient solution to this problem,
is already being used by firms that contract with 
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report on the involvement of small group coopera-
tives in linking smallholders to IOFs in Africa.
Cooperatives provide self-monitoring benefits that
reduce the risk of default and work in the same way
as rural credit cooperatives; ie peer monitoring is
cheap and effective because default of an individual
affects the entire group. For the same reason, coop-
eratives assist in self selecting groups of farmers
who are likely to meet the terms of the group’s con-
tract. At the same time, the IOF’s costs of negotia-





The NIE theories on vertical coordination are useful
tools for considering agricultural supply chain issues,
and are relevant to the developing country context.
However, the existing literature has not covered the
effect of prevailing institutions on the merits of
cooperatives and other marketing alternatives. For
example, the theory of incomplete contracts focuses
on ‘uncertainty’ being very important as that is how
contracts are breached. But contracts are only as
good as the legal system that enforces them. In some
developing countries there may be scope for oppor-
tunistic behavior even in the best written contracts,
due to poor contract enforcement. 
Hubbard (1997) discusses the problem of weak or
hostile prevailing institutions in developing coun-
tries, and observes that it can lead to the emergence
of a bimodal industry structure, consisting of a small
number of large integrated firms targeting the export
sector, and an informal sector of smallholders and
small-scale processors. Because of the enormous
investment required for overcoming the ‘missing
markets’ and ‘missing public goods’ in the sector,
the small-scale sector experiences enormous barriers
to growth. Small-scale farmer cooperatives are
likely to face similar barriers to growth. Some of the
institutional barriers that need to be overcome are:
weak contracting law enforcement; weak public
infrastructure to support agricultural markets (eg
ports, roads); weak public services to support quality
control such as certification; greater degree of infor-
mation asymmetry due to low education level and
poor communication; and poorly functioning factor
markets.
These issues may have a greater bearing on the
‘hold-up’ problems associated with investment in
value adding supply chain investments, than does
the ownership structure of downstream elements in
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 has been much discussion in developing coun-
tries about the ability of agricultural cooperatives to
minimise the exploitation of small farmers by various
market intermediaries (Lele, 1981). In most devel-
oping countries, the agricultural marketing system is
characterised by a highly atomistic production side
(where there are many small, widely-dispersed
farmers growing perishable crops) and an oligopo-
listic marketing system (where there are only a few
traders) (Mendoza and Rosegrant, 1995). Marketing
costs are high because of an inefficient transport
system, inadequate cool storage capacity and signifi-
cant variations in product form, variety and quality
(Harris-White, 1995). The supply chain itself is often
long and protracted, involving a large number of
market intermediaries (Lele, 1981). Furthermore,
information and locational factors potentially limit
the number of intermediaries available to transact
with primary producers (Pomeroy and Trinidad,
1995). In other instances, various credit arrangements
may lock farmers into long-term business-to-business
relationships where the farmer is, to varying degrees,
more or less dependent upon the market intermediary
(Mendoza and Rosegrant, 1995).
While the introduction of agricultural coopera-
tives is often perceived to be an effective means of
providing farmers with some countervailing market
power, there is increasing evidence that most
attempts to intervene in the market have failed.
Without first seeking to improve the physical infra-
structure, the flow of market information, technical
advice and capital, or to introduce appropriate
pricing policies, quality standards and to upgrade the
regulatory institutions, there is not only a greater
chance of failure, but a greater possibility that any
benefits derived from cooperative marketing will be
disproportionately allocated to those who have the
highest social status and most political power (Lele,
1981). With little or no access to education, most
small farmers are unable to participate meaningfully
in any organisation dealing with complex develop-
ment functions such as management, marketing or
finance. 
There is also a growing recognition that economic
exchange is embedded within various overarching
social institutions including locality, class, ethnicity,
religion, gender and age (Zucker, 1986; Fukuyama,
1995; Harris-White, 1997). The importance of trust
and social capital as a means of reducing risk and
facilitating exchange is being increasingly recog-
nised when producers and market intermediaries
have limited access to the legal system as a means
for redress (Mendoza and Rosegrant, 1995;
Fafchamps, 1996; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998).
Using three alternative methods of evaluation, this
paper seeks to examine the efficiency of the
marketing system for fresh potatoes in the Red River
Delta (Vietnam). It is proposed that before any inter-
vention is contemplated, the supply chain must be
examined to identify the marketing margins
extracted by the various market intermediaries, the
extent to which suppliers are able to fulfil the needs
of their downstream customers, the constraints that
adversely affect the suppliers’ ability to meet
customers’ needs and the nature of the long-term
relationships that exist between suppliers and their
customers. 
 
Analysing performance in marketing 
channels
 
Developed primarily by Williamson (1979, 1985),
transaction cost theory assumes that various costs are
associated with an exchange. These costs are com-
prised of the costs of obtaining and processing infor-
mation, negotiating contracts, monitoring agents and
enforcing contracts. These costs may become signif-
icant in the presence of information asymmetry,
uncertainty and transaction specific investments.
Although there are several different approaches for
measuring transaction costs, the market is said to be 
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efficient if the price consumers ultimately pay ade-
quately reflects storage costs, transportation costs and
differences in price due to product form (Harris-
White, 1995). Since price data is usually the most
readily available and most reliable source of market
information in developing countries (Goletti and
Christina-Tsigas, 1995), the performance of the
supply chain is most often evaluated using price mar-
gins. However, a large marketing margin may result
in little or no profit for a player in the market and
may even result in a trading loss, depending on the
buying and selling prices and the costs of marketing
(Mendoza, 1995). Marketing margins will also fluc-
tuate due to the perishability of the product, the
number of people involved in the exchange, the mar-
keting services provided and the risk and uncertainty
borne by each one (Pomeroy and Trinidad, 1995). 
Using the concept of market structure, conduct
and performance, market concentration is a strong
indicator of non-competitive pricing behaviour and
of inefficient market performance (Mendoza and
Rosegrant, 1995). Ordinarily, the presence of a few
large market agents within the market is sufficient
evidence of market power and price collusion. How-
ever, in order to verify the extent to which various
actors have been exploited by unfair trading prac-
tices, the net returns and the marketing margins at
each step in the supply chain must be estimated
(Pomeroy and Trinidad, 1995). 
Industrial purchasing theory suggests that cus-
tomers will seek to purchase goods from those pro-
ducers who are the best able to deliver the desired
quantity, within predetermined quality specifica-
tions, on time, at an agreed price (Monzcka et al.,
1998).
In describing a supplier’s offer quality, Gronroos
(1990) finds it necessary to differentiate between
technical quality and functional quality. Technical
quality describes the customer’s specifications. This
is a physical description of the product in terms of its
size; shape; colour; freedom from pests and diseases;
purity (in terms of its freedom from chemical con-
taminants, pathogenic organisms and genetically
modified plants); maturity or freshness; and the
manner in which the product is packed.
Functional quality describes the way a supplier
goes about delivering the product to the customer.
While this fundamentally means being able to
deliver the product when the customer wants it, by
implication, it involves many inter-related activities
such as production scheduling, storage and ware-
housing, logistics, ordering and invoicing. Since
most market intermediaries purchase products in the
expectation that they will be able to resell them,
the timely and efficient receipt of goods is critical
to the success of most downstream manufacturing
and retail operations. For this reason, many cus-
tomers prefer to purchase from local suppliers. Local
suppliers are generally less expensive and more
dependable than those located at a distance
(Hakansson and Wootz, 1975). Delivery may be
more prompt because the distance is shorter and
there is less likelihood of transportation delays.
However, more importantly, local suppliers gain
greater knowledge of their customers’ needs and
may be more flexible in responding to their require-
ments (Leenders and Fearon, 1993).
More recently, Parasuraman (1998) has intro-
duced a third dimension called service quality, which
describes the extra things a supplier is willing to do
to retain the customer’s business. While the exact
meaning of the term service varies with the nature of
the product and the requirements of the buying
organisation, it may include such variables as
providing technical assistance, innovative sugges-
tions, credit arrangements, support for special needs,
or providing advance notice of impending price
changes or shortages in supply (Hutt and Speh,
1995).
In measuring the extent to which suppliers are
able to meet the needs of their customers,
Parasuraman, et al. (1985), proposed the concept of a
service gap, which is a measure of how well the
service level delivered by a supplier matches cus-
tomers’ expectations. An integral part of this anal-
ysis is concerned with the identification of the
various constraints that prevent the supplier from
fulfilling the customer’s needs. It is only after these
constraints have been identified that suppliers can
improve their performance.
Traditionally, in order to cut costs, customers
have gone out of their way to identify the cheapest
supplier (Monczka et al., 1998). The traditional
approach to purchasing required the buyer to take
three or more bids, then to play one supplier off
against another until they got the lowest price. Since
this approach relied primarily on the use of short-
term contracts, it led to what can best be described as
an adversarial relationship. Both customers and
suppliers sought to extract as much as they could
from the transaction, knowing that at any time, if
either party found a better deal, the contract would
be cancelled. However, such short-term opportunism
stifles innovation and provides few incentives to
invest in productivity improvements or new tech-
nology. Technology is the source of and the reason
for interaction between firms (Thomas and Ford,
1995). Since technology may substantially alter the
value chain and the way the value chains are linked,
strong mutual interdependencies arise, so that the
level of technology in one firm will influence the
product and process technologies of its partner. As a 
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result, a firm’s unique market position, power and
competitive advantage are created through its inter-
actions with suppliers, customers and other third
parties.
With increasing turbulence and greater uncertainty
in the market, more firms are moving away from
transaction orientated marketing strategies towards
relationship marketing for enhanced performance
(Noordeweir et al., 1990). More industrial firms are
realising that customer retention is more cost effec-
tive then customer creation (Han et al., 1993;
Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995; Achrol, 1997).
Firms are establishing relationships with their
suppliers because it enables them to be more effi-
cient and more effective (Anderson and Narus, 1990;
Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995; Sheth and Sharma,
1997). By developing relationships with their sup-
pliers, buyers and sellers can achieve cost savings
through: reduced search and evaluation costs
(Hakansson, 1982); reduced transaction costs (Arndt,
1979; Hakansson, 1982; Han et al., 1993); and the
learning effects and relationship specific scale econ-
omies (Arndt, 1979; Cunningham and Homse, 1982;
Gundlach et al., 1995). However, the primary reason
for establishing relationships with suppliers is that
customers realise that suppliers create value (Evans
and Laskin, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Kalwani
and Narayandas, 1995; Wilson, 1995). Developing
long-term relationships can improve access to mar-
kets and reliable market information (Low, 1996);
customers can anticipate improved access to a more
reliable supply of production inputs (Arndt, 1979;
Hakansson, 1982); improved product quality and
performance (Han et al., 1993); and a higher level of
technical interaction in the form of information
exchange, potential product adaptations and tech-
nical assistance (Cunningham and Homse, 1982).
By becoming closer to customers and better
understanding and satisfying their needs, suppliers
can achieve greater customer loyalty and higher
repeat sales (Evans and Laskin, 1994; Lohtia and
Krapfel, 1994; Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995).
Relationship marketing provides a stronger, longer-
term customer benefit that is more difficult for com-
petitors to match and it becomes more difficult for
competitors to enter the market (Hakansson, 1982;
Turnbull and Wilson, 1989; Heide, 1994). Buyers
become less sensitive to price competition and sup-
pliers may even benefit from higher prices (Kalwani
and Narayandas, 1995). Suppliers benefit from being
able to better plan and forecast production schedules
(Lohtia and Krapfel, 1994), coordinate deliveries and
to undertake joint promotions (Easton and Araujo,
1994). However, the greatest benefit arising from
long-term relationships is the reduction in uncer-
tainty (Arndt, 1979; Hakansson, 1982; Noordewier
et al., 1990). 
While much has been written about the develop-
ment and maintenance of long-term buyer–seller
relationships, the greatest support has emerged for
the key constructs of satisfaction, trust and commit-
ment (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Anderson and
Weitz, 1992; Han et al., 1993; Morgan and Hunt,
1994).
Satisfying customer needs lies at the very founda-
tion of modern marketing thought. Satisfaction is
derived from the result of a comparison between the
preferred supplier’s performance and the customer’s
expectations (Fornell, 1992). Whenever performance
exceeds expectations, satisfaction will increase, but
when it falls below expectations, customers will
become dissatisfied. 
Since satisfaction is defined as a positive affective
state resulting from an appraisal of all aspects of one
firm’s working relationship with another (Frazier et
al., 1989), Geyskens et al. (1999) propose that satis-
faction should capture both the economic and non-
economic (social) aspects of the exchange. Eco-
nomic satisfaction is defined as the channel
member’s positive affective response to the eco-
nomic rewards that flow from the relationship with
its partner. An economically satisfied channel
member considers the relationship a success when
they are satisfied with the effectiveness and produc-
tivity of the relationship with their partner and the
resulting financial outcomes. Channel members who
are satisfied with the economic rewards that flow
from their relationship may attribute a great deal of
credit to their partner and the channel members
attraction to and trust in their partner will increase.
Mackenzie and Hardy (1996) propose that as satis-
faction increases so also will trust. 
For any particular potential exchange, trust will be
critical if two situational factors are present; risk and
incomplete buyer information (Hawes et al., 1989).
Since most sales transactions present some degree of
risk and uncertainty to the potential buyer, without a
degree of trust, the perceived risk may be too great
for the transaction to occur. More specifically, trust
becomes important whenever there is a high level of
performance ambiguity and poor product perform-
ance will have a significant adverse impact on the
value derived by the buyer (Singh and Sirdeshmukh,
2000). In such circumstances, trust acts as an infor-
mation resource that directly reduces the perceived
threat of information asymmetry and performance
ambiguity. 
However, trust also relates to the focal firm’s
intention to rely upon their exchange partner.
Ganesan (1994) describes this component as benevo-
lence, because it is based on the extent to which the 
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focal firm believes that its partner has intentions and
motives beneficial to it. A benevolent partner will
subordinate immediate self-interest for the long-term
benefit of both parties and will not take actions that
may have a negative impact on the firm. Singh and
Sirdeshmukh (2000) describe trust as a belief that an
exchange partner will act in a manner that is respon-
sible, with integrity and without injury to the focal
firm.
In building trust, Sako (1992) finds it necessary to
differentiate between trust at three levels. Contrac-
tual trust is an expectation that the exchange partner
will abide by its written or oral contractual obliga-
tions and act according to generally accepted busi-
ness practice. Competence trust is derived from the
assumption that the entrusted firm will carry out
the activities competently and reliably. Goodwill
trust arises where both parties have developed
mutual expectations that the other will do more than
what it is formally committed to perform. Here, the
firm not only expects the other not to act opportunis-
tically, but that it will, altruistically, go out of its way
to help (McCutcheon and Stuart, 2000). 
Opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted
disclosure of information, especially calculated
efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or
otherwise confuse (Williamson, 1985). The incentive
to engage in opportunistic behaviour arises because
one party finds it advantageous to maximise their
own gains at the expense of the relationship (Parke,
1993). However, should either party choose to
behave opportunistically, it is likely to provoke retal-
iatory behaviour (Gundlach et al., 1995). Oppor-
tunism begets opportunism. With trust and
confidence in the relationship undermined, the
aggrieved party will seek to withdraw or to limit
their commitment to the relationship. Furthermore,
developing a reputation as a selfish, exploitative and
unreliable exchange partner will decrease the likeli-
hood of participating in future relationships. Most
firms will avoid entering into exchange relationships
with those firms who are perceived to have a ques-
tionable reputation (Parke, 1993). Committing only
to reputable, trustworthy partners reduces the risk
of being mistreated (Anderson and Weitz, 1992;
Ganesan, 1994). 
When the outcomes obtained from the relationship
are important or highly valued; when they are better
than the outcomes available from alternative sup-
pliers; and when fewer alternative sources of
exchange are available to the firm, dependence is
said to increase (Heide and John, 1988). With greater
dependence comes greater vulnerability, for the more
powerful exchange partner may be in a position to
create more favourable terms of trade for itself. 
Whenever a channel member controls resources
that another channel member needs, various power
relations emerge that potentially enable the party
controlling those resources to exert some influence
or power (Andaleeb, 1996). Since this may include
access to markets or access to capital, farmers are
often dependent upon their trading partners
(Tagarino et al., 1998). 
Dependence is also increased when the outcomes
available from the relationship are comparatively
better than the outcomes available from alternative
relationships. Firms dealing with the best trader are
more dependent because the outcomes associated
from dealing with that trader are better than those
available from alternative traders. In this context,
dependence is a measure of the overall quality of the
outcomes available to the focal firm from the best
alternative exchange relationship (Anderson and
Narus, 1990).
When fewer alternative sources of exchange are
available to the focal firm, or when replacing or sub-
stituting a current exchange partner is difficult
because there are fewer potential alternatives,
dependence increases (Heide and John, 1988; Frazier
et al., 1989). In general, firms will seek to reduce
their dependence on other firms and to increase the
dependence of other firms upon themselves (Lohtia
and Krapfel, 1994). Firms may either seek to reduce
and manage dependence by purposely structuring
their exchange relationships with other firms (Heide,
1994), or to deal with multiple entities (Ganesan,
1994). Where there are many alternatives, the need
to interact is reduced, but as the number of alterna-
tive exchange partners declines, the need to interact




Potatoes have been cultivated in Vietnam since 1890
when they were first introduced by the French colo-
nialists. In 1980, Vietnam was the largest producer
of potatoes in Southeast Asia with more than
100,000 hectares under cultivation (Schmiediche,
1995). However, in the absence of a reliable supply
of good quality seed, productivity per hectare
declined and the area of potatoes cultivated subse-
quently decreased. Today, some 35,000 hectares of
potatoes are cultivated in Vietnam, primarily in the
Red River Delta (Tung and Ho, 1995). 
Potatoes are the second most important crop in the
Red River Delta and, understandably, are a priority
crop for development by the government. Potatoes
are an alternative food crop to rice, capable of
feeding an expanding population and providing both
a valuable source of nutrition and a valuable source
of income for many impoverished rural families. 
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The majority of potato farmers in the Red River
Delta are very small family enterprises, cultivating
fewer than 0.15 hectares of potatoes. Most farmers
plant potatoes in either October or November and
harvest their crops in January. With such a short
cropping season, inclement overcast weather during
most of the growing season, poor quality seed, soil
compaction and the inappropriate use of chemicals
and fertilisers, the average yield in the Red River
Delta is just 16.7 tonnes per hectare (Batt, 2002).
For most potato farmers in the Red River Delta,
collector agents and traders provide the major mech-
anism for the disposal of the potato crop. However,
traders purchase only the large and extra large
tubers; farmers generally retain some proportion of
the medium sized tubers for seed and the small
tubers are primarily used for stock food. Not unex-
pectedly, the price farmers receive for the potatoes
they have harvested is dependent upon supply and
demand and tuber size. As potatoes provide the
majority of on-farm income for most farm house-
holds in the Red River Delta, any reduction in the
prices received will have an adverse impact on
the household. With 88% of potato farmers earning
less than US$67 per month (Batt, 2002), most farm
households in the Red River Delta are severely cash
constrained. 
The function of the various traders is to collect the
potatoes from the farmer’s property and to transport
and deliver the tubers to wholesalers in the major
metropolitan centres throughout Vietnam. The
majority of traders are also small enterprises, with
most purchasing fewer than 1500 kg of vegetables
per week. However, during the potato season, there
is a marked increase in the quantity of product
purchased, with most traders handling more than
10 tonnes of potatoes per week (Batt, 2002).
In some potato-growing districts, collector agents
provide an intermediary function. It is the function of
the collector agent to aggregate potatoes from a
number of small farmers, to pay the farmers, and to
store the potatoes until the traders come to collect
them. Quite clearly, by aggregating the tubers in one
place, the traders do not have to travel to as many
farmers to fill their trucks. In most cases, the col-
lector agents are potato farmers themselves. 
The wholesale enterprises are significantly larger
than the traders, with most handling in excess of
5000 kg of fresh vegetables per week. Wholesalers
deal with traders and collector agents rather than
farmers, as traders and collector agents are more able
to provide tubers of the desired variety in the
required quantity and desired size. Traders and col-
lector agents offer a more competitive price and are
able to deliver the potatoes when the wholesalers
require them (Batt, 2002). 
Wholesalers operate in the supply chain as market
intermediaries, but unlike traders and collector
agents whose function it is to source potatoes from
many small farmers and to aggregate them into
larger quantities, wholesalers break the consignment
down into quantities sufficient to meet the needs of
retail customers and the food service sector. For the
wholesalers in Hanoi, the main customers are the
food service industries (51% of sales) (Batt, 2002). 
Excluding sales to the food service sector and
processing industries, retailers provide the final link
with household buyers in the supply chain for fresh
potatoes. However, the scale of retail operations has
been found to vary enormously between rural and
metropolitan areas and between and within the major
metropolitan cities. Businesses range in size from
those selling fewer than 500 kg of fresh vegetables
per week, to those selling in excess of 5000 kg per
week. The price at which retailers buy and sell
potatoes also differs markedly between and within
regions depending on the source of supply and the
level of supply and demand (Batt, 2002).
 
Data collection and analysis
 
Analysis of the supply chain for fresh potatoes in the
Red River Delta involved detailed interviews with 60
potato farmers using a structured questionnaire.
Information was sought on the cultivation and post-
harvest practices adopted by the farmer and the
average price farmers received for the potatoes they
sold by month, tuber size and variety. Farmers were
then asked what criteria they believed a market inter-
mediary would use in choosing to purchase potatoes
from them. Based on the purchasing literature from
industrial marketing, farmers then responded to 15
statements about the quality of their offer on an
importance scale of 1 (not at all important) to 6 (very
important). Farmers then rated their ability to meet
these same criteria on a scale of 1 (not at all well) to
6 (very well). Finally, farmers were asked to indicate
why they perceived they were unable to meet the
market intermediary’s needs and the various con-
straints that prevented them from improving their
offer quality. In the final section of the question-
naire, farmers were asked to describe the nature of
their relationship with their preferred trading partner
and to respond to 24 prepared statements. The var-
ious statements, derived and developed from the
literature on buyer–seller relationships, were divided
into three groups (satisfaction, trust and power/
dependence). Initially, an agree/disagree scale of
1 (I  disagree a lot) to 6 (I agree a lot) was tried, but
pilot testing of the questionnaire indicated that
farmers were unable to respond to the six-point
agree/disagree scale. The scale was subsequently 
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divided into two three-point scales where 1 was “I
agree/disagree a little” and 3 was “I agree/disagree a
lot”. Farmers were then asked to indicate whether
they agreed or disagreed with the statement and to
rate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed. In
order to facilitate data analysis, the three-point disa-
gree scale was then reversed and the responses mod-
ified to revert back to the initial six-point scale. 
Twenty potato farmers were interviewed from
each of the three major potato-producing provinces
in the Red River Delta (Hai Duong, Thai Binh and
Bac Giang). The people who carried out the survey
(known as enumerators) were instructed to interview
four farmers from a minimum of five districts and to
interview no more than two farmers from any one
village. Interviews were conducted by research staff
from the Food Crops Research Institute, Gia Loc.
At the conclusion of the interview, farmers were
asked to identify the trader with whom they most fre-
quently interacted. Based on the number of names
received, 10 traders in each province were randomly
selected for interview. Traders were asked to indi-
cate the average quantity of potatoes purchased and
from whom they purchased those potatoes. Informa-
tion was sought on the prices paid to purchase
potatoes by month, tuber size and variety. Traders
were then asked to indicate whether they graded the
potatoes or stored them before resale and the prices
at which those potatoes were sold to market inter-
mediaries. Traders were then asked to describe the
various criteria they used in choosing to purchase
potatoes from a farmer or collector agent. Traders
then responded to the same 15 statements on an
importance scale of 1 (not at all important) to 6 (very
important). Traders then rated the extent to which
farmers and collector agents were able to meet these
same criteria on a scale of 1 (not at all well) to
6 (very well), and to indicate why farmers and col-
lector agents were unable to meet their needs.
Traders were then asked to describe the nature of
their relationship with the farmers and collector
agents from whom they most often purchased
potatoes and the nature of their relationship with the
market intermediaries to whom they most frequently
sold potatoes.
At the conclusion of the interview, traders identi-
fied the potato wholesaler with whom they most fre-
quently interacted. From the names received, 10
wholesalers were randomly selected for interview in
Hanoi. Information was sought on the average quan-
tity of potatoes purchased, the source of those pota-
toes and the prices paid to purchase potatoes by
month, tuber size and variety. Wholesalers were then
asked to indicate whether they graded or stored the
potatoes before resale and the prices at which they
were sold; as well as to describe the various criteria
they used in choosing to purchase potatoes from a
potential supplier. Wholesalers responded to 15
statements on an importance scale of 1 (not at all
important) to 6 (very important). They were asked to
rate the extent to which their preferred suppliers
were able to meet these same criteria on a scale of
1 (not at all well) to 6 (very well), and to indicate
why their suppliers were unable to meet their needs.
Wholesalers then described the nature of their rela-
tionship with the various traders and collector agents
from whom they most often purchased potatoes and
the nature of their relationship with the retailers to
whom they most often sold potatoes.
Finally, 10 random interviews with retailers were
undertaken in Hanoi with five additional interviews
being undertaken with retailers in each of three pro-
vincial centres. Information was sought on the
average quantity of potatoes purchased and from
whom they purchased those potatoes. Information
was sought on the prices paid to purchase potatoes
by month, tuber size and variety. Retailers were
asked to indicate whether they graded or stored the
potatoes before resale and the prices at which those
potatoes were sold. They were also asked to describe
the various criteria they used in choosing to purchase
potatoes from a supplier and to respond to 15 state-
ments on an importance scale of 1 (not at all impor-
tant) to 6 (very important). The retailers were also
asked to rate the extent to which suppliers were able
to meet these same criteria on a scale of 1 (not at all
well) to 6 (very well), and to indicate why suppliers
were unable to meet their needs. Retailers were
asked to describe the nature of their relationship with
the supplier from whom they most often purchased
potatoes.
Data was entered into the SPSS program (Version
10.0) for analysis. The difference between what the
market intermediary expected and what they
received from their exchange partner was evaluated
using the paired t-test. Although the mean ratings
across the supply chain were analysed using one-way
ANOVA, the sample sizes were generally too small
to enable any meaningful statistics to be calculated.
Hence, the majority of the analysis undertaken was
descriptive.
 
Examining the price margins in the 
supply chain
 
Since few farmers and market intermediaries main-
tain any written records of the prices at which they
buy and sell potatoes, some errors in reporting are
inevitable. Furthermore, since there is a degree of
confidentiality associated with the reporting of
market prices, respondents may deliberately choose
to overstate the prices at which they have purchased 
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potatoes and to understate the prices at which they
have been sold to reduce their perceived profit
margin. While data was collected from three potato-
growing regions, the most confidence is placed in the
data collected from Hai Duong. This assertion is
made because the Food Crops Research Institute was
located within this province and the enumerators
used to collect the data were well known and
respected by the farmers and market intermediaries. 
Farmers in Hai Duong indicated that they sold
potatoes to traders for an average price of VND1385
per kg (US$0.092 per kg). Traders indicated that
they purchased potatoes from farmers for an average
price of VND1470 per kg and sold those potatoes to
both wholesalers in Hanoi and retailers in Hai Duong
for an average price of VND1770 per kg. In Hai
Duong, retailers indicated that they purchased pota-
toes from traders for VND1795 per kg and then sold
those potatoes for an average price of VND2150 per
kg. However, in Hanoi, wholesalers sold these pota-
toes for an average price of VND2180 per kg to
retailers who sold the potatoes for an average retail
price of VND2920 per kg (Table 1). 
In Bac Giang, there was a difference of VND200
between the reported price at which farmers sold
potatoes and the price at which traders purchased
them. No doubt this was the result of intervention in
the market by collector agents. Collector agents are
responsible for sourcing potatoes from many small
farmers and arranging for their transport to some
central collection point. Farmers are paid in cash for
their potatoes when the collector agent takes posses-
sion of the product. The potatoes are then graded and
stored for five to seven days until the trader comes to
pick them up. Depending on the level of services
provided by the collector agent, traders appear
willing to pay an additional VND50–200 per kg
(Batt, 2002).
While there was a difference of VND145 per kg
between the price at which traders indicated they
sold the potatoes and the price retailers reported pur-
chasing them, this was attributed to sampling error,
for the retail margin was reported to be VND385 per
kg; a figure that was consistent with other estimates.
In Thai Binh, it is apparent that farmers grossly
over reported the prices at which they sold potatoes,
for both the traders’ margin and the retail margin
were consistent with the other two potato growing
districts. This was supported by anecdotal evidence
and various unstructured interviews with growers
undertaken during the preliminary phase of this
research project. Furthermore, and similar to Bac
Giang, the majority of potato farmers transacted with
collector agents rather than traders.
An examination of the marketing margins along
the supply chain reveals that the marketing margin
increased as the product moved closer to the con-
sumer. Traders were able to extract an average mar-
keting margin of VND260 per kg, or 19%. In rural
areas, retailers extracted an average marketing
margin of VND410 per kg (or 25%). However, in
Hanoi, wholesalers were able to extract a marketing
margin in the region of VND395 per kg (or 22%),
and retailers were able to extract a marketing margin
of VND615 per kg (or 27%). However, the mar-
keting margin that market intermediaries were able
to extract was not consistent over the season. At both
the beginning (December) and the end (February) of
the harvest season, the marketing margins declined.
Conversely, in January, during the peak harvest
period, the marketing margins for all market inter-
mediaries increased. Such pricing behaviour has
been reported by Batt and Parining (2000) who
accredited the reduced marketing margin during
times of reduced supply to the increased competition
between traders to secure the farmers’ produce. At
the consumer level, research undertaken by Batt
(2002) reveals that consumers in rural areas seldom
purchase potatoes for more than VND2200 per kg
and, in Hanoi, consumers are unlikely to purchase
potatoes at prices exceeding VND3500 per kg.
While traders may be able to extract an average
marketing margin of VND260 per kg, the traders
must not only grade and store the tubers they have
purchased, but also pay for the costs of transporting
the tubers from the farm to the various wholesale and
retail markets. Even though most of the potatoes pur-




Prices along the supply chain (VND per kg)
Farmer Trader Wholesaler Retailer
Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell
Hai Duong 1385 1470 1770 1795 2150
Thai Binh 1420 1280 1450 1465 1950
Bac Giang 1170 1370 1680 1535 1920
Hanoi 1785 2180 2305 2920 
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and collector agents (59%), a significant proportion
were purchased ungraded. Furthermore, over 54% of
traders indicated that they regraded the potatoes they
had purchased prior to resale. Although the costs of
grading ranged from VND10–50 per kg, the market
was willing to pay a significant price premium for
larger tubers. 
At the farm level, farmers received an average
price of VND1385 for the large tubers (5–8 tubers
per kg). For the extra large tubers (3–4 per kg),
farmers received a price premium of VND185 per kg
and for the medium sized tubers (9–15 per kg), the
price was reduced by some VND180 per kg. For
the small tubers (more than 16 tubers per kg),
farmers received only VND500 per kg, hence most
farmers retained the small tubers for feeding live-
stock. As the product moved through the supply
chain, not only did the price premium increase for
the larger tubers, but the disincentive for smaller
tubers became more pronounced (Table 2).
Despite the differences in price, 74% of whole-
salers and 70% of retailers reported that they did not
regrade the potatoes they had purchased prior to
resale. Presumably, having purchased the tubers
from traders and collector agents, wholesalers and
retailers had no recourse; what they could not sell,
they would either have to eat themselves or incur the
loss. No doubt, in the absence of any enforceable
quality standards, wholesalers and retailers sought to
reduce the perceived risk by transacting with repu-
table traders and collector agents. 
While the majority of traders (70%) stored pota-
toes for 5–7 days, no doubt as an integral part of the
process of consolidation, the majority of wholesalers
(63%) indicated that they did not store potatoes.
Conversely, some 57% of retailers indicated that
they stored potatoes for up to one month. Presum-
ably such storage practices were undertaken to
accommodate the abrupt reduction in the supply of
potatoes in February–March. Storage losses gener-
ally ranged from 1–5% and, quite surprisingly, were
not related to the storage duration. This would sug-
gest that the storage losses incurred were the result
of either damaged or diseased tubers being placed in
storage, rather than of any contamination occurring
during the storage period.
Transportation costs consumed a significant pro-
portion of the traders’ marketing margin. Of the
three areas studied, Hai Duong was the closest to
Hanoi, hence traders were able to pay a significantly
higher price and to transact directly with the farmers.
Since both Bac Giang and Thai Binh were located at
a greater distance, farmers were paid lower prices to
accommodate the higher transportation costs. While
it is unclear whether prices in Hanoi are set at the
wholesale or the retail level, traders apparently work
backwards, subtracting the costs of transport and the
profit margin they seek to achieve, to arrive at a
price they are prepared to pay the farmers and col-
lector agents. 
On the other hand, since most wholesalers neither
regrade nor store the potatoes they have purchased, a
much greater proportion of the marketing margin will
be profit. However, given the significant price disin-
centive for small tubers, if wholesalers inadvertently
purchase a large quantity of small to medium sized
tubers, they may be exposed to potential trading
losses. As the last market intermediaries in the chain,
retailers have no recourse. Having purchased the
potatoes, they must either sell them, lose them to




Traders want to buy potatoes that are free of chem-
ical residues, free of pests, diseases and physical
injury, of the desired size (large), and which provide
an acceptable shelf life. In order to meet the needs of
their downstream customers, traders need to buy
sufficient quantities of potatoes at a competitive
price and to be able to pick them up when required
(Table 3). 
Regrettably, a simple methodological error meant
that data was not collected from the wholesalers,
however, retailers’ expectations were not greatly dis-
similar to those of the traders. Retailers did place
greater emphasis on the ability of suppliers to meet
their immediate needs. Since retailers purchased in
much smaller quantities, being able to secure suffi-
cient quantities of potatoes was much less important.
Similarly, since most purchased from market inter-
mediaries rather than directly from farmers, geo-















Extra large +185 +170 +240 +450
Large 1385 1595 2180 2550
Medium –180 –170 –480 –885 
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important. However, retailers placed more impor-
tance on purchasing a consistent, well graded line of
potatoes. Variety was of little importance to retailers,
presumably because most of their customers did not
differentiate between varieties. While the market
preferred large, evenly shaped tubers, the principal
criteria consumers used in their decision to purchase
were skin colour and flesh colour. Over many years,
consumers had learned to associate yellow skin
and yellow flesh with potatoes that tasted good and
cooked well (Batt, 2002). 
Traders indicated that the collector agents were
generally better able to meet their perceived needs
than farmers. As the principal function of the col-
lector agents is to aggregate the potatoes from many
small farmers and to grade them prior to collection,
this was not unexpected. However, since even this
most fundamental task requires some effort, collector
agents will only undertake these activities if they are
adequately rewarded. As a result, traders report that
it is more expensive to purchase potatoes from col-
lector agents (Table 4).
Farmers were generally perceived as being unable
to deliver sufficient quantities of potatoes that were
free of pests and diseases, physical injury, of the
desired size and which delivered the desired shelf
 
where 1 is ‘not at all important’ and 6 is ‘very important’




Mean rating for what market intermediaries desire from upstream suppliers
Traders Wholesalers Retailers
Free from chemical residue 5.74 5.21
Free from pests and disease 5.70 5.37
Desired size  5.52 5.42
Long shelf life 5.52 5.37
Sufficient quantity 5.45 4.68
Meet immediate needs 5.39 5.47
Good reputation 5.39 5.42
Competitively priced 5.35 5.26
Deliver when required 5.30 4.74
Free from physical injury 5.27 5.42
Desired variety 4.87 3.79
Proximity (close)  4.48 3.32
Well graded 4.26 5.05
Appropriately packed 3.48 3.00




The extent to which farmers and collector agents meet traders’ needs





Free from chemical residue 5.74 5.30 5.55 0.066 0.056
Free from pests and disease 5.70 4.87 5.05 0.034 0.061
Desired size 5.52 4.74 5.32 0.005 0.545
Long shelf life 5.52 4.70 4.91 0.013 0.015
Sufficient quantity 5.45 4.43 5.27 0.021 0.480
Meet immediate needs 5.39 4.91 4.86 0.077 0.030
Good reputation 5.39 4.91 5.14 0.164 0.284
Competitively priced 5.35 5.04 4.91 0.259 0.107
Deliver when required 5.30 4.91 5.64 0.025 0.096
Free from physical injury 5.27 4.13 4.86 0.005 0.016
Desired variety 4.87 4.91 5.05 0.803 0.436
Proximity (close) 4.48 5.04 4.77 0.163 0.521
Well graded 4.26 4.14 4.91 0.751 0.313
Appropriately packed 3.48 2.17 3.45 0.001 0.910
Supply a wide range of fresh vegetables 3.39 3.43 2.85 0.877 0.438 
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life. Even though traders placed little importance on
packing, most reported that the manner in which
farmers packed potatoes was significantly below
their expectations.
Although collector agents regraded the potatoes
prior to resale, shelf life and freedom from physical
injury remained problematic for the traders. Since the
majority of potatoes in the Red River Delta are har-
vested before they are mature (Batt, 2002), the skin is
unlikely to have hardened sufficiently. As a result,
the tubers are more susceptible to damage, dehydra-
tion and decay. The high incidence of physical
damage is, no doubt, related to harvesting practices.
Although no data was collected that quantified the
wholesalers’ expectations, it was apparent that most
wholesalers were dissatisfied with both the technical
quality and the functional quality of the product they
received from traders and collector agents. Whole-
salers reported that the tubers they received were
often too small and excessively damaged by both
pests and disease and physical injury. As a result, the
shelf life of the product was generally too short. Sup-
pliers were often unable to meet the wholesalers’
immediate needs and variations in product quality at
the farm level made it difficult for traders and col-
lector agents to provide a consistent quality. While
the inability to meet wholesalers’ immediate needs
was, no doubt, the result of geographic distance,
since both the traders and collector agents operated
in rural areas, most wholesalers reported that the
prices traders and collector agents expected for the
potatoes they sold were too high (Table 5). Con-
versely, for the majority of retailers, suppliers either
met or exceeded their expectations. Although prob-
lems were reported in the same key areas: tuber size,
freedom from physical injury, shelf life and price, it
was only the inability of suppliers to provide tubers
that were substantially free from pests and diseases
that proved to be significantly different from what
other members in the supply chain had said.
Two of the three market intermediaries recognised
that the high price of potatoes was a major constraint
(Table 6).
Traders indicated that it was too expensive to pur-
chase potatoes from both farmers and collector
agents; while retailers indicated that it was too expen-
sive to purchase potatoes from wholesalers. Since
wholesalers did not indicate that it was too expensive
to buy potatoes from traders, this would imply that
wholesalers, being in perhaps the most powerful posi-
tion in the market, were able to extract the margin
they desired irrespective of the purchase price and to
pass these higher costs onto the metropolitan retailers
who had no alternative source of supply.
From the wholesalers’ perspective, the major
problem experienced with traders was the narrow
range of vegetables delivered. This would imply that
wholesalers sought to buy more than just potatoes
from the traders, but since most traders (in the Red
River Delta) bought and sold potatoes only when
potatoes were available from the farmers, this would
not seem possible. Various other problems were
experienced with the quality of the tangible product
including inappropriate varieties (to meet the
customers’ intended use), tubers infected with dis-
ease and contaminated with chemical residues, small
tuber size and a high incidence of physical damage to
tubers. Problems with the functional quality included
 




The extent to which upstream suppliers meet wholesalers’ and retailers’ needs
Want Get Probability 
Wholesaler Retailer Wholesaler Retailer
Meet immediate needs 5.47 4.70 5.63 0.420
Good reputation 5.42 4.40 5.26 0.578
Desired size 5.42 4.80 5.26 0.625
Free from physical injury 5.42 4.40 5.00 0.119
Free from pests and disease 5.37 4.50 4.68 0.015
Long shelf life 5.37 3.80 5.16 0.429
Competitively priced 5.26 4.80 5.11 0.506
Free from chemical residue 5.21 3.70 5.32 0.695
Well graded 5.05 5.00 5.05 1.000
Deliver when required 4.74 5.00 5.58 0.038
Sufficient quantity 4.68 5.30 5.53 0.061
Desired variety 3.79 3.80 4.16 0.309
Proximity (close) 3.32 3.40 4.05 0.105
Supply a wide range of fresh vegetables 3.06 2.60 3.22 0.721
Appropriately packed 3.00 3.80 3.37 0.185 
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poor packing and an inability to deliver sufficient
potatoes for wholesalers to satisfy their customers’
needs. No doubt, since the traders operated in rural
areas and, presumably, since wholesalers were not
able to readily communicate with their suppliers, dis-
tance was perceived to be a major impediment.
For the retailers, while wholesalers could gener-
ally supply sufficient potatoes to meet their needs,
they were unable to respond to their immediate
needs. Retailers also experienced more problems
with inconsistent tuber quality.
Comparing the various impediments traders expe-
rienced with purchasing potatoes from farmers and
collector agents provided some interesting results.
Traders deemed that it was more expensive to pur-
chase potatoes directly from farmers. Presumably,
this was because farmers demanded a high price and
provided only small quantities of largely ungraded
tubers. Thus, traders experienced more quality prob-
lems when transacting directly with farmers. How-
ever, when dealing with collector agents, traders
experienced more problems with inappropriate varie-
ties, small tuber size, physical injury and tubers
being infected with disease. The only plausible
explanation for this would appear to be the traders’
ability, when purchasing direct from farmers, to
select for themselves, those tubers they wanted to
buy or to reject. Conversely, when purchasing from a
collector agent, the trader must purchase the entire
quantity. It would also seem highly likely that, since
collector agents store potatoes for between 7–10
days, any problems regarding tuber decay would be
more likely to show up after a short period of storage
rather than immediately after harvest. 
While traders indicated that they experienced
more problems with poor packing when purchasing
direct from farmers, farmers acknowledged that poor
packing was one of the major impediments that pre-
vented them from meeting the needs of their
downstream customers (Table 7). Poor grading, con-
tamination by disease, a high incidence of physical
injury, poor appearance and small tuber size were
also perceived to be problems. However, that vari-
able which farmers believed most prevented them
from meeting the needs of downstream customers
was the high purchase price. 
Farmers believed that the major factors contrib-
uting to their inability to meet customers’ perceived
needs was insufficient capital (62%) which impacted
adversely upon their ability to purchase good quality
seed and sufficient quantities of inputs to maximise
productivity. Nevertheless, various other agronomic
constraints affected the farmers’ ability to produce
good quality potatoes including heavy rain and the
cropping pressures under which farmers found them-
selves operating; eg many farmers reported that com-
post applied had not broken down completely. The
agro-ecological environment of the Red River Delta
is far from optimal for the production of potatoes and
not all farmers possess the skills to improve produc-
tivity. In this case, where farmers are operating
below their full potential, costs per unit output will
be proportionately higher (Table 8). 
Lack of knowledge was also perceived to be a
major problem for the traders. While it is readily
apparent that farmers would benefit most by
improving their agronomic knowledge, traders may
not have the knowledge to differentiate between
varieties, to identify infected tubers, to know how to





Why suppliers fail to meet the needs of downstream customers (%)






High price 75 48 10 50
Poorly graded 21 10 18
Inappropriate varieties 33 50 16
Narrow range of vegetables 78 16
Poor quality 41 13
Small tuber size 8 24 10 11
Not free of physical injury 24 10 11
Cannot meet immediate needs 11
Poor packing 17 22 10
Not free of disease 13 29 30 8
Poor storage capability 8
Poor reputation 8
Not free of chemical residues 5 33
Cannot deliver required quantity 10 30
Excessive distance 10 56 
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Downstream relationships in the potato 
supply chain
 
Contrary to expectations, it was apparent that most
farmers had a very positive relationship with their
preferred trading partner. The majority of farmers
were very satisfied with their trading partners and
trusted them. Farmers reported that their preferred
trading partners were always honest and kept their
promises. Since their preferred trading partners
seldom acted opportunistically, farmers had confi-
dence in them and generally believed the information
they provided. Most farmers maintained that they
had a close personal friendship with their preferred
trading partner (Table 9). 
It is also apparent that most farmers were able to
act independently of their preferred trading partner,
despite the modest levels of financial assistance pro-
vided and the willingness of their preferred trading
partner to share the risks. Most farmers indicated that
they could readily choose an alternative trading
partner, although most did not wish to do so because
they believed their preferred trading partner had
made the best offer relative to the alternatives.
Furthermore, most farmers indicated that their pre-
ferred trading partners seldom had all the power in
the relationship, nor did they control all the informa-
tion. Consequently, the preferred trading partner was
seldom able to coerce farmers into making decisions
that were not in their best interests.
Similarly, the traders’ relationship with their pre-
ferred wholesale trading partner was also quite posi-
tive, with most traders indicating high levels of trust
and satisfaction in the exchange. However, it was
apparent that the traders were more dependent upon
their preferred wholesale trading partners, even
though they did not necessarily provide the best
offer. Traders perceived that their wholesale trading
partners had more power and controlled more of the
information, although they were less willing to pro-
vide financial assistance or to share risks. 
Conversely, the majority of wholesalers indicated
very low levels of both satisfaction and trust in their
relationships with retail customers. Transactions
entailed a high degree of risk and there was a greater
possibility of being exposed to opportunistic behav-
iour and conflict in the relationship. There was
minimal cooperation between wholesalers and
retailers and minimal trust. As a result, most whole-
salers indicated that their retail trading partners had a
poor reputation. Wholesalers were not only more
dependent, but retailers also wielded more market
power and controlled more of the information.
Retailers were also less likely to provide financial
assistance or to share the risks.
 
Upstream relationships in the 
potato supply chain
 
In reviewing their relationship with farmers and col-




Variables that prevent suppliers from meeting customers’ needs (%)
Farmer to Trader Trader to Wholesaler Wholesaler to Retailer
Insufficient quantity 32
Inappropriate varieties 5 29 26
Not free of diseases 17 21
Insufficient range 21
Too far from customer 21
Not free of physical injury 18 16
Small tuber size 2 16
Price too high 48
Poor grading 33 38
Tubers not packed 20
Poor appearance 8




What prevents suppliers from better meeting customers’ needs? (%)
Farmer Trader Wholesaler
Lack of capital 62 29
Unable to buy good quality seed 35
Agronomic issues 32
Lack of knowledge  12 42
Don’t have desired variety 8 
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that they experienced high levels of satisfaction and
trust. Understandably, because the collector agents
accumulated potatoes from many small farmers,
traders generally felt they could rely more upon the
collector agents than they could upon individual
farmers. Furthermore, the collector agents were both
more willing and able to provide financial assistance
and to share the risks. However, somewhat surpris-
ingly, traders indicated that they were more
dependent on farmers than they were upon their col-
lector agents. Since the farmers could choose the
trader to whom they would sell their potatoes,
farmers generally exercised more power and con-
trolled more information (Table 10).
Just as wholesalers reported a not entirely satis-
factory relationship with their down-stream trading
partners, they also indicated that they were equally
dissatisfied in their relationship with the traders and
collector agents. Wholesalers reported that traders
seldom treated them fairly and equitably and, on
many occasions, failed to meet their expectations.
Despite the longevity of the relationship (an average
of six years), there was a high degree of risk associ-
ated in the exchange. Traders were slow to respond
to the wholesaler’s complaints and there was evi-
dence of only moderate levels of cooperation in the
exchange. Wholesalers also reported that despite the
opportunity to choose from several alternative sup-
pliers, traders and collector agents had more power
and controlled more of the information. Neverthe-
less, wholesalers indicated that they were neither
dependent nor did they have to adhere to the trader’s
demands. This was achieved because most whole-
salers (68%) purchased potatoes from more than two
traders and collector agents (Batt, 2002).
No doubt because of the potential variation in the
quantity and quality of the tubers delivered by
traders and collector agents, wholesalers demon-
strated the least amount of trust in their relationship
with their upstream suppliers. Wholesalers believed
that traders and collector agents were more dishonest
and less likely to keep their promises. However,
wholesalers also seemed less willing to believe in the
information provided by traders and wholesalers and
 




Mean ratings of relationship variables for downstream relationships between market intermediaries







Trading with preferred partner is less risky  5.82 5.83 4.20
Good cooperation with preferred trading partner 5.64 5.70 3.70
Expect to continue to trade with partner 5.61 4.40 4.64
Preferred trading partner meets expectations 5.55 5.43 3.10
Treats me fairly and equitably 5.49 5.77 4.10
Adequately rewarded 5.44 5.57 4.30
Quick to handle complaints  5.22 4.10 3.10




Confidence in preferred trading partner 5.58 5.03 3.90
Always keeps promises 5.54 5.20 4.00
Always honest 5.53 5.37 4.00
Good reputation  5.46 5.33 2.70
Trust preferred trading partner 5.36 4.93 4.30
Believe information provided 5.05 4.53 3.70
Close personal friendship 5.03 4.77 3.80




Free to choose another trading partner at any time 5.71 4.90 2.90
Has best offer relative to alternatives 5.31 4.57 4.30
Partner provides financial assistance 4.98 3.43 2.70
Willing to share risks 4.86 3.87 2.40
Must adhere to partners’ demands  2.78 2.37 3.78
Trading partner has all the power 2.28 2.83 4.30
Trading partners control all the information 2.21 2.40 3.00
Trading partner often acts opportunistically 2.15 2.03 3.22
More dependent on trading partner 2.07 2.37 4.50 
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perceived them to engage more frequently in oppor-
tunistic trading. This would suggest that price was of
considerable importance in the transaction. Whole-
salers believed that if traders and collector agents
could obtain a higher price from an alternative cus-
tomer, they would be more likely to abandon their
relationship. In turn, traders and collector agents
could readily blame their inability to deliver on the
inconsistent supply from farmers.
While the wholesalers were generally dissatisfied
in their relationship with their retail customers,
retailers expressed quite high levels of satisfaction
and trust in their relationship with the wholesalers.
Indeed, most retailers intended to continue to trade
with their wholesale trading partner, even though
there were plenty of alternatives, noting that their
current wholesale supplier provided the best offer
relative to the alternatives. However, retailers
expressed some doubt as to whether wholesalers
always acted in their best interests. Wholesalers
seemed the most willing to share the risks and some




An analysis of the price margins along the supply
chain demonstrates that there is a reported variation
of VND95–200 per kg between the price at which
farmers sell potatoes and the price that traders buy
them. While some of the variation can be explained
by sample error, in other instances, the variation can
be explained by the intervention of collector agents,
who, as representatives of the traders, purchase small
quantities of potatoes from many small independent
farmers, aggregate these potatoes and then grade
them into a longer, more consistent line for the
traders to collect. For the provision of these services,
collector agents are paid between VND50–200 per
kg. Having purchased these potatoes, the traders
indicate that they are able to extract a marketing
margin of between VND170–310 per kg. Potentially,
given that there is a margin of some VND220–510
per kg or 28% between the price at which the farmer
sells potatoes and the price at which the traders sell
potatoes, there may be some opportunity for
 
















Trading with preferred partner is less risky  5.83 5.55 3.90 5.40
Good cooperation with preferred trading partner 5.70 5.68 4.10 5.45
Preferred trading partner meets expectations 5.48 5.32 4.60 5.60
Treats me fairly and equitably 5.48 5.68 3.50 5.50
Adequately rewarded 5.41 5.41 4.70 5.10
Expect to continue to trade with partner 4.82 5.18 4.60 5.13
Quick to handle complaints  4.26 4.77 2.70 4.90




Trust preferred trading partner 5.35 5.00 4.40 5.16
Always honest 5.17 5.29 4.00 4.90
Good reputation  4.95 4.68 4.00 4.60
Always keeps promises 4.91 5.23 4.10 4.85
Confidence in preferred trading partner 4.87 5.27 4.20 5.10
Close personal friendship 4.68 4.73 4.20 4.42
Believe information provided 4.10 4.23 4.10 4.95




Free to choose another trading partner at any time 4.77 5.10 4.40 5.80
Has best offer relative to alternatives 4.05 4.14 4.60 5.25
Willing to share risks 3.32 3.82 3.20 4.03
Partner provides financial assistance 2.91 3.18 4.44 4.24
Trading partner has all the power 2.91 2.59 3.30 3.70
Trading partner controls all the information 2.82 2.27 2.80 1.90
Must adhere to partner’s demands  2.77 2.32 2.60 2.30
More dependent on trading partner 2.36 2.23 2.70 2.45
Trading partner often acts opportunistically 2.36 2.00 2.33 2.20 
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cooperative marketing to return more of this margin
to the farmers.
Shepherd and Futrell (1982) begin their discussion
on the role of agricultural cooperatives by refuting
the widely held belief that the larger the marketing
margin, the more inefficient the market. If individual
farmers were to sell their products to consumers
directly, the prices paid by consumers and the prices
received by farmers would be identical. The
marketing margin would be zero, but the market
would be exceedingly inefficient. Using the same
argument, they demonstrate how the elimination of
middlemen will not necessarily improve the effi-
ciency of the market, for if farmers were to distribute
their produce directly to consumers, the costs of
transport and the farmers’ marketing costs would
increase appreciably. 
While the physical distribution of product creates
time, place and product form utility, the additional
value created usually comes at a cost. Not only must
the traders regrade and store the tubers they have
purchased but, given the significant price premium
paid for large tubers and the various problems asso-
ciated with harvesting immature tubers, excessive
physical injury and infection by pests and disease,
some risk and some losses are inevitable. Further-
more, traders must also pay for the cost of trans-
porting the tubers from the farm to the various
wholesale and retail markets. 
While farmers often seek to establish marketing
cooperatives as a means of diverting more of the
profit extracted by the market intermediaries to the
farmer, the greatest opportunity for cooperatives lies
not in diverting profits, but in reducing costs (Shep-
herd and Futrell, 1982). Cooperatives are often in a
position to reduce costs by handling greater volumes
of produce than their competitors. However, many
cooperatives have found to their dismay that they
cannot operate at a lower cost. Kohls and Uhl (1990)
suggest that in low capital industries such as fresh
fruit and vegetables, the economies of scale are not
so great. Economies of scale are usually gained by
continuous, large-scale production from specialised
farm units. In the Red River Delta, where potato pro-
duction is highly seasonal and derived from many
thousand small farmers, it is highly unlikely that any
real economies of scale could be achieved. Since the
majority of collector agents and traders operate pri-
marily as small businesses themselves, it is highly
unlikely that any formal cooperative group could
compete cost effectively as it would have to pay for
fixed management overheads.  
Traditionally, cooperatives have been established
to enable farmers to do collectively what they cannot
achieve independently: to alter the competitive struc-
ture of the market (Kohls and Uhl, 1990). Through
acting collectively, many small farmers are able to
approach the market as a single business, thereby
enabling them to improve their bargaining position
with other firms. However, the key assumption is
that by continuing to work independently, farmers
are subjected to exploitive marketing practices. If
this were the case, potato farmers in the Red River
Delta would demonstrate low levels of satisfaction
and trust and a high degree of forced collaboration or
dependence in their relationship with trading part-
ners. This is not the case. Most farmers report that
there is minimal conflict in their relationship with
their preferred trading partner. Most farmers per-
ceive that they have been adequately rewarded and
treated fairly and equitably. There is good coopera-
tion between the farmer and their preferred trading
partner and a high degree of trust in the relationship.
Farmers had confidence in their preferred trading
partner and could rely both on the accuracy of the
information provided and the knowledge that their
exchange partner seldom acted opportunistically.
Since information was widely available, traders who
did behave opportunistically would be readily
detected. Within a small rural community, the
trader’s reputation would suffer immeasurable
damage and, with few barriers to switching, farmers
could readily choose an alternative trading partner.
However, it was also apparent that most farmers
expected to continue to transact with their preferred
trading partner. It is possible to conclude therefore,
that potato farmers in the Red River Delta choose to
stay with their preferred trading partner because they
want to, not because they have to.
When the relationships in the supply chain are
analysed from a customer rather than a supplier per-
spective it is apparent that the traders are more satis-
fied with the offer quality they receive from the
collector agents rather than the farmers. This would
suggest that collector agents are not only performing
some important assembly function, but by sorting
and regrading the potatoes they are performing an
important value-adding activity. Gap analysis con-
firms that, while several issues remain unresolved
(inadequate shelf life and the high incidence of phys-
ical damage), the collector agents offer quality is
generally higher with regard to both the technical
quality dimensions and the functional quality dimen-
sions. Since the traders are even less dependent on
the collector agents than they are on the farmers,
traders would not transact with the collector agents if
they considered the additional costs they incurred as
being too high. Competition between the many
collector agents will ensure that traders receive a
competitive price.
While traders generally indicate high levels of
relational satisfaction and trust with their preferred 
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wholesale partners, it is abundantly clear that the
wholesalers are much less satisfied in their relation-
ship with their preferred suppliers. Most of the
wholesalers’ problems are derived from the inability
of traders to deliver potatoes that are of the desired
size, free from physical injury, pests and diseases
and which provide an acceptable shelf life. While
traders are generally able to provide sufficient quan-
tities of potatoes and to deliver them when they are
required, most wholesalers report that traders have a
questionable reputation. Presumably, since most
traders provide potatoes that are well graded, this
relates more to the traders’ desire to allocate more
produce to those wholesalers who are willing to pay
the highest price. Potentially, since wholesalers are
the most dissatisfied, the least trusting and the most
dependent upon their up-stream suppliers, farmer
cooperatives may be readily accepted by the whole-
salers, providing that they can offer better quality
product at a more competitive price. Since most
wholesalers indicate that they want to purchase a
range of vegetable crops from their preferred sup-
plier rather than just potatoes, offering a greater
range of produce will greatly facilitate not only the
entry of any cooperative into the marketing system,
but also have a significant positive impact on cash
flow and profitability. Furthermore, since more than
85% of the potato crop in the Red River Delta is har-
vested in just one month, by providing adequate
storage facilities, cooperatives might be able to
extend the seasonality of supply and, to a limited
extent, smooth the market price. 
Price and the price/quality relationship is report-
edly the major problem throughout the supply chain
for fresh potatoes in the Red River Delta. At the farm
level, the poor productivity per unit area, the large
number of small tubers, the high incidence of pests
and disease, physical injury and poor storage per-
formance of tubers, can all be attributed to various
agronomic issues, poor quality seed and the lack of
adequate capital. Without first addressing and
improving productivity on the farm, any first level
marketing cooperative will struggle to survive.
Where product quality is highly variable and a large
proportion of production falls outside the size speci-
fications sought by downstream market intermedi-
aries, the costs of grading will increase. That then
introduces the additional problem of how to dispose
of product which is rejected. 
To have any real impact in the market, any poten-
tial cooperative will need to work at both the input
and the output end. With most farmers reporting that
the lack of capital is the major constraint affecting
their ability to provide better quality potatoes, the
cooperative might establish itself as an alternative
source of finance. Being run by the farmers, for the
farmers, such problems as unexpected crop failures
could be readily accommodated, as such natural
calamities would affect most farmers. By consoli-
dating the farmers’ needs for chemicals, fertilisers
and good quality seed, the cooperative should be
able to purchase these inputs at a lower cost. Addi-
tional services might include the provision of
improved market information, insurance or a range
of other social and infrastructural services such as
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 paper presents some preliminary results from a
larger ongoing project analysing three farm contracts
in East Java, Bali and Lombok. The primary purposes
of the larger study are to examine the effects of the
three contracts on welfare of participating small-
holders, reasons for contract participation and identi-
fication of the implications of contract farming for
government policy. Analysis of the data collected in
the study has been completed for the East Javanese
and Bali contracts, with preliminary results for the
East Javanese work presented in Simmons et al.
(2003).
It was never our intention to pay particular atten-
tion to village farmer organisations associated with
the three contracts, however after conducting our
first smallholder survey in East Java it became
apparent that such organisations were an important
part of the story. The purpose of this workshop paper
is to explain what we discovered about links between
contract farming and farmer organisations from our
three case studies. The first section of the paper iden-
tifies three types of farmer organisations associated
with contract farming, the next section explains the
ways that contract farming affects smallholder wel-
fare, the next three sections are the case studies and
the final section uses the case studies to discuss farm
level linkages associated with contract farming and
effects of contract farming on village organisations.
 
How farm contracts influence 
smallholder welfare
 
Over the last two decades market liberalisation has
profoundly influenced agriculture in both developed
and developing parts of the world. Market liberalisa-
tion, driven by WTO and earlier GATT Rounds, new
technology and changing food habits have resulted in
deregulation of domestic food markets and opening
and expansion of international markets (Jaffee,
1994). Ponte (2000) examines the economic and
social impacts of liberalisation and associated micro-
economic reform on African agriculture with less
government credit, less parastatal production (where
production is subject to controls by a government
statutory organisation) in food markets and removal
of price supports and input subsidies. Marsh and
Runsten (1995) report microeconomic reforms in
Mexico such as the 1989 deregulation of trucking
and exports. Goodman and Watts (1997) provide a
broader picture of effects of international trade
expansion in food products on the economic and
social environments in developing countries. These
studies show market liberalisation is changing pat-
terns of agricultural production in terms of on-farm
crop and livestock mixes, increasing total production
in physical and value terms and changing the types
of food products entering international markets. The
studies also show traditional values and habits in
agriculture are being replaced by transactions that
increasingly reflect a ‘cash culture’. 
Contract farming is an integral part of this process
however the net effect of contract farming on the
welfare of smallholders has been controversial. A
number of authors express concern that contractors
favour larger growers and hence poorer growers may
be left out of the development process (CDC, 1989;
Runsten, 1992; Little and Watts, 1994). Other
hazards of contract farming are the potential for
‘capture’ of smallholders within contracts, negative
social effects of the ‘cash economy’, narrowing of
local markets as contracted production squeezes out
local food production, deteriorating contract terms as
contracts mature, and general concerns about how
multinational corporations behave in developing
countries (Clapp, 1988; Wilson, 1990; Little and
Watts, 1994; Torres, 1997; Singh, 2000). Positive
evaluations of contract farming generally indicate
farmers either benefit from contracts in terms of
enhanced profits or get out of them. Benefits from
contract participation result from improved access to
markets, credit and technology, better management 
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of risk, improved family employment and, indirectly,
empowerment of women and development of a suc-
cessful commercial culture (Glover and Kusterer,
1990; Runsten, 1992; Key and Runsten, 1999; Eaton
and Shepherd, 2001). 
The economic benefits of contract farming
described in the literature (Simmons, 2003; Key and
Runsten, 1999) are remarkably similar to those
claimed for farmer cooperatives by the International
Cooperative Information Centre on its website
http://www.wisc.edu/uwcc/icic/ and elsewhere in the
developing country farm cooperatives literature
summarised in Shar (1995). That is, both contract
farming and cooperatives provide an institutional
structure that allows smallholders to overcome var-
ious types of transaction costs and hence to make
more productive use of their capital (in the sense
described by de Janvrey et. al., 1991). Incidentally,
the parallels between contract farming and coopera-
tives are not limited to the types of benefits that each
confers. Based on the 40 or so case studies of
cooperatives in Shah (1995), it seems that all the
things that can go wrong in a farm contract can also
go wrong in a cooperative: non-compliant behaviour,
corruption, bad management, poorly thought out
arrangements and domain problems such as adverse
political pressures, drought, pests and disease and
collapsing output and factor markets.
In this context, four potential benefits from con-
tract farming, also attributed to successful coopera-




Recent expansion of contract farming is often
viewed as part of the broader globalisation phenom-
enon whereby removal of trade restrictions has led to
increased flows of agricultural products, especially
from developing to developed countries. Runsten
(1992) documents a range of contracts since 1989 for
high-value food (HVF) crops including strawberries,
melons and frozen vegetables processed in Mexico
then exported to the United States by both domestic
and multinational agribusiness firms. Goodman and
Watts (1997) document the development of con-
tracts, alongside other multinational activity, for
pineapples and bananas from Central American
countries for export to the United States and Europe.
Glover and Kusterer (1990) document similar
activity in Central American countries and Porter
and Phillips-Howard (1997) examine a range of new
types of contractual arrangements involving interna-
tional trade from Africa. 
Agribusiness firms are instrumental in ‘opening’
markets for smallholders in all of these studies.
These firms have advantages over smallholders in
market knowledge and experience, information, legal
expertise, economies to size in processing and trans-
port and have the financial muscle necessary for
sustaining international trade relationships. From a
smallholder perspective, in the absence of contracts
these markets are ‘missing’ in the sense that transac-





Non-traditional or high-value food crops are more
costly to produce than traditional crops and cash
requirements for farm inputs are usually relatively
high (Goodman and Watts, 1997; Key and Runsten,
1999). These crops often require specialty inputs and
have more exacting quality requirements requiring
sophisticated technology and flexible use of labour
and chemicals. Hence, smallholders need access to
credit to undertake production.
Many smallholders are credit constrained in the
sense they have no access to credit at all (Glover and
Kusterer, 1990; Hayami and Otsuka, 1993). Alterna-
tively, if access is available they face high interest
rates, often three to four times the bank rate, from
local moneylenders or excessive transaction costs if
they use bank credit. High interest rates reflect rela-
tively high costs faced by local moneylenders in
sourcing funds and servicing borrowers who do not
have collateral. Titles to land may be traditional
rather than legal and court processes slow, expensive
or ineffective so that defaulters are not worth pur-
suing legally. In this situation, the only assurance a
moneylender has of repayment is the smallholder’s
desire for future loans and, since they are often part
of the same community, may face social pressure to
be benevolent when repayments are delayed by bad
seasons or exigencies such as weddings and funerals.
These high costs are passed on to borrowers in the
form of high interest rates. When smallholders seek
credit from agricultural banks or micro-lenders,
transaction costs are high. On even small loans they
may face forced purchases, loan delay costs, travel
costs, application fees, legal service costs and collat-
eral titling costs (Key and Runsten, 1999).
The agribusiness firm has several strategic advan-
tages over banks and traditional lenders in borrowing
that can be conferred on contractors through con-
tracts. The contract confers lending advantages on
the agribusiness firm through monitoring of input
use, control over crop management decisions that
might jeopardise repayment and specification of how
cash advances are to be repaid. Also, contracts
require delivery to the firm hence cash advances can
be deducted from post-harvest cash settlements (Key
& Runsten, 1999). Other loan protection devices 
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include making future contracts dependent on
meeting repayment clauses in current contracts and
making loans in the form of specialised agricultural
inputs rather than cash. Finally, there may be no
other local market for the contracted commodity than
the agribusiness firm, thus ensuring collateralised
farm output is not diverted to other markets to avoid
repayment. These factors reduce the need for collat-
eral and mean that agribusiness firms have relatively





Entering a contract may mitigate or exacerbate
smallholder risk. If upfront investment is required
then failure of either the crop or the contract results
in loss. Alternatively, if the contract works and
becomes integral in the farm plan then it constitutes
a form of diversification and may reduce risk,
providing it does not dominate the farm plan. 
Non-traditional crops are likely to be more risky
than traditional crops. They have higher production
costs hence more income is at risk in the event of
crop failure. In addition, prices of non-traditional
crops are more volatile due to thinly traded markets,
yield is more uncertain than with traditional crops
and such crops are often more perishable (Marsh and
Runsten, 1995). Hence, adoption of these crops can
be unattractive from a risk standpoint without some
form of risk protection. Such protection can occur in
contracts in different ways. Subsidies may be pro-
vided when farmers first enter contracts to reduce
risks in setup of the new enterprise, cash assistance
with operating costs and extension and management
input from the firm may reduce yield risk. Glover
and Kusterer (1990) report that smallholders with
contracts were subsidised in the early years of their
participation, and extension from the contracting
firms was important in reducing yield risk.
Agribusiness firms could hedge some price risk
for high-value food  products in options and futures
markets to protect their own forward commitments
and provide upstream protection to smallholders.
However, we found no evidence of firms actually
doing this by putting price guarantees in contracts. In
contracts we examined for seed corn, mangosteens
and ginger, contract prices were set at a small pre-
mium to open market spot prices prevailing at the
time of delivery.
Thus, opportunities for reducing smallholder risk
through contracting include diversification into a
new crop with price movements largely independent
of those for traditional products, reduced risk associ-
ated with start-up costs, seasonal operating costs met
by the firm through subsidies at start-up and forward





Information can be expensive to gather and is not
depleted by use. Hence, an agribusiness firm
spreading information over many contracts has
advantages in providing crop specific information
over smallholders gathering their own information.
Most contracts described in Glover and Kusterer
(1990) included visits by firm extension officers to
either individual farmers or farm groups several
times during the first year of the contract but often
less in later years. These visits combined dissemina-
tion of information with suggestions about manage-
ment as well as providing firms with feedback on
issues between themselves and growers. Most devel-
oping countries have government extension services
to disseminate information about traditional crops
however, given the limited nature of developing
country government resources, these agencies are
unlikely to provide specialised information about
new crops. Such specialised information may con-
cern chemical restrictions related to food safety
requirements in specific markets, timing of planting
and harvest to meet markets, management of product
quality and other market and technical information.
 
Links between contract farming and 
village organisations
 
We found three types of farmer organisations associ-
ated with contract farming. In the first type, partici-
pation in a particular group is a condition of entry to
the contract and the group is entirely linkage
dependent on the contract. Such an organisation is
created specifically by the contracting firm to facili-
tate communication with its contractors and may be
comprised of farmers who have not met previously
or a sub-set of an existing farmer or irrigation group.
The purpose of this type of group is to allow effi-
cient communication between the firm and growers.
The groups may meet as often as once a month and
activities can include agricultural extension by a firm
representative and feedback from growers to the firm
about problems with contract terms and their inter-
pretation. The second type of organisation, which
may be linkage dependent or linkage independent, is
the traditional village grower or irrigation group.
Members of an existing group may collectively seek
out a contract, negotiate its terms and cooperate in
management of resources to service it, even if all
members do not end up as contractors. In the irriga-
tion areas we surveyed it would be unthinkable for a
smallholder to undertake a new type of production 
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such as contract farming without consulting his irri-
gation group. The third type of group is linkage inde-
pendent and forms after the contract has been
implemented. This type of organisation is designed
to protect growers by bringing political pressure to
bear on the contracting firm in response to harsh
contracting terms. These organisations are particu-
larly common in contract farming in developed
countries however there are also a number of cases
in developing countries (Glover, 1987). We did not
encounter such groups in Indonesia and concluded
that growers had traditional ‘channels’ for com-
plaints about legality of third party behavior.
 
Case study 1: East Javanese seed corn production
 
Pioneer is a multinational corporation growing a
range of high-value agricultural products in many
countries including Australia. In Indonesia, Pioneer
grows only hybrid seed corn which is produced only
in East Java. Between 30–40% of this seed is
exported, mainly to the Philippines with small
amounts to Thailand and Japan and the remaining
60–70% is sold domestically. Pioneer first offered
contracts for the production of hybrid seed corn to
East Javanese smallholders in 1986. At present there
are between 40 and 50 grower groups participating
in the contract each year with a total of about 10,000
contracted growers. Average plantings are around
0.2 ha and total plantings by Pioneer contractors last
year were around 2000 ha. Production of seed corn
was around 7000 tonnes (with an additional 5000
tonnes rejected on quality grounds and sold as con-
sumption corn) which was cleaned, screened, sized,
tested and packaged in the plant in Malang for sale
in small packs (1, 5 and 40 kg) and jumbo packs of
1000 kg.
There is only one quality standard although dif-
ferent varieties are grown. Only 40–50% of deliv-
ered seed meets the standard and seed not reaching
this standard is sold as consumption corn. All seed
delivered to the plant is accepted regardless of
quality. Quality issues are dealt with by excluding
poor performers from future contracts and by spot-
ting problems in the field prior to harvest. Pioneer
says “if growers follow guidelines then quality prob-
lems are ‘bad luck’ and costs will be borne by the
company”. The cost of this risk is probably spread
over all growers through offer prices.
The price paid to growers is 130% over the pre-





 for consumption corn is around Rp.
500 per kg compared to a contract price of around
Rp. 1150 per kg. (Yield from contracted corn is
around 6 tonnes per ha compared to a consumption
corn yield of 12 tonnes per ha.) Inputs provided by
Pioneer include foundation seed, money for land
preparation, physical inputs (chemicals) and exten-
sion services. Costs of these inputs (except extension
services) are deducted from the post-harvest pay-
ment for the crop with Pioneer organising funding
through a commercial bank.
Negotiation, for single season contracts only,
occurs at grower group level between Pioneer and
the 
 
ketua kelompok tani 
 
(Head of the Grower Group,
HGG) who represents the interests of growers in his





(village mayor), local politicians and government
extension officers. These parties do not actively
negotiate, rather, their roles are firstly, to legitimise
the outcome of the negotiations and, secondly, to act
as intermediaries or ‘referees’ if a dispute arises.
There is a written agreement at group level signed by
the HGG, politicians and extension officers with
verbal agreements between growers and the HGG.
Thus, the contract selection problem for Pioneer is
primarily at grower group level with the selection
decision taking into account distance from plant, irri-
gation, previous corn experience and disease and
rodent problems.
Pioneer provides one extension officer for every
one or two villages. They provide advice to growers
on husbandry, monitor the crop and provide feed-
back to Pioneer. The staff member is likely to have
an undergraduate degree in agriculture and to come
from a farming background. These are company
people who move around geographically during their
careers and have performance assessed on the basis
of contract success.
Cross-pollination with other corn crops can con-
taminate hybrid corn seed and render it unregister-
able as certified seed. Thus, Pioneer insists that all
corn grown by a smallholder group (a specified geo-
graphical area) must be Pioneer hybrid seed corn.
Since a neighbouring village or farmer group is a
potential source of contamination, Pioneer may need
to also capture their production, resulting in clusters
of contracting groups. Individuals not participating
in the contract may receive a payment from the com-
pany for not growing corn if they have a previous




The term ‘consumption corn’ refers to grain, while corn delivered to the Malang plant is ‘on the cob’ with husk and
usually the stem intact. As a rule of thumb, from Birchall, (2002), approximately one half of the mass weight of such corn
is grain hence the ‘grain equivalent’ price paid to contractors is Rp. 2300 per kg, considerably higher than the consump-
tion price.  
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surrenders use of the land for the growing season and
a hybrid corn crop is planted by another grower. The
compensation, called ‘rent’, is set at the gross margin
for consumption corn. Usually, at most, only three or
four growers in the group are affected by this
arrangement. 
Pioneer employs around 30 full-time staff at head
office in Malang in management and administrative
positions in the office and processing facility. An
additional 300 people are employed in the processing
facility on a part-time basis of whom around half are
female. In addition, hybrid seed corn husbandry is
labour intensive. For example, it takes 60 people one
day to de-tassle one hectare and many day labourers
are employed casually at specific points in the
growing cycle.
Finally, Pioneer faces competition for groups and
villages to produce seed corn from the multinational
corporations Monsanto and PC, but it is not clear
how fierce this competition is. These firms are more
diversified than Pioneer.
From the smallholder’s perspective, the contract
provides a low-cost way to access seed corn markets
using Pioneer’s well established international mar-
keting network. Without this network, and the
processing facility in Malang that supports it, it
seems unlikely that smallholders would produce this
product on a large scale, if at all. The contract pro-
vides a credit facility in cash and kind which allows
smallholders to overcome the constraints they nor-
mally face in credit markets with collateralisation of
future production and reduced borrowing costs,
resulting in credit at commercial bank rates. The
contract also allows production diversification,
reduces risk associated with high-cost farm inputs
and provides a guarantee of price regardless of
quality. There was no evidence of contracts domi-
nating farm plans or reducing diversification. High
levels of entry to and exit from the contract indicated
there was little, if any, dependence on the contract in
meeting basic income needs. Finally, growers partic-
ipating in the contract receive high-quality informa-
tion on how to grow a technically complex crop in a
situation where it is unlikely that the same type of
technical help could come from government exten-
sion services.
 
Case study 2: Balinese seed rice production
 
PT Pertani is a government-owned agribusiness firm
centred in Jakarta. It was established by the Indone-
sian Government in the Sukarno era to provide seed
to farmers. It produces seed in all provinces for crops
including soybean, corn, rice and peanuts. Produc-
tion of seed rice by PT Pertani (Bali) was about 2000
tonnes last year with about half sold in Bali and the
remainder distributed in East Java. As well as pro-
ducing and selling seed under contract the company
sells fertiliser and pesticides to farmers. PT Pertani is
government owned but not subsidised and is
expected to break even at both national and provin-
cial levels.
Since the start of the rice seed contract in Bali in
1988, the number of farmers under contract has
varied between 200 and 300. All growers must be
certified seed producers to participate in the contract.
Certification is undertaken by Balai Pengawasan
Sertifikasi Benih (BPSB), who require farmers to
undertake training prior to certification. About 5% of
Balinese farmers are certified for seed rice produc-
tion and PT Pertani faces considerable competition
from private producers of seed rice.
The PT Pertani contract terms are relatively
simple. Farmers are provided with free foundation
seed and extension advice and must deliver at least
75% of production to PT Pertani. Up to 25% of pro-
duction can be retained for the farmer’s own use and
diversion to other markets is forbidden. Payments





) and usually no advances of farm inputs or
cash are provided. This was different last season
when the contract was altered to take advantage of
special government credit provisions where Bank
Madiri provided credit for farm inputs. The bank
advances money to PT Pertani who then advance




 for distribution to





Farmers usually receive four visits during the
growing season from BPSB extension officers who
are paid to undertake an advisory and monitoring
role. Visits occur at land preparation, 30 days after
sowing, again at 40–60 days at the pre-flowering
stage and then a week prior to harvest. Quality is
important and about 15% of contracted production is
rejected following visual inspection prior to harvest.
Rejected production is subsequently sold as con-
sumption rice in the spot market.
The husbandry for the seed rice is similar to that
for consumption rice in terms of water use and
weeding, however more and better fertiliser is used,
resulting in a yield premium of about 20%. Crops
usually yield 6–7 tonnes per hectare. Farmers receive
the spot consumption rice price plus 5% and were
paid Rp. 1400/kg last season. Other private firms and
individuals produce seed rice, which they sold
through the seed-rice spot market last season for
Rp. 3000/kg. Although prices paid to PT Pertani
farmers were lower than the price available to pri-
vate seed rice producers, PT Pertani reported that
farmers saw the costs of the price discount being
offset by other benefits provided by company and 
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associated government agencies. These include free
foundation seed, seed processing and drying (pro-
ducers did not have to own their own drying equip-
ment), a guaranteed market and the provision of
extension advice. The cost of these services was
Rp. 2250/ha, a token charge.




, who is in
charge of each irrigation area, is critical in under-





 who represents the interests of 50–60
farmers in his area participating in the contract. PT




 which paddies it wishes to
use and the desired hectarage. The contract is signed




 and not by growers themselves
and payments for delivery under the contract are




 who distributes it to the





considerable power, however precisely how much
was never clear. For example, the manager at PT




 chose the cropping alloca-




) in terms of
hectarage of seed rice, consumption rice and soybean
leaving only minor production decisions to indi-
vidual farmers. He also expressed the view that
many contracted smallholders did not actually know
who they were contracted to. It was clear to us that
there was a high level of coordination amongst





 could be viewed as a single decision-
making unit. More research of a sociological nature
is needed in this area.
Preliminary analysis of the survey data indicates
that the seed rice contract has no significant impact
on the productivity of farm capital. In terms of the
possible welfare gains from contracting outlined in
the previous section, the main benefits are in risk
management. Effects on access to markets, credit
access and information are likely to be minimal. The
seed rice market is a mature market where the only
barriers to entry are the requirement for certification
as a seed producer and access to drying facilities.
Except in the last season where contractors could use
the contract to access government-subsidised credit,
only foundation seed is advanced under the contract
and this would not make any significant contribution
to overcoming credit constraints. The contract does
provide extension and hence would overcome prob-
lems resulting from lack of information, however,
since husbandry for seed rice is similar to that for
consumption rice and because the certification
process includes a training component, the benefits
here would be limited. The major advantages of the
contract for contractors are in reducing risk. They
receive an assurance that their product will be pur-
chased at harvest and the contracted production
constitutes a form of production diversification.
 
Case study 3: Lombok broiler production
 
Nusantara Unggasjaya Mataram is owned by a Thai
multinational firm that produces poultry and pigs
under contract and participates in livestock feed mar-
kets in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and China. It
has over 70 enterprises throughout Indonesia with
Nusantara Unggasjaya Mataram, operating in the
Lombok broiler market, being its smallest with only
20 staff.
Nusantara Unggasjaya Mataram currently uses
contracts with smallholders to produce around
10,000 broilers per day on Lombok. It has operated
on Lombok since 1998 and since starting operations
has carved out a stable market niche for broilers.





 chickens was around 5000.
After five years of contracting this figure has not
changed, indicating strong market segmentation. An
examination of prices of the two products supports
this conclusion since kampong chickens, which are
favored in the local market for their tastiness, lean-
ness and low chemical content, return about
Rp. 18,750/kg compared to broilers which fetch
about Rp. 5000/kg. The firm claims that the major
competing product in consumption is wild fish,
which is produced on a seasonal basis. All Lombok
broiler production is consumed locally and the firm
claims the market is ‘mature’ with little scope for
expansion. Prices of fish and broilers appear to be
inter-dependent and fluctuate quite widely. Interest-
ingly, Nusantara Unggaasjaya Mataram’s broiler
production is currently operating at a loss with
producers receiving around Rp. 7000/kg under the
contract.
About 250 farmers participate in the contract,
each with about 2500 birds at any point in time,
giving a total broiler production of about 600,000
birds in each cycle of production. 
To enter the contract, the farmer must provide a
chicken coop from his own resources and have
Rp. 20M (AU$2,000) in capital. Once in the contract
they receive day-old chicks to rear to 1.8–2.0 kg
liveweight, which takes 35–38 days depending on
target weight. Production must follow the firm’s
guidelines with regard to input use and the firm pro-
vides extension and advice, day-old chicks (imported
from nearby Bali), feed, veterinary products and
other chemicals on a credit basis. No cash advances
are made. Upon reaching the target weight the
chickens are delivered to the firm which sells them
live directly to consumers. The firm does no
processing of the broilers.
Growers currently receive about Rp. 7000/kg with
the price determined by a cost-based formula where
feed costs are the dominant item. The firm is domi- 
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nant in its output market in Lombok and can doubt-
less exercise some market power, however it would
be constrained in this activity by competition from
Balinese broiler production. It was not clear what
type of power the firm could exert in the feed market
or whether the firm used its market position to
charge ‘captive’ growers unreasonably high prices
for feed. Growers are required to purchase feed from
the firm however they would be aware of feed prices
in nearby Bali. This introduces an element of con-
testability since if the firm were too ‘out of line’ with
Balinese feed markets experienced contractors could,
presumably, undertake ex-contract broiler production
by sourcing feed from Bali.
Final payments to farmers are made 14 days after
delivery, after credit is deducted. Farmers receive a
cheque that they convert to cash in an ‘over-the-
counter’ transaction. There appear to be few issues
about quality since apparently ‘every chicken has its
price’. That is, underweight or otherwise defective
birds can be sold at a discount in the spot market for
consumption and the discount passed back to the
producer under the contract terms. 
The firm claims that contract participation is
stable, that there is a queue of farmers wishing to
participate and that exits are restricted to about 3%
of participants per year who are asked to exit
because of alleged dishonesty. The major problems
for the firm are technical such as unreliable elec-
tricity and maintaining a constant temperature. Other
issues concern the consistency of management.
The contract is negotiated directly between the
firm and the grower who is usually literate. The
contract is not signed or witnessed by third parties.
Contractors do not belong to any special groups
specialising in broiler contracting and the only
meeting of contractors is when the firm’s extension
officers talk to groups of 16–20 contracted farmers.
These are poor farmers compared to those partici-
pating in the East Javanese seed corn and Balinese
seed rice contracts. The benefits they derive from
contract participation are considerable and fall neatly
into three of the categories of benefits outlined previ-
ously. The firm provides access to the broiler market
in Lombok — however there are no barriers to entry
so farmers could sell broilers at the market price
achieved by the firm anyway. Feed costs are high
and farmers receive advances for both feed and other
inputs which are deducted from the settlement price.
It seems likely that this allows farmers to overcome
credit constraints however, further empirical work is
needed on our survey data to confirm this. The con-
tract is a major form of diversification for farmers as
production risk is low and price risk is born by the
firm. The firm representative stated that the firm is
concerned about continuity of supply and when
prices fall on a seasonal basis (related to fish catch)
the firm takes losses on production rather than lose
contractors. The firm provides guidelines for the
fairly chemical intensive production and contractors
would have little chance of easily acquiring this type
of expertise without participating in a contract. A
possible negative associated with the contract is the
possibility of ‘capture’. Contractors buy into the
contract, investing about Rp. 20m  which is a consid-
erable sum and would not be easily written off if
contract terms were to sour. We found no evidence




In each of the case studies village level organisations
played some role in the execution of the contract.
Both the seed corn and seed rice contracts made con-
siderable demands on village resources for land and
irrigation water and required a collective commit-
ment by the grower or irrigation group to enter the
contract, even when all members were not directly
participating in it. This was particularly so for the
seed corn contract where the husbandry requirement
that seed corn be grown in isolation from consump-
tion corn dictated arrangements to compensate
farmers who traditionally grew consumption corn
and were no longer able to do so. The broiler con-
tract made no demands on land or irrigation water
and traditional village organisations played no role in
it. The firm created specialised broiler producer
groups to facilitate extension however the linkage
dependence of these groups was such that member-
ship of the group was solely related to contract
participation. Other contracts we examined, mangos-
teens in Bali and dairy in East Java, were much the
same in that the contracted production made few
demands on collective resources and the only pro-
ducer groups associated with the contract were those
created by the contracting company for extension
purposes.
Both Pioneer and PT Pertani receive tangible
benefits from dealing with groups rather than individ-
uals. The costs of drafting, negotiating and enforcing
contracts are lower if the firm negotiates with 40–50
heads of grower groups, as in the East Java contract,
rather than 10,000 individual smallholders, or five or
six heads, in the Bali contract, rather than 200–300
growers. Grower differences within the groups can be
solved internally using traditional dispute resolution
systems and written contracts need only be struck
with the heads of the groups. In terms of enforcement
costs, the firms benefit by selecting contract partici-
pants at group rather than individual level. Since pro-
viding the contract serves collective interests, the
group has incentives to deal with contractually errant 
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members. Enforcement costs, an important source of
contract failure elsewhere, become a problem that can
be dealt with by the group using its existing power
structure. Maladaption costs, when contract specifica-
tions are not met, are also an important source of con-
tract failure. Both Pioneer and PT Pertani are in the
enviable position of being able to sell sub-standard
seed to the consumption market hence can offset
some of the costs incurred when quality is below
standard. However, again, the grower group plays a
role in preventing maladaption to the contract.
Members have a collective interest in preventing any
individual from departing from contract growing
guidelines since this would jeopardise the contract for
the whole group and not just for the errant member.
Set-up and running costs associated with governance
are also greatly reduced in a group environment since
the firm field employee works at grower group level.
His costs of conflict resolution are reduced by the
collective nature of grower interests and regular meet-
ings of the group allow him to spend less time face-
to-face with individuals. Finally, financial trans-
actions are supervised by the heads of the grower
groups at group level including grower payments and,
in the case of Pioneer, this includes provision of con-
tracted inputs. We concluded that both Pioneer and
PT Pertani achieved transacting scale by contracting
with farmer groups that are like small firms with
powerful chief executive officers rather than with
many individual smallholders and that this accounts
at least partly for the success of these contracts.
The power relationships between heads of grower
groups and others associated with the contract were
never clear. The head of the grower group was the
link between the growers and the contracting firm
and derived considerable authority as the sole signa-
tory of the contract as well as from the financial
arrangements. In the case of Pioneer, both advances
of factors such as fertiliser and payments for con-
tracted production were channelled through the head
of the grower or irrigation group and, in the case of
PT Pertani, final payments were made by the head. It
was not clear how much transparency there was in
these arrangements however the comment by one
contracting firm representative that ‘growers did not
actually know who they were contracting to’ indi-
cates that information flows within the grower group
may not have been very substantial when it came to
contract detail. Further research is needed to fathom
the true role played by the head of the grower group
in these situations however, on the surface at least, it
seems to be some type of principal-agency problem.
The head of the grower group presumably services
his own interests by trading off the respective inter-
ests of contract growers, non-contract growers who
are also group members, the contracting firm and the
broader village constituency.
Keeping in mind the small number of case studies
examined, some general conclusions can be drawn
about village level organisations and contract
farming:
• When farm contracts do not tie up collective
resources such as water or large amounts of land
then traditional or pre-existing grower groups do
not seem to get involved in the contract. In this
situation, the only groups are those the contracting
firm sets up for extension purposes. This was the
case with the broiler contract and also for mangos-
teen and dairy contracts that we encountered when
setting up the larger study.
• When contracts make significant demands on land
and water, as with the seed rice and hybrid corn
contracts, there is a need for group involvement
and this need is met by the traditional grower or
irrigation group which may become central in the
execution of the contract.
• When traditional village organisations are
involved in contracts this confers considerable
savings in transaction costs on the contracting
firm.
The literature on contract farming is abundant, as
is the case with rural cooperatives, however there are
few links between these bodies of knowledge. In our
larger study we reviewed around 150 papers on con-
tract farming (Simmons, 2003) and, generally, most
of the studies focused on either the effect of the con-
tracts on smallholder productivity or on agency prob-
lems associated with contract design. Few studies
paid much attention to the role that village organisa-
tions play in contract farming. Glover and Kusterer
(1990) acknowledge that farmer groups were impor-
tant in several of their case studies. Dorward (2001)
fits them into his ‘ideal’ contract farming framework
and Coulter et al. (1999) discuss how NGOs may
work through village organisations to make con-
tracting more effective. There is also a small litera-
ture on the use of political grower organisations in
protecting farmer interests against aggressive
behavior by contracting firms that is not directly rel-
evant to our discussion (Glover, 1987; Singh, 2000).
It was not possible to conduct a very wide review of
the cooperatives literature for this workshop how-
ever the case studies surveyed did not pay much
attention to contract farming (Shah, 1995). In case
studies of cooperatives, contract farming is seen as
an element in linkage dependence however the syn-
ergies between cooperatives and farm contracts and
the role of contracts in reducing transaction costs are
not addressed. There seem to be two different and
very separate literatures for horizontal and vertical
farm alliances respectively, yet, as our case studies 
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reveal, there is a need to better understand the rela-
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 are one of the economic institutions
which face many challenges in the changing national
and world economy. These challenges include the
more competitive market, the globalisation of the
market, deregulation and privatisation, and the
autonomy of some regions within the country. Most
developing countries also tend to reduce inefficiency
in the public sector and cut public spending because
of limited funding. Hence, cooperatives as an eco-
nomic and social institution struggle to survive.
In Indonesia, cooperatives also face challenges
from economic changes, especially after the eco-
nomic crisis, which hit the country in the middle of
1997. The huge government debt, the collapse of the
banking sector and the bankruptcy of many compa-
nies because of economic crisis, may influence the
economic and business environment for coopera-
tives. 
External and internal factors of cooperatives influ-
ence their capability to cope with unexpected events.
This paper attempts to analyse the economic
rationale, challenges and future development of
cooperatives in Indonesia, using the coconut industry
in North Sulawesi as a case study. 
 
Historical background and 
cooperative development
 
The cooperative movement in Indonesia, as in other
Asian countries, was greatly influenced by the devel-
opment of cooperatives in Europe, which was an
attempt to fight poverty and exploitation of human
rights (Sharma, 1997). In Europe, the movement was
initiated by the working classes, farmers, artisans
and other lower class groups due to the deteriorating
socio-economic conditions of workers caused by the
industrial revolution. The causes of the cooperative
movement in Asia, including in Indonesia, were
slightly different from those in Europe. The move-
ment was affected by the land revenue system
enforced by the colonial powers. It created large-
scale landless labour and rural indebtedness in many
regions in Indonesia (Sharma, 1997). 
The first consumer cooperative in Indonesia was
built in 1910 by Budi Utomo, an organisation of
Javanese Medical Schools in Jakarta. It was followed
by a cooperative built by Sarekat Islam, the political
organisation, in 1913. As a socio-economic organisa-
tion, the cooperative has a democratic content, which
might encourage national independence movements.
In the case of Indonesia, the Netherlands Govern-
ment also suspected that the cooperative could be
utilised as a political tool and encourages people to
live independently (Sharma, 1997).
The cooperative movement In Indonesia after
independence in 1945 can be segmented into the





) and non-KUD (Prakash, 1997). The
KUD is the rural, multipurpose cooperative institu-
tion at the village level whose members come from
the rural population and include farmers, farm
workers, small traders and fishermen. In contrast, the
non-KUD segment includes thrift and credit cooper-
atives of civil servants, armed forces, industrial
workers and traders. While the non-KUD segment is
not organised vertically, the KUD is structured verti-
cally from provincial business federations of KUDs
(the Puskuds) to a national federation (the Inkud).
The vertical integration of KUDs is established by
government with the main objective to maintain
national food supplies in collaboration with Bulog
(National Food Agency). KUD activities are
processing, rice milling, and distributing essential
commodities including farm inputs. KUDs were also
provided with several services and facilities, ware-
houses, rice milling units, drying floors, transporta-
tion equipment, a monopoly on distribution of
chemical fertilisers and disbursement of farm credit
(Prakash, 1997). The economic performance of
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Table 1 shows that about 10% of KUD and civil
servant cooperatives are non-active and the number
is even greater for other types of cooperatives. While
there are fewer KUD cooperatives than other types,
they have the most members. However, the divi-
dends paid to KUD members are far below those
paid by civil servant cooperatives. As organisations
based on active membership, cooperatives encourage
members rather than being selective. Cooperatives
usually have a small number of employees and not
all of them have a manager. It can be seen from
Table 1 that the number of managers is less than the
number of cooperatives.
In some cooperatives, the organisation is built
because of government projects or programs. The
government gives a commission to the cooperatives
that distribute fertiliser and farm credit. In this case,
the cooperative will still exist if the government
program continues. It can be seen in Tables 2 and 3
that the number of cooperatives is closely related to
the level of credit realisation.
The government increased farm credit as part of
the economic recovery program after the economic
crisis in 1997 (Table 2). Table 3 shows that the
number of cooperatives also increased dramatically
between 1997–1998 and 1998–1999. The lack of
government funding decreased the level of credit
available to farmers in 1999–2000, which will chal-
lenge the cooperatives in the future. The trend is for
government support to decrease, leaving the cooper-
ative struggling to survive. The next section will
analyse the economic rationale for cooperation and





From an economic point of view, the cooperative
type of organisation can be applied to coordinate
members that usually have small-scale businesses.
The corporation of many small-scale farms or firms
can be seen as vertical integration, horizontal inte-
gration, or combination. Vertical or horizontal
integration is the vertical or horizontal coordination
of two or more farming systems, firms, or individual
economic players, which are operating together
vertically or horizontally.
Vertical integration is what occurs when two or
more cooperative members operating at different
stages of production, processing, and marketing
combine under a single cooperative management
while vertical coordination is attained through pro-
duction or marketing arrangements (Seitz et al.,
1994). In the production activity, the cooperative
member of the processing firm requests specific
products, to be supplied by the cooperative member
of the production firm. The processing firm usually
provides financial and management services to the
production firm. In the marketing activity, the pro-
duction firm supplies a certain quantity and quality
of output at a stated price to the processing or
marketing agent. 
From an economic point of view, a vertically inte-




 Calculated from Ministry of Cooperative Home Page: www.depkop.go.id, accessed March 12, 2003





















KUD 7931 689 8620 11,007,785 7160 53,802 82,563
Civil servant 15,314 1446 16,760 2,778,637 4660 21,413 159,375
Others 53,340 10,493 63,833 8,742,777 10,637 95,323 301,725




Recapitulation of Farm Credit in Cooperatives (1996–1997 to 1999–2000 (Million Rupiah) 
No. Year Platform  Credit Realisation Cooperatives ( Number) Hectares
1 1996–97 216,150 231,333 2541 1,138,022
2 1997–98 400 374,631 3938 740,760
3 1998–99 8,870,142 8,336,329 9517 5,746,235
4 1999–2000 1,775,600 1,108,226 3586 958,533
5 MT 2000* 0 5904 34 3896
Total 11,261,892 10,050,519 19,582 8,583,550 
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outweigh the costs of integration. In vertically inte-
grated firms, supply of key inputs is assured, market
failure due to externalities can be corrected by inter-
nalising those externalities, the firm can avoid
government restrictions and regulations, better
exploit or create market power, and eliminate the
market power of other firms (Carlton and Perloff,
2000). Seitz et al. (1994) list some of the reasons for
vertical integration as: a more reliable supply,
economies of scale, reduced price uncertainty and
transaction costs, assurance of desired product char-
acteristics, and diversification or reduction of risk.
In horizontal integration, one of the economic rea-
sons for inter-linkages of the small-scale firms of
cooperative members is that the large-scale firm
tends to be more efficient and more competitive than
the small-scale firm because of economies of scale
(ie changes in the cost of production associated with
a change in the amount of the fixed factors of pro-
duction possible in the long run, when fixed costs
become variable). The increasing return to scale is
hoped to be achieved as cooperative members join
together with their production activity.
The two dominant factors which determine the





, 1994). The technical relationships among inputs
and outputs determine the shape of the firm’s pro-
duction function. The relationship causes the long-
run average cost curve to decrease and then increase
as the size of the plant increases. The pecuniary fac-
tors refer to the prices paid and received by the firm.
Many large firms purchase inputs at discounted
prices because they buy in large amounts. They
negotiate contracts or make arrangements with sup-
pliers to receive discounts, lower delivery charges, or
other savings. In addition, large firms may realise
higher unit returns on sales by achieving efficiencies
in marketing, hauling, or sales contracting. They
spread their overhead costs over the larger number of
units of output produced by a larger firm. The
 








Number of Cooperatives in Indonesia that Distribute Farm Credit (by Province 1996–97 to 1999–2000) 
No. Provinces Year (Number) Growth (%)


























4 Riau 7 42 71 0 0 500.00 69.05 0.00
































9 DKI. Jakarta 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 Jawa Barat 258 504 825 1225 0 95.35 63.69 48.48
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minimum average cost of production occurs when a
manager combines the technical and pecuniary fac-
tors into optimum arrangements. The optimal size of
the industries will vary widely between industries. In
this case, cooperatives can act as a large-scale firm,
which integrates members’ production activity to
gain the benefits of technical and pecuniary factors.
It is clear that the vertical and horizontal integra-
tion of small-scale enterprises, which can be associ-
ated with cooperative members, will benefit them.
However, the cooperative may not realise the advan-
tage of the integration. Historically in Indonesia,
most cooperatives were established by the govern-
ment. Some cooperatives did not survive after the
government stopped subsidising them. Cooperatives
have faced many challenges in the changing
economic environment. In the next section, these
challenges are analysed and the future development
of cooperatives examined. 
 
Challenges and future development
 
Cooperatives in most developing countries,
including Indonesia, are faced with several chal-
lenges. These come from the national and global
economies. Changes in the world economy can be
identified as globalisation and liberalisation, while
the change in the national economy can be seen from
the greater openness and deregulation of the Indone-
sian economy, privatisation, bank restructuring and
regional autonomy. These changes have increased
the competition faced by cooperatives. 
On international markets, Indonesia has already
ratified world and regional agreements to eliminate
trade and non-trade barriers. These agreements
include AFTA among the ASEAN countries, APEC
among the Asia Pacific countries and WTO globally.
As a consequence, Indonesia must open its trade and
increase its competitiveness in order to survive on
the world market. As economic institutions, coopera-
tives must face this reality and try to increase their
competitiveness.
In Indonesia itself, economic policy has been
moved from protectionism (during the several years
after independence in 1945), to outward orientation
(late 1960s to the 1980s) and deregulation and open-
ness (during the 1990s) (Oktaviani, 2000). The gov-
ernment has launched numerous trade and
investment reform packages since 1989 in order to
face the more open and competitive world economy.
Since 1989, the restrictions on trade, including tariff
and non-tariff barriers, have gradually been elimi-
nated. Trade regulations have followed investment
regulations to encourage direct foreign investment.
The year 1994 saw a significant change in invest-
ment: essentially, unrestricted direct foreign
investment was permitted for the first time in all
sectors. 
The economic performance of cooperatives is usu-
ally based on a majority of members who are small,
marginal and resource-poor farmers. As individuals,
they have no bargaining power. The members usu-
ally have an objective to produce and market more to
meet their consumption and production require-
ments. With limited capital and education they
cannot invest in high-technology farming. The gov-
ernment usually supports, or even gives, monopoly
power to cooperatives to distribute fertilisers and
farm credit, to have irrigation facilities and to sup-
port market intelligence. In Indonesia, almost 90% of
KUDs are engaged in rice procurement and distribu-
tion of farm input and consumer goods (Prakash,
1997).
Since mid-1997, there has been a dramatic change
in Indonesia’s monetary economy. The exchange
rate depreciated from 2658 Rp per US$ before
August 1997 to a low point of 15 000 Rp per US$ in
January 1998 (Fane, 1999). The crisis worsened with
the lack of confidence in the financial sector and
overall economic activity. The financial crisis has
acted as an inducement for the government to dereg-
ulate in several areas, including trade policy. The
government also eliminated Bulog’s monopoly over
the import and distribution of sugar and rice, and
over the distribution of wheat flours. The govern-





shed the pesticide subsidy. These changes contribute
to the economic performance of cooperatives, espe-
cially KUDs, which have monopoly power through
the Bulog monopoly. 
As small-scale types of economic institutions,
cooperatives are also being protected by the govern-
ment through Presidential Decree No. 99 of July
1998. This decree is about sectors/types of businesses
reserved for small-scale enterprises and sectors/types
of businesses opened to medium-scale or large-scale
enterprises under a partnership requirement (Foster
Father Scheme (Kemitraan)). The policy is based on
the argument that small-scale enterprises (SEs) are
community-based activities which have a strategic
position, potential and role to translate into reality a
more balanced national economic structure and equal
distribution of development on the basis of economic
democracy. On the one side, SEs need to be protected
from unfair competition, but on the other, it is




This was the case in March 2003 although the situation has changed since then. 
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their contribution to optimise national development.
A presidential decree is needed to determine sectors/
types of business reserved for small-scale enterprises
and sectors/types of business open to medium-scale
or large-scale enterprises under a partnership require-
ment. However, decree no 99/1988 is the type of
regulation which creates a barrier to entry and there-
fore against competitiveness. Hence, the government
evaluates this regulation and tends to deregulate it
(Oktaviani, 2001).
The changes to the Indonesian and world econo-
mies influence the role of state, the cooperatives and
the apex organization (the cooperative’s board of
representatives). For some cooperatives, these
changes to the economic environment mean they
cannot develop and become autonomous. A suitable
environment is needed for creating a cooperative and
enabling it to grow (Wardhono et al., 2003). 
Prakash (1998) argues that the challenges for
cooperatives in facing globalisation and an open
market economy in developing countries are: 
1. Improving the management skills of managers
and those who provide advice to cooperatives
2. Establishing a marketing intelligence system to
enable farmers to follow market trends
3. Reducing the uncertainty of farm input supply
4. Establishing business federations through cooper-
ative clusters
5. Being aware of quality controls and standardisa-
tion
6. Participating in natural resource conserving
efforts
7. Providing information to farmers on the implica-
tions of restructuring, globalisation and the WTO
agreement.
Rather than employing managers, cooperatives
need to improve the management skills of their
members to be able to work efficiently. With these
skills, the members can manage the cooperative
themselves, eg managing production in order to
maximise output quality. Establishing a marketing
intelligence system will give members an opportu-
nity to understand market trends and so plan their
strategies for production and marketing. To be pre-
pared for economic changes, cooperatives should be
able to reduce the uncertainty of farm input supply,
such as the quality of seeds, fertiliser, credits and
extension services. Quality controls and standardisa-
tion are also important to compete on the open
market. The cooperative cluster in vertical or hori-
zontal integration is beneficial in order to undertake
primary agri-processing, marketing of local products
and to cover financial requirements. The economic
rationale for integration is that it will increase the
cooperative’s efficiency. Another challenge is to pro-
vide information to cooperative members on the
issues of restructuring, globalisation and trade agree-
ments. Other information that is also important is
world supply and demand, and market price for
exporting and importing goods. The information on
climate change is also important for the production
type of cooperative. 
Based on those challenges, the future develop-
ment of cooperatives is needed, not only for the
managers but also for the members. A conducive
business environment is also needed for the adjust-
ment of the cooperative. Wardhono et al. (2003)
argue that several future developments for coopera-
tives include adjustment to the new trade regime,
building modern management and professionalism,
and education and training. A conducive business
environment includes better access to markets, credit
and information. Infrastructure is also important. The
synergy of both external and internal factor develop-
ment will help cooperatives to face the competitive
world market.
 
The coconut industry in North Sulawesi, 
a case study 
 
Coconut is an export commodity for Indonesia.
Together with products such as rice, pepper, nutmeg
and cloves, coconut was a commercial crop, even
before the arrival of western powers to Indonesia.
Native coconut growers in Donggala and Minahasa
produced more than 95% of total coconut exports
from Indonesia during the colonial period (Purwanto,
2002). Coconut has also become a popular cash crop
in Minahasa (North Sulawesi). The main native
coconut producing areas in Minahasa were the dis-
tricts of Manado, Tonsea, Tondano, Amurang,
Kawangkoan, and Tarahan. About 70% of the popu-
lation in these districts was involved in copra
production in the 1930s (Purwanto, 2002).
Data from 1999 also shows coconut as one of
Indonesia’s main agricultural products. Coconut was
the main source of income for almost 70% of North
Sulawesi’s population (Usman et al., 2001). In terms
of weight, coconut was the main output in North
Sulawesi (Table 4). Most coconut production (more
than 50%) is in Minahasa district. In order to
increase value-adding in the agricultural sector,
including coconut, the local government tries to
attract the investor to invest in agricultural
processing manufacture. The new regulations for
regional autonomy in Indonesia enable the district to
plan its regional development.
Income from coconut and copra is no longer being
received since the coconut price has fallen below the
cost of production (Usman et al., 2001). The
farmers’ bargaining position has weakened with the
cooking oil industry company PT Bimoli purchasing 
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a large proportion of copra. Bimoli can purchase
copra independently and has a contract purchasing
agreement with a specific price for a two-week
period. Failure to fulfill the contract will reduce the
contract price. The basic calculation of the copra
price from PT Bimoli and the discussion to deter-
mine a reasonable price are discussed in Usman et al.
(2001). 
This type of contract is a type of vertical integra-
tion which has weakened the position of many small-
scale coconut farmers. In this case, it is an example
of the cooperative type of vertical and horizontal
integration. APEKSU (Association of North
Sulawesi Coconut Producers) has criticised the pur-
chasing price of PT Bimoli, which has a quick
adjustment for declining fob price and very slow
adjustment for a rising fob price. However, they
have not been successful. Horizontal integration
among farmers and vertical integration among
farmers and other processing industries are needed,
not only to increase the bargaining power of small-
scale farmers in front of PT Bimoli, but also to create
options for coconut processing and production.
Instead of producing copra from coconut meat, many
parts of coconut can be processed as commercial
products. The trunks of coconut trees can be made




 (sweet jelly from coconut juice) and
coconut shell can be processed into charcoal and
many kinds of souvenirs.
Another alternative to develop the coconut
industry in North Sulawesi is to have a partnership
commitment from the government and the coopera-
tive and banking sectors. A pilot project was run in
Gorontalo in 2000 through the PARUL (Poverty
Alleviation through Rural/Urban Linkage) Project, a
Government of Indonesia, BAPPENAS, United
Nations Development Program (Evans, 2000). The
project is a burning pit project in Gorontolo (it was
formerly in North Sulawesi) which provides a
revolving fund to build a burning pit for charcoal
production, which is proposed by Gorontalo’s
Kabupaten Implementation Team (KIT Gorontalo).
Two cooperatives act as loan receiver, PARUL and
KIT Gorontalo work as facilitators and coordinators
of fund management, while Bank Sulut Limboto
assists and organises the money flow. The buyer
works as a ‘foster-father’ in the system that promises
to buy all the charcoal produced by the cooperative





The system works well because there is a certain
buyer for the charcoal and a bank controls the flow
of money. There is a MoU (Memorandum of Under-
standing) among cooperatives, the bank, and the
buyer. Therefore, these parties have an agreement
with a win-win solution if there are some changes in
the future. This type of cooperation can be also be
applied to the coconut industry. The bank can give a
loan to the APEKSU and farmer groups at the lower
level so they can produce coconut products other
than copra and collaborate with the definite buyer. In
this case, the North Sulawesi government agency can
act as a facilitator. The external environment, such as
market, credit and information access, is already
favourable in this system. Other external environ-
mental factors, such as infrastructure, can be devel-
oped by the government. The internal development
of cooperatives is a challenge for the future develop-
ment of the coconut industry in South Sulawesi. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
It is argued that vertical and horizontal integration of
small-scale enterprises, which can be associated with
cooperative members, will be beneficial to those
members. However, most cooperative establishments
in Indonesia will not survive once the government
subsidy ends. 
The challenges facing cooperatives are improve-
ment of managerial skills, establishment of systems
of market intelligence and business federations and
the provision of information on quality control and
anything else related to their activities. The future
development of cooperatives is needed, not only for
managers, but also for the members. The business
environment also needs to improve in line with the
adjustment of cooperatives.
The case study of the coconut industry in North
Sulawesi provides an example of monopsony in the
industry. The cooperative type of horizontal integra-
tion among farmers and vertical integration among








Primary agricultural commodities in North Sulawesi, 1999 (thousand ton)
Districs/Province Rice Coconut  Clove  Ocean  Fish
Minahasa District 42.3 153 3.9 6.4
Bolmong District 188.2 48 0.6 7.5
North Sulawesi 231.9 261 5.2 153 
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not only to increase the bargaining power of small-
scale farmers, but also to create more options for
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 agricultural development paradigm has shifted
from production oriented to a broader agribusiness
spectrum. Within this spectrum, one of the Ministry
of Agriculture’s main development programs has
been focused on the development of the agribusiness
of reliable agricultural commodities in response to
changes in the following strategic international envi-
ronments: (1) increasing pressure to implement the
GATT/WTO agreements; (2) the transportation, tele-
communication and tourism revolutions; (3) the
global movement of rehabilitation and conservation
of natural resources and protection of human rights;
and (4) a global trend towards improvement of
product quality. Changes in the following domestic
environments also have impacts: (1) macro-
economic conditions; (2) social, cultural and political
conditions; and (3) the demographic structure and
problems of poverty. The agribusiness development
programs may be viewed as being successful until a
year before the adverse economic crisis in 1998.
Since then, there has been a slow down in agri-
business activities.
Conglomeration was seen as contributing to the
failure to bring about a significant growth in the
Indonesian economy in general and the agribusiness
sector in particular and in improving the welfare dis-
tribution of society. Only a very small group of
people become very rich, while the majority remains
very poor. Conglomeration has been shown to
exclude the development of most Indonesians.
Cooperatives built many decades ago, therefore,
remain relevant for improving the economy of the
people since their main objective is to improve the
welfare of their members. In the agribusiness sector,
farmers constitute the only members of cooperatives.
In this situation, the most challenging issue to be
raised is how cooperatives can contribute to the
development of the agribusiness sector through
introduction or development of: (1) appropriate con-
tract farming systems; (2) an appropriate financing
system; and (3) appropriate marketing systems. To
enable a designation of appropriate contract farming,





Most of the farmers in Indonesia are smallholders
who have a low bargaining position. Small-scale
farmers are often constrained in what they can pro-
duce by limited marketing opportunities, which often
makes diversification into new crops very difficult.
Lack of cash capital limits their ability to buy
external inputs, so they are not able to adopt
improved technology. Small-scale farms are mostly
inefficient users of agricultural inputs, so that per
unit cost of production is relatively high. On the
other hand, low bargaining power in marketing of
their product results in a low farm-gate price. Con-
tract farming offers a potential solution to this situa-
tion by providing market guarantees to farmers and
assuring supply to purchasers.
In an era of market liberalisation, globalisation
and expanding agribusiness, there is a danger that
small-scale farmers will find difficulty in fully par-
ticipating in the market economy. In many countries
such farmers could become marginalised as larger
farms become increasingly necessary for a profitable
operation. A consequence of this will be a continua-
tion of the drift of populations to urban areas that is
being witnessed almost everywhere. Attempts by
governments and development agencies to arrest this
drift have tended to emphasise the identification of
income generating activities for rural people. Unfor-
tunately, there is relatively little evidence that such




This paper was written as a research proposal to develop a cooperative model of agribusiness systems in Indonesia. 
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In order to improve the efficiency and bargaining
position of farmers, agribusiness should be done
commercially on a relatively large scale. Therefore,
farmers have to work cooperatively in a group or
association. If farmers buy inputs collectively, the
per unit price of inputs will be cheaper. Similarly, if
farming is carried out collectively over a larger area,
the use of inputs will be more efficient, because the
per unit cost of production will be lower. In the post-
harvest sub-system, collective handling and mar-
keting of agricultural product is thought to be more
efficient. By doing agribusiness cooperatively,
farmers will be able to increase efficiency and thus
farm income.
One form of cooperative farming is contract
farming. A contract is defined as a ‘legally enforce-
able agreement expressed or implied’. This agree-
ment is shown by actions, verbally or in writing. In a
legal context, an agreement is a ‘meeting of the
minds’, meaning that the contract exists in the mind
of each party. Once a contract has been made, it is as
binding upon the parties as any other law, and one
party cannot withdraw without the agreement of the
other parties.
Contract farming can be defined as an agreement
between farmers and processing and/or marketing
firms for the production and supply of agricultural
products under forward agreements, frequently at
pre-determined prices. The arrangement also invari-
ably involves the purchaser providing a degree of
production support, for example, the supply of inputs
and the provision of technical advice. The basis of
such arrangements is a commitment on the part of
the farmer to provide a specific commodity in quan-
tities and at quality standards determined by the pur-
chaser and a commitment on the part of the company
to support the farmer’s production and to purchase
the commodity. This form of contract in Indonesia is
very common for dairy cattle, hybrid maize, sugar
cane, etc.
Contract farming has been in existence for many
years as a means of organising the commercial agri-
cultural production of both large-scale and small-
scale farmers. Well-organised contract farming does,
however, provide vertical linkages, and would
appear to offer an important way in which smaller
producers can farm in a commercial manner. Simi-
larly, it also provides investors with the opportunity
to guarantee a reliable source of supply, from the
perspectives of both quantity and quality. The
Nucleus Small Holders (NES) for oil-palm and
rubber plantations in Indonesia is just one example.
The intensity of a contractual arrangement varies
depending on the depth and complexity of the provi-
sions in each of the following three areas:
 
(i) Market  provision. 
 
The grower and buyer agree
to the future sale and purchase of a crop or live-
stock product.
 
(ii) Resource provision. 
 
In conjunction with mar-
keting arrangements the buyer agrees to supply
selected inputs, including land preparation and
technical advice.
 
(iii) Management specifications. 
 
The growers agree
to follow recommended production methods,
usage of inputs and harvesting specifications.
With effective management, contract farming can
be a means to develop markets and to bring about the
transfer of technical skills in a way that is profitable
for both the sponsors and farmers. The approach is
widely used, not only for tree and other cash crops,
but increasingly, for vegetables, poultry, dairy prod-
ucts and even prawns and fish. Indeed, contract
farming is characterised by its enormous diversity,
not only with regard to the products contracted but
also in relation to the many different ways in which
it can be carried out.
The contract farming system should be seen as a
‘partnership’ between agribusiness and farmers. To
be successful it requires a long-term commitment
from both parties. Exploitative arrangements by one
party are likely to have only a limited duration and
can jeopardise agribusiness investments. Similarly,
farmers need to consider that honoring contractual
arrangements is likely to be in their long-term ben-
efit. Contract farming is becoming an increasingly
important aspect of agribusiness, whether the prod-
ucts are purchased by multinationals, smaller compa-
nies, government agencies, farmer cooperatives or
individual entrepreneurs. The approach would
appear to have considerable potential in countries
where small-scale agriculture continues to be wide-
spread. In many cases, small-scale farmers can no
longer be competitive without access to the services
provided by contract farming companies. It must be
stressed, however, that the decision to use the con-
tract farming model must be a commercial one. It is
not a development model to be tried by aid
donors, governments or non-government organisa-
tions (NGOs) because other rural development
approaches have failed. Projects that are primarily
motivated by political and social concerns rather
than economic and technical realities will inevitably
fail.
Contract farming, however, is not free of weak-
nesses or problems. For farmers, the potential prob-
lems associated with contract farming include
increased risk, unsuitable technology and crop
incompatibility.
Farmers entering new contract farming ventures
should be prepared to balance the prospect of higher
returns with the possibility of greater risk. Such risk 
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is more likely when the agribusiness venture is intro-
ducing a new crop to the area. There may be produc-
tion risks, particularly where prior field tests are
inadequate, resulting in lower-than-expected yields
for the farmers. Market risks may occur when the
company’s forecasts of market size or price levels
are inaccurate. Considerable problems can occur if
farmers perceive that the company is unwilling to
share any of the risk, even if it is partly responsible
for the losses.
The second problem is the practicality of intro-
duced innovations. The introduction of sophisticated
machines (e.g. for transplanting and weeding) may
result in a loss of local employment and overcapital-
isation of the contracted farmer. Furthermore, in
field activities, such as transplanting and weeding,
mechanical methods often produce less effective
results than do traditional cultivation methods.
The introduction of a new crop to be grown under
conditions rigorously controlled by the sponsor can
cause disruption to the existing farming system. For
example, the managers may identify land tradition-
ally reserved for food crops as the most suitable for
the contracted crop. Harvesting of the contracted
crop may fall at the same time as the harvesting of
food crops, thus causing competition for scarce labor
resources.
In Indonesia there are a variety of contract
farming models, namely the nucleus estate model
(sugar cane, oil-palm, rubber plantations, etc), the
multipartite model (dairy cattle, hybrid maize,
tobacco, etc), and an informal model (eg food crops,
horticulture). These forms of contract farming are
increasingly important to small farmers constrained
by a lack of access to cash capital and the market
economy. The characteristics of contract farming
need to be identified, these include the present condi-





For more than a decade, the evolution of micro-
finance institutions has created job opportunities and
income for the poor in rural areas of developing
countries. Most of the rural people earn their income
from the agricultural sector. In order to increase the
household income of the poor in rural areas, some
development programs have been launched,
including microfinance in terms of credit. In some
cases, these programs have been directed close to
where they are being sustainably implemented. Rural
Unit BRI (BRI Unit Desa) in Indonesia, ACCION’s
BancoSol in Bolivia, and Grameen Bank in Bangla-
desh are some examples among other microfinance
institutions that are known to be successful in pro-
viding services to their members. The fees from their
services are sufficient to cover all operational costs.
In Indonesia, some microfinance schemes for
small farmers have been introduced, especially for
farmers of food crops, from the BIMAS program in
1968–1969 to the agricultural credit scheme for food
security in 2001–2002. Cooperatives were intensely
involved in the implementation of those credits.
The low performance, especially in terms of credit
repayment, changes in agricultural credit policies,
the phasing out of subsidies, and the complicated
procedure of credit, have meant that such credits
have not been widely used and they are becoming
less accessible to small farmers. Consequently, the
capacity of farmers to adopt improved technology is
low because they are not able to buy external inputs
needed to apply the technology, resulting in low
agricultural productivity and thus household income.
To avoid these problems most farmers try to
borrow cash from informal money lenders who have
a high interest but which involves a simple proce-
dure. The high interest rate contributes to a high cost
of production.
Another aspect which is usually omitted from the
design of microfinance schemes is a savings com-
ponent. This is just as important as the credit aspect.
Empirical evidence has shown that farmers have the
ability and are willing to save. Assuming that saving
and credit services can be implemented simultane-
ously as an integrated service, then small farmers’
capital accumulation can be developed as a source of
microfinance and their dependence on external
sources of capital can be minimised. Thus, the devel-
opment of a saving service in line with a credit
service is increasingly important.
An intensive assessment of the small farmers’
accessibility to credit is needed. It is also important
to assess the ability and willingness of small farmers
to save. The expected output from this assessment is
a policy recommendation on the appropriate credit




The existing systems for marketing agricultural prod-
ucts remain inefficient in terms of high marketing
margins. This is primarily due to: (1) individual mar-
keting by farmers with very small amounts of pro-
duce; (2) farmers are not in a strong bargaining
position; (3) exploitation due to high dependence of
farmers on traders in capital; (4) inappropriate post-
harvest handling (grading, transportation, storage,
etc) and processing; and (5) long marketing chains.
The following benefits can be expected from
involving cooperatives in product marketing: (1) a
gain in economies of size; (2) bargaining power may 
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be improved; (3) an end to exploitation of farmers by
traders; (4) an improvement in product quality for
higher prices; and (5) a significant improvement in
overall marketing efficiency. The end result would be
an improvement in the welfare of the farmers, who




The overall objective of the research is to develop a
cooperative model of agribusiness systems in Indo-
nesia. Specifically, the objectives of the research are:
• to identify the characteristics of cooperatives in
agribusiness
• to analyse current roles of cooperatives in contract
farming
• to analyse current roles of cooperatives in
financing agricultural production
• to analyse current roles of cooperatives in mar-
keting of agricultural commodities
• to design an appropriate agribusiness system
which covers contract farming, micro-financing




The ultimate output of the research will be a cooper-
ative model of agribusiness systems in Indonesia,
specifically:
• data and information on the characteristics of
cooperatives in agribusiness
• data and information on the current roles of coop-
eratives in contract farming
• data and information on the current roles of coop-
eratives in financing of agricultural producers
• data and information on current roles of coopera-
tives in marketing
• design of an appropriate agribusiness cooperative







1. Nucleus estate and smallholder system in the
eastern part of Indonesia





1. The credit delivery system for small agricultural
producers (nucleus estate and smallholder system
and multipartite partnership system)
2. Development of saving services for small agricul-
tural producers (nucleus estate and smallholder




1. Analysis of marketing efficiency (nucleus estate
and smallholder system and the multipartite part-
nership system)
2. Problems and prospects for a collective marketing
system (nucleus estate and smallholder system






: Research in designing an agribusiness coop-
erative model (contract farming, microfinance, and
marketing) in nucleus estate and smallholder system








Testing of the cooperative model of an




: Evaluation and improvement of the coopera-




: Mass implementation of the cooperative
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